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EU, Ukrainian Officials Arrive for Visits to Chisinau

LD2302113395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1115 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau February 23 TASS—Chairman of the Council of Europe Miguel Martinez and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko today arrived for official visits to the Republic of Moldova.

Miguel Martinez will focus on preparations for a session of the European Council's parliamentary assembly which will consider the adoption of Moldova as its member.

In Chisinau Martinez is expected to meet President Mircea Snegur, Parliament Chairman Petr Luchinskiy, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, and representatives of parliamentary factions.

On Thursday afternoon, Martinez is scheduled to meet for talks with chairman of the Dniester region parliament Grigoriy Maracuca.

He will then address the Moldova parliament and hold a press conference.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko will discuss "bilateral cooperation and relations between Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of European security and within the Commonwealth of Independent States".

The Ukrainian minister told ITAR-TASS that the agenda of his two-day visit to Moldova provides for a discussion of Ukraine's role in the peaceful settlement of the Dniester problem and the withdrawal of Russia's 14th Army from Moldova via Ukrainian territory.

"It is a complex problem associated with security and environmental impact," Udovenko said. He stressed that Ukraine would not put up any barriers to the move and promised a more detailed statement after the talks in Chisinau.

Udovenko will meet President Mircea Snegur, Parliament Chairman Petr Luchinskiy, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli. He is also expected to meet representatives of the Dniester region, sources in the Moldova Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS.

According to the same sources, Moldova and Ukraine are expected to sign protocols on consultations and information exchange between the two countries' foreign ministries. They are also likely to sign an intergovernmental agreement on services to respective diplomatic missions, the sources said.

Russia, Ukraine Compete Over Australian Space Complexes

LD2302092295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0853GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Gritsenko, Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Without resolving the problem of its own space-launch complexes, Russia has entered competition struggle with Ukraine over the ability to use space-launch facilities of Australia and Oceania. A group of Glavkosmos specialists, who returned recently from Australia, announced that a space-launch complex may be built soon in the Arnem land peninsula, near the city of Darwin, with direct participation of Russia.

However, the projects, suggested by Russia and Ukraine, are far from perfect and have a number of defects. The main problem for the Russian programme is an enormous distance between Russia and the complex, from which it is planned to launch heavy carrier rockets of the proton type. Fuel and equipment can be transported to the starting position only by sea, which is far from safe from the ecological point of view, because highly toxic substances are used in fuel for proton rockets.

The situation is the same with the project, suggested by the Khrunichev state space and research centre. Together with the Australian firm CTC it would like to locate a space-launch complex for proton rockets in Papua-New Guinea. At the same time, it is the distance to the former rocket-launching base in Svobodny, the Amur region, which Russia began to transform into a space-launch complex, that is evoking the strongest criticism of specialists, although in this case there would be no need to use sea transport.

Ukraine, in its turn, is offering its services for building a space-launch complex at Cape York, Australia. The project is an attempt to reanimate a programme of Russian Glavkosmos, which was rejected in 1991. Under the project, it is suggested to use Cape York for the launching of Zenit carrier rockets. Several years ago the suggestion was rejected, because Zenit rockets were not reliable enough. However, they are preferable from the ecological point of view. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is going to visit Australia in March, and the problem of the building of an Australian-Ukrainian space-launch complex is sure to be raised during the visit.

Report on CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Council Session

MM2302135295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 First Edition p 6

[Report by Sergey Alekhin: "Members of Parliament, Unite! Single Information Area Essential to CIS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] St. Petersburg—More than 20 questions concerning economic, social, and cultural cooperation between Commonwealth states were placed on the agenda of the CIS countries' Interparliamentary Assembly [IPA] Council session which took place in St. Petersburg.

Questions of strengthening the IPA and of its cooperation with the parliaments of CIS member states occupied a central position in the work of the nine countries' delegations.

But from a practical point of view, there is the question of changing the status of the IPA, which does not at present have any direct influence on the political and social processes in Russia and the CIS countries, although quite a few very necessary and appropriate documents have been produced within the framework of this interstate formation. But they are not effective due to the disparity between national legislation. Speaking at the meeting of CIS heads of state and government in Almaty on the eve of the IPA Council session, Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Russian parliament's upper chamber, supported an initiative by Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev to create a so-called Eurasian Parliament.

At the final press conference, Vladimir Shumeyko, who has again been elected to the same post, emphasized the extreme importance of the draft convention's first paragraph confirming the assembly as an organ of interstate cooperation. In his opinion this should raise the assembly to the level of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government. Shumeyko considers that the role of the CIS member countries' IPA will without doubt be strengthened in the future and it is possible that it will be renamed and transformed into a parliamentary assembly with the right to adopt laws which are binding throughout the Commonwealth's territory.

However, it is pointless at present to think about the IPA's development and the enhancement of its role when we do not possess a common information area. People in the states, which not so long ago comprised a single country, now know more about the situation in Germany or life in the United States than about the joys and misfortunes of their nearest neighbors across customs checkpoints. Therefore, a decree was adopted at the current assembly on the formation of a special organ under the IPA Council: the Council of Commonwealth Countries' News Agency Leaders

Yuriy Sizov, executive director of the Council of CIS State News Agency Leaders, emphasized in conversation with your ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent that the CIS states' aspiration to more efficiently provide broader and more diverse information about the political, economic, and social processes taking place in them, should be at the heart of a coordinated information policy..

Questions of strengthening peace and security on the territory of Commonwealth states were examined at the IPA Council's February session; it was proposed that IPA peacekeeping groups continue the quest for ways to achieve a political settlement in the Georgian- Abkhaz and Dniester Region conflicts. Particular attention was paid at the current meeting to the preparation of recommendatory legislative acts, aimed at stepping up the struggle against organized crime in Commonwealth countries. A program committee and working groups have been formed to produce a model Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure.

Other questions of interparliamentary cooperation were also examined at the current assembly.

Idea of Unified CIS Air Defense System Promoted

MK2102122095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Plotnikov under the "Army" rubric: "Creation of a Joint CIS Air Defense System Is a Costly Project But it Has no Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The single air defense system virtually vanished by summer 1992.

Many representatives of the national republics taking part three years ago in deciding on the future of the ex-USSR's armed forces did not ponder the consequences at that time. The prospect of taking under their jurisdiction the forces that at the moment happened to be on the republic's territory and the creation on their basis their own armies proved much more tempting than the convincing arguments of leaders of the Russian Defense Ministry. But it is one thing to put under your authority, for example, general-purpose groupings of forces or to form a civil defense system, and quite another to create such highly complex systems as air defense forces. Their effective functioning is only possible within the framework of unified forces. It is no accident that a joint American-Canadian air defense system (NORAD) has been functioning for more than one decade. And in Europe, there is a unified air defense system of NATO countries. [passage omitted]

Analysis of the situation taking shape and the possible tendencies of its development motivated the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to begin last year to study the question of creating a unified air defense system of CIS member countries. Russia's initiative, right from the start, was backed by Kazakhstan. Signed during the latest CIS heads of state summit was an agreement "On the Creation of a unified Air Defense System of CIS Member States." Those opting out were Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan. A Coordination Committee under the CIS Defense Ministers Council on Air Defense Questions was created. Colonel General of

Aviation Viktor Prudnikov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Air Defense Forces, was appointed its chairman. Commanders of air defense forces (air defense forces and air forces) of CIS states became members of the Coordination Committee. If need be, some other officials may be also included in it on the decision of the Council of Ministers.

The creation of a unified Commonwealth air defense system is a costly project, but there is no alternative. What are the benefits of creating such a system? First, a comprehensive employment, in line with one concept, of all the air defense troops, forces, and equipment of CIS member states, the preservation and rational employment of the unique reconnaissance and tactical control systems upon which depends, if a national security threat develops, the provision of timely information for the top state military-political leadership of the CIS countries and an adequate reaction by the armed forces. Second, the conduct of a coordinated military- technical policy, standardization of weaponry and equipment, hence considerable financial savings which is very important when defense outlays are being cut. Third, a possibility for a unified training of specialists of troop command and control organs, a rational use of training facilities which would considerably raise personnel training standards and save material and human resources. And perhaps most important, this achieves unity and centralization of control of all air defense forces in the interests of each state and the Commonwealth as a whole.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 23 Feb

LD2302071995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0517 GMT 23 Feb 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—The official visit by President Boris Yeltsin to Belarus, which ended last Wednesday, is among the main topics of today's Russian press. The army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA singles out the Russian-Belarusan treaty on joint efforts to protect the Belarusan border among documents signed during the visit.

The newspaper stresses that this treaty is a logical continuation of further integration between countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In turn, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper notes that "Boris Yeltsin gives priority to Belarus".

The IZVESTIYA daily believes that "distance between Moscow and Minsk has sharply decreased" as a result of the Russian president's visit. In the newspaper's opinion, "the Russian leadership has achieved important successes, satisfying its interests in the economic, military and other spheres".

"This was necessary to formalise in documents, since while the present Belarusan elite is a pliant wax in Moscow's hands, serious political changes in that country are possible in the foreseeable future," notes IZVESTIYA. "In that case, Russia can face undesirable difficulties."

The press devotes much space to materials dealing with Motherland Defenders Day marked by Russia today. Newspapers print congratulatory messages sent to the armed forces and war veterans by President Boris Yeltsin, Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and other Russian leaders.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries a festive order of the day by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. "It is very symbolic that nobody succeeded in 'cancelling' February 23 (eds: February 23 was celebrated by Bolsheviks in honour of their victory over the German army in 1918)," the newspaper writes.

"Indeed, we are living through troubled times. The nation-wide idea is very vague. The crisis of statehood is evident. Even those who stand at "the helm" of the state have no clear understanding of Russia's interests. Hence, a devil-may-care attitude of the state to the army which, despite the above, still continues to remain its bulwark."

"Its high time for all of us to understand that there will be no free market, wellbeing and prosperity as well as sound democratic foundations withount a strong state, one of the cornerstones of which a powerful army was, is and will be for a long time," the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper stresses.

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper carries an interview with Colonel-General Yevgeniy Podkolzin, commander of airborne troops, in connection with Matherland Defenders Day.

He says that airborne combat troops are manned only by 50 per cent. The general reiterated criticism of drawbacks in organising the Chechen operation which he expressed earlier at a news conference.

Turning to the reform of the army, Podkolzin noted that it will be impossible to carry it out without huge outlays. Admitting that "the Chechen war graphically showed problems of the armed forces and acute need for their earliest reorganisation", the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper writes at the same time that "the military reform should not become a victim of bureaucratic battles".

The PRAVDA newspaper runs an interview with former Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov in connection with the army holyday. Refuting bloated figures about losses of Soviet troops in the Second World War, which were circulated in the recent past, he stresses that the general staff calculated during his term of office as defence minister that the losses of Soviet armed forces in the war had amounted to 10.5 million men and officers.

The same daily carries the text of a bugged telephone conversation between Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and a certain Iskander Gamidov from Baku where they spoke about deliveries to Dudayev troops of mines, Stinger missiles and rockets to Grad missile launchers.

In an interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Deputy Prosecutor-General Oleg Gaydanov says that several criminal cases were instituted in connection with the Chechen events.

"Democratic authorities need a constructive dialogue with political forces," claims Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian president's office, in an interview with ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI.

The interview expresses concern that "virtually all democratic and centrist parties are still very weak" in Russia.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes in connection with the coming resumption of talks between Russia and the International Monetary Fund on another credit that "nobody can say whether Moscow has any clear-cut policy on Russian debts".

At the same time, Professor Andres Oslund of the Carnegie Foundation claims in IZVESTIYA that Russia "can do without IMF billions".

Kozyrev on START-3 Treaty, Clinton, NATO

LD2302130695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1107 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Murmansk, Feb 22 (INTERFAX)—"When Moscow and Washington will sign a START-3 treaty depends on when they ratify the START-2 accord, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told an Interfax interviewer upon his arrival in Murmansk (the Kola Peninsula, Russia) Wednesday.

President Yeltsin declared during his visit to the Belarusian capital Minsk that he had preliminary agreed with Clinton to start work on such a treaty. He also announced that the U.S. President would visit Moscow this year.

Meanwhile, Kozyrev noted that he did not link "rumors about Clinton's refusal to take part in the upcoming celebrations in Russia of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazism with political and military events on the territory of the Russian Federation."

He also told the interviewer that Moscow and Washington were working together on terms for interaction between Russia and NATO on plans to expand the North Atlantic Alliance to the east. Formal negotiations to find a compromise on the matter, according to Kozyrev, can start already in autumn.

Foreign Ministry Official Comments on START-3 Treaty

LD2202151095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Russian-American START-3 Treaty, the start of whose preparation Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared in Minsk on Tuesday, is not a treaty "in the pure form" but a system of measures to strengthen confidence, strategic stability, transparency, nuclear security, etc., a top-ranking official from the Russian Foreign Ministry declared in an interview with Interfax Wednesday.

In his words, "talks on this subject have been going on for a year already at the expert level."

"A decision on this subject was adopted immediately after the signing of the START-2 Treaty," the diplomat said. "The parties reached agreement that as the START-1 Treaty is fulfilled and the START-2 Treaty is ratified (so far it has not been ratified by either the Russian Federation or the United States—Interfax) the parties will start preparing for the second stage, to strengthen Russian-American partnership under the code name "the START-3 Treaty."

The source noted that the issue of the development of START-3 was "in general" discussed in September, 1994 in the course of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's official visit to the United States.

"This issue will become one of the key ones at the next Russian- American summit which, we hope, will be held in May in Moscow," the diplomat said.

He reminded that "the Russian leadership has invited U.S. president Bill Clinton to Moscow to take part in the ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of Victory Day." " We believe that Russian-American working talks could take place after the ceremonies," the diplomat said.

He preferred not to comment on statements by various officials in Clinton's circles about the U.S president turning down the trip to Moscow in May due to the Chechen events.

"Moscow orients itself only on Clinton regarding this issue and Clinton declared that he had not made his final decision yet. Thus, the ball is in the American court and we await an answer from Washington," the diplomat concluded.

Commentary on US Reaction to New Mobile ICBM

MM2202104195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Dolinin: "Topol M 'Flies' to U.S. Mass Media"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Strategic Rocket Forces—The first flight tests of the modernized Russian Topol M2 missile have prompted lively comment overseas.

The U.S. media are particularly emphasizing that launch preparations for the Topol M2 take less time than for the U.S. MX ICBM, that U.S. detection systems find it hard to detect a launch of the missile, that its guidance system has heightened resistance to jamming, and that the missile is able to maneuver in flight. Its high accuracy and heightened protection against the kill mechanism of nuclear bursts are stressed. Emphasis is also placed on the fact that the missile is equipped with a megaton-class warhead, and its storage, transportation, and servicing in its transporter-launcher provide a guarantee that the missile system will be ready for combat use without factory overhaul for 15 years.

Kozyrev Said To Have U.S. OK for Belgrade Talks

MM2202171495 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 7

[Commentary by Yelena Kalyadina: "Clinton Approved It, Kozyrev Announced It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnian armistice, which was well and truly drenched in diplomatic sweat, did not hold a minute in the trenches. In the unfinished war the agreed lull is only kindling passions. For example the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim autonomists have rushed into an early attack. Though it is likely they might have sat quiet a little longer had another peace offensive not been launched first by the diplomats. Among them senior Russian diplomats.

So Andrey Kozyrev spent last weekend in Belgrade quietly, in a semi-clandestine manner. Although the theme of his weekend negotiations with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic deserved greater exposure. You bet—the Serbs were once again shown a new bright future—in the shape of a repeal of the harsh economic sanctions. But only, of course, under the no less harsh present political terms, namely the recognition of Bosnia and Croatia.

Translated from diplomatic language into the vernacular, this means for Serbia the betrayal of the interests of its compatriots living on the territory of the aforementioned republics of former Yugoslavia. The question is: For what purpose?

To achieve the desired peace on the territory of Bosnia and the whole of the former Yugoslavia—the authors of the new proposal announced by the Russian minister consider. They say that the "senior" Serbs will stop supporting the "junior" ones in Bosnia and Croatia, and the latter, deprived of "parental" support, will lay down their arms. Then there will be the long-awaited "happy ending" to the Balkan battle.

However, it is only in diplomatic documents that everything is that uncomplicated. But I began these notes with a description of the military pitfalls. These pitfalls will be transformed into new trenches—it is in such a graphic manner that the commentary on the Belgrade negotiations I received from the Bosnian Serbian capital Pale can be described. "We will strengthen our statehood and continue to fight for it," they say there, showing their resolution.

Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia, gave roughly the same assessment of the recent pushes for peace made by international and Russian diplomacy in the Balkans. It could not have been any different after Croatia turned down further peacekeeping measures by the United Nations on its territory.

But what about President Milosevic? Andrey Kozyrev has jealously guarded the secret of what he said to the Russian minister in private, encapsulating it in a well-known gnomic diplomatic phrase: "The president wants peace."

Of course he wants it. He also wants the sanctions to be lifted. And he does not want to offend his compatriots. I think this is why he spoke his mind in untranslatable diplomatic language, maybe as yet only in private but nevertheless to a Russian minister. Saying in the end, as many people think, an indeterminate "no." But this is a pity. After all, he could probably have made a word-for-word translation from Serbian into Russian. Had it not been for one circumstance. The Russian minister, who as we know is absolutely fluent in English, actually spoke English in Belgrade (in the figurative sense, of course). That is, he spoke American. You see, on the eve of Andrey Kozyrev's weekend in Yugoslavia, U.S. President Bill Clinton approved the plan he announced.

Demurin: OSCE Experts To Fly to Chechnya

LD2302142495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1349 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—A group of experts of the Organisation for Security and Cooperaton in Europe (OSCE) on human rights which arrived in Moscow will fly to the Chechen Republic on February 25. Mikhail Demurin, the spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, told this a briefing at the ministry's press centre on Thursday.

OSCE experts plan to study the possibilities for increasing the deliveries of humanitarian aid to Chechnya, to familiarise themselves with the situation regarding human rights observance and to discuss prospects for OSCE assistance to the preparation of elections to local and republican bodies in Chechnya, Demurin said.

On February 23-February 24 OSCE experts will meet with Valentin Kovalev, the minister of justice and chairman of the provisional commission for monitoring the observance of constitutional rights and liberties during the restoration of constitutional law in the Chechen territory. Experts will also have conversations at the Russian Ministry of Nationalities, Ministry for Emergencies and Foreign Ministry. The fact that this trip was organised is a new confirmation of Russia's readiness for constructive interaction in OSCE framework on Chechen affairs", Demurin said.

Kozyrev Thanks Butrus-Ghali for 'Practical' Aid in Chechnya

LD2302163895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1605 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev thanked U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali for practical aid of U.N. special institutions to those affected by the events in Chechnya. Mikhail Demurin, the spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, told this to a briefing at the ministry's press centre on Thursday.

Demurin said the joint urgent call of the United Nations for aid to displaced persons within Chechnya was adopted at the United Nations headquarters in New York early in February on the initiative of the agency of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The total required sum for a period of three months is 23.6 million dollars. The purpose of the extraordinary programme is to render humanitarian aid to 190 thousand displaced persons from Chechnya in territories adjacent to Chechnya.

The spokesman said aid is meant for the support of families that gave shelter to refugees and also for the support of local structures, above all, medical services.

Potential donor countries are on the whole positive regarding this call, and it is hoped in the United Nations to raise the required funds within February, Demurin said.

Poland Seen Using Chechnya To Speed NATO Entry

MK2202112095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Natalya Kalashnikova: "NATO Membership Argument Reveals Chechen Trace"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Russian Embassy in Poland voiced displeasure yesterday over the Warsaw Foreign Ministry's explanations in regard to the activities of the so-called "Chechen information bureau" in Krakow. The Russian diplomatic mission demanded that Poland's official authorities stop the activities of the "bureau," which was opened with the assistance and on the premises of the Krakow city council. By some lights, "information bureaus" disguised as Chechnya "aid centers" have been opened in five cities around the country including Warsaw. [passage omitted]

The reasons for such an obvious patronage extended to the Chechen centers by the Polish authorities transcend the purely Chechen problem. The Chechen factor (interpreted as Moscow's stepped-up neo-imperial ambitions and the growing threat from the East) is being played up by President Lech Walesa as he tries to accelerate the process of Poland's joining NATO. Moscow is known to want to retain a modicum of the right of control over a "gradual and unhurried" widening of the bloc—discussions to this effect are now going on at all levels. In the meantime, and as the West (in particular in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany) increasingly tends to take account of Russia's interests in what for it is so delicate a matter, Eastern Europe (especially Poland, which initiated the join-NATO movement) is showing increasing anxiety that the process of integrating into the alliance may slow down somewhat. In the course of his discussions with Chernomyrdin, Walesa was utterly frank, remarking that once it has set its heart on joining NATO, Warsaw is not going to ask Moscow's permission. The Chechen episode has proved just right in a bid to bolster this stance with the power of public opinion (something that is also useful shortly before presidential elections). The Polish-Chechen campaign is hardly effective in regard to foreign consumption (on the NATO level). As for the Russia-Poland package of agreements, it now has several documents missing—the men in Warsaw have gone overboard trying to sour the Russian premier's mood.

Embassy Dissatisfied with Warsaw Response

LD2002222995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2126 GMT 20 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Potyomkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw February 20 TASS—The Russian Embassy in Poland said on Monday it was unsatisfied with the response by the Polish Foreign Ministry to the embassy's note concerning the illegitimate activity of the so-called "Chechen News Bureau" in Krakow.

A few days ago, the Russian Embassy demanded that the Polish authorities close down the bureau established with the assistance and at the premises of the Krakow City Council.

The Polish Foreign Ministry asserts that it "is not aware about the opening of such a representative office by the Polish official agencies". However, in its response to the Russian note, the ministry said it had requested the Krakow authorities for explanations, while the actions of "private individuals" in Krakow should not be regarded as "either a friendly or a hostile act towards Russia". According to Krzysztof Sliwinski, spokesman for the Polish Foreign Ministry, the point at issue is "humanitarian activity" with a view to assist victims of the Chechen fighting.

But Polish diplomats give no comments on whether this "humanitarian activity" can also apply to dozens of anti-Russian rallies staged across the country by Russian citizens of Chechen origin, whom Polish mass media refer to as "plenipotentiary official envoys of the Chechen president".

Nor diplomats say anything about the newspaper published by these people and the "independent" news agency set up by them, about the participation in this activity and manifestations of some Polish lawmakers, or about the involvement of these "plenipotentiary envoys" in anti-Russian rallies during the recent visit to Poland by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

In the meantime, similar "bureaus" have already been established in five Polish cities, including in the capital. The only difference is that now they are called "assistance centres" for Chechnya.

Moscow-Minsk Border, Military Agreements Hailed

MM2202163595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Vasiliy Kononenko and Aleksandr Starikevich: "The Distance Between Moscow and Minsk Has Been Reduced Drastically"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk—The series of documents signed during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Minsk gave material form to the achievements of Russian diplomacy on the Belarusian front. Russia's leader assessed relations between Moscow and Minsk as the best within the CIS. They are now consolidated by the Treaty on Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation, as well as other agreements.

Boris Yeltsin was greeted at Minsk-2 airport with flowers and kisses. The flowers were presented by young girls, and the kisses were from his Belarusian colleague Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In the Belarusian capital itself, the highest level of readiness was displayed beforehand by the services ensuring the visit's security. Even before B. Yeltsin took off from Moscow, certain streets in Minsk were closed, and militiamen were placed along the entire rout to be followed by the presidential motorcade. Viktor Sheyman, secretary of state of the Security Council, tightened up security to such an extent that the militiamen surrounding the government residence on Voyskovyy Pereulok would not even allow Sheyman himself through for a long time.

The services responsible for supporting the journalists in their professional activity worked with their traditional inefficiency, as was the case during Bill Clinton's visit. Many representatives of the press simply did not reach the official event, and many had all kinds of communications problems. But otherwise everything was fine.

"In the European Union, coordination of economic and foreign policy activity costs less," Boris Yeltsin said. Well, now the two states—and first and foremost, Russia—can save on this. The discussion of Belarus' debt for energy sources proved difficult, but the difficulties were overcome thanks to an accord on a barter basis: Russian enterprises (first and foremost "Gazprom") received the right to participate in share ownership of Belarusian enterprises. Specific projects for the creation of joint production facilities will be implemented by finance and industry groups, while the governments of the two countries have pledged to assist them. It became clear that the presidents also signed treaties on coordinating operations to protect the borders and the control of customs networks.

"For a long time we have been working toward an understanding with Belarus as to what border security is," Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian border forces, said in an exclusive interview for IZVESTIYA. "Within the framework of the commonwealth, this problem has not yet been resolved and is not likely to be in the near future. In relations with Belarus we have reached a remarkable and unexpected stage of mutual understanding. For instance, the treaty that was signed contains a definition of what constitutes security on the borders with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. This means that Russia is shifting its border interests 615 km to the west of the administrative borders. Under the bilateral agreement we have pledged to set up an operational group of border troops (headed on the Russian side by the deputy commander of border forces). The Belarusian side, in turn, is creating a group of representatives to the Russian Main Border Forces Directorate with a view to upholding their state's interests on the actual borders. And in the agreement we avoid the contentious issue of representation of army subunits on the territory of Belarus. The border troops will be brought in under a special statute (which was signed during the visit—author's note) only to protect the border, and nothing more."

Several documents were signed by the foreign ministers. Among these documents, the agreement on cooperation in the military sphere stands out. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that talks on this subject "went remarkably smoothly and calmly." "We have already resolved the problem of basing our long-range aviation at the Baranovici airfield. We have now reached an agreement on material and technical services for the two countries' armies, with the introduction of state quality control [gospriyemka] at specialized enterprises in Russia and Belarus." In addition, the question of creating an integrated ABM defense system was discussed.

Summing up the results of the visit, it can be noted that the Russian leadership has achieved successes of some importance, meeting its interests in the economic, military, and other spheres. This must be formulated in documentation, since whereas at present the Belarusian political elite is putty in Moscow's hands, in the foreseeable future there could be major domestic political changes in Minsk. Then Russia would encounter undesirable complications.

Moscow-Kiev Treaty Being 'Finalized'

LD2202172395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1527 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW Feb 22 (Interfax)—Russia and Ukraine's first Vice-Premiers Oleg Soskovets and Yevgeniy Marchuk met in Moscow on Tuesday. The Ukrainian embassy's press service has said that the meeting was constructive and key-noted by understanding.

Vice-Premier Soskovets's office has said that a Russian-Ukrainian treaty of friendship, cooperation and partnership is being finalized and it is going to be signed, when President Yeltsin pays an official visit to Kiev.

Soskovets and Marchuk agreed to continue the search for "coordinated approaches to settling the Black Sea Fleet problem proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the treaty the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents signed last April and on the basis of a joint draft document on that problem".

Russia and Ukraine last April agreed they would have equal shares of the fleet. At the same time Ukraine must sell part of its share to Ukraine in payment for Russian fuel. In the end Moscow would receive about 83

of the Black Sea fleet.

Moscow, Kiev Differ on Meaning of BSF Talks

MK2102140095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Viktor Zamyatin under the "Russian-Ukrainian Relations" rubric: "Russian, Ukrainian Texts Turned Out To Be Too Different"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When they negotiated the text of the declaration on the principles of splitting the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] in Kiev on 8 February, the Russian and Ukrainian delegations appear to have had different documents in their hands. It turns out that the Ukrainian version does not call for the Russian lease of Sevastopol—the city is considered to be just one of the "Black Sea Fleet provisional deployment locations." The "inconsistencies" do not stop there, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Bizhan said in an interview for KOMMERSANT-DAILY.

In Ivan Bizhan's view, the very phrasing regarding "the possibility of deploying the Russian fleet's base in Sevastopol and a number of other locations" (that have yet to be specified) is of crucial importance for the declaration. The formula whereby "Sevastopol is the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet," which has been proposed by Moscow for the past several months, has finally been removed from the agenda. Still, it has for some reason become the basis for the Russian interpretation of the results of the talks. Moreover, it turns out that Sevastopol will not fully belong to the Black Sea Fleet even as a deployment location. Kiev is ready to cede only two, albeit the largest two, out of five Sevastopol bays. In Bizhan's view, this will be more than enough to accommodate the Russian part of the fleet. (The Ukrainian side has confirmed that it lays claim only to 20 percent of water craft.) Hence, Moscow's demands that the Ukrainian Naval Staff be withdrawn from Sevastopol also become redundant. As for other locations of the fleet's deployment, Ukraine is ready to contemplate basing in Kerch and Feodosiya. Ukraine cannot make greater compromises with regard to the splitting of the fleet, the deputy defense minister pointed out, and now the ball is in Russia's court.

Moscow was asked to make concessions on the status of the fleet and the bases that are due to be turned over to it (Kiev appears to have ignored Moscow's concessions—which seemed unimaginable even a month ago—made for the sake of signing the declaration on the principles of division). In particular, Russia was asked to resolve all status-related matters in accordance with international practice, including the amount of lease payment, the status of servicemen, the procedure for using resources, and the number of ships, weapons, and personnel to be based there. It turns out that Moscow agrees with all that: it has shown understanding with regard to these issues, Bizhan stressed; what is lacking is specific steps to resolve them. (By the way, KOMMERSANT-DAILY has already pointed out that the very results of the Soskovets delegation's talks call into question the possibility of implementing the agreements.)

Russia has not given ground on ownership of the fleet's infrastructure. Moscow proceeds from the assumption that if the fleet is Russian, so should be its infrastructure. Kiev, however, asserts that all real estate is Ukrainian property and it can only be leased to Russia. The period of lease has also yet to be agreed on. Russia insists on 25 years, while Ukraine proposes from three to five years with the possibility of renewing it "upon agreement between the two sides."

Moscow, Kiev Soon To Agree on Price of Strategic Bombers

MK2202113095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: "Russia Will Buy What Ukraine Received Gratis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia will buy from Ukraine the strategic bombers Kiev inherited from the USSR. Such is the outcome of the nearly two-year-long confidential negotiations and an inspection tour by Russian military experts of Ukrainian military air bases where Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft are stationed, which ended yesterday. True, the sides have so far not been able to agree on the price of this equipment. Although it is possible that in an official communication on the results of the negotiations today, the Russian side will quote an acceptable sum for the deal. Especially considering that Kiev has already done so.

Ukraine came by strategic aviation in 1992. It acquired virtually the very best that had been accumulated by that time in the USSR. As a result of a repeat swearing of allegiance (in the Ukraine Army at the time), Ukraine air bases granted "permanent residence" to 23 Tu-95 MC bombers ("Bear" in NATO classification) and 19 Tu-160 bombers ("Blackjack"). At the time they constituted approximately 45 percent of the USSR's entire aviation. As for Tu- 160 bombers (this aircraft is still the heaviest in this class of machine in the world, superior in a number of parameters to its U.S. brother, the B-1B), none were left on Russian territory. Today Ukraine has 19 Tu-160 aircraft, while Russia, which produces them, has only six, of which four have been in combat readiness until recently (according to Defense Ministry official data).

As far as combat readiness is concerned, however, Kiev cannot boast it. To maintain strategic bombers in operational condition, regular training flights are required. And flights require fuel, which Ukraine does not have. Neither is their a corresponding technical basis for maintaining and overhauling Tu-95's and Tu-160's. Of course, Russia, too, will be confronted with maintenance problems in the near future: The only plant producing lubricants for Tupolev bomber hydraulic systems was in Groznyy. Rather, it is still there, but it can hardly produce oil now.

Yet technical problems, insoluble for Kiev per se, are nothing compared to the diplomatic ones it would have faced had Ukraine wished to retain the Tupolev bombers forever. The fact is that both Tu-95 MC's and Tu-160's can carry nuclear weapons and therefore are subjects of the START I and START II Treaties. These agreements establish some very tough qualitative and quantitative limitations on such hardware—including "conversion" aimed at ruling out the possibility of their use as nuclear weapon carriers. Not to mention the fact that the treaties regard all USSR strategic aircraft as unquestionably Russian. Kiev, for its part, cannot ignore the START Treaties: Western economic support for Ukraine's reform hinges on compliance with them. Moreover, it was not yesterday that Ukraine came to realize the inevitability of parting with the strategic bombers.

The need to sell the aircraft to Russia was first recognized last March by Vitaliy Radetskyy, Ukraine defense minister at the time. Since then, there have been repeated attempts to resolve the problem of the form in which the equipment will be transferred, but with no result. Now, after Russian Defense Ministry experts visited Ukraine Air Force bases in Prilyki and Uzin (where Tu-160 and Tu-95 MC aircraft are based, correspondingly), some progress has emerged. To a large extent owing to the impression the aircraft produced on the guests: Moscow has long buried them, but it turned out that they are in quite good condition. Yet, having decided to buy the bombers after all, Russia does not at all intend to pay "live money" for them (which interests Kiev the most). True, if Volodymir Antonets, Ukraine Air Forces commander in chief, is to be believed, Kiev is not averse to parting with the missile carriers [raketonostsy] also in exchange for forgiveness of part of its debt for Russian energy supplies. But this does not make Gazprom happy.

Before deciding on the form of settlement, the sides will still need to coordinate the value of the contract. It is known that the Tu-160 analogue—the B-1B—costs approximately $300 million. Naturally, Moscow will not be paying Kiev this sort of money. True, this is not being claimed. According to one Ukraine expert, Kiev is hoping "for a sum several times less: 15-20 percent of the B-1B cost." Russia is silent so far. It is not ruled out, however, that as early as today Kiev will hear a worthy answer: A corresponding press release is about to be published.

Reportage on Stepashin's Visit to Ankara

Discusses Chechen Situation

LD2202210895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1901 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Palariya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara February 22 TASS—The Russian and Turkish leaders, the same as the security services of the two countries, regard the Chechen crisis as Russia's internal affair, according to the chief of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) [FCS].

Sergey Stepashin, currently on a two-day visit to Turkey, emphasised that both countries were interested in the soonest possible solution to the Chechen conflict and cessation of hostilities in the rebel North Caucasian republic.

Turkey has pledged once again that it had not and would not allow any interference in the Chechen conflict, be it by recruiting mercenaries or supplying arms and material resources to Chechnya, Stepashin reported.

The FSK chief told TASS that any attempts to depict military actions in Chechnya as an inter-ethnic or religious conflict "are 100-per-cent wrong". Over the three years of Dudayev rule, 450,000 out of the 1.5 million Chechen residents were expelled from the republic, and another 35,000 were exterminated, Stepashin noted. The Chechen economy was completely ruined. At the same time, the breakaway republic had hundreds of armoured vehicles and Grad missile launchers, to say nothing of small arms which were enough for everybody seeking to obtain them.

Recalling about the counterfeit payment advice notes worth billions of roubles, as well as the five attempted hijacks in Russia last year, the FSK chief said if this was to be interpreted as "a threat by Russia, this is the threat we tried to liquidate".

When asked about the possiblity of Turkey mediating a Chechen settlement, Stepashin said there had not been and would not be any talk about it. "This is Russia's internal affair, which was stated by the Turkish leadership", the FSK chief noted.

Signs Intelligence Cooperation Deal

LD2202214195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2114 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Palaria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara February 22 TASS—Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) [FCS] and Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) agreed to cooperate.

FSK chief Sergey Stepashin, currently on a two-day visit to Turkey, said the Russian and Turkish secret services were to cooperate in such fields as combatting terrorism, including the international one, narcobusiness, world-scale corruption related, in particular, to illegal migration of people charged with economic crimes. The services are also likely to exchange information on internal security, which is of mutual interest and concern.

Stepashin described the current visit as unprecedented for secret services of both the former Soviet Union and Russia. He met the senior officials of the Turkish Interior Ministry to discuss the implementation of the accord signed between this ministry and the Russian Security Ministry (now the FSK) in 1992. He also had talks with officers of some other ministries and a meeting with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel.

The FSK chief pointed out that relations with Turkey, which have been quite friendly in the recent decades, would be further improved. "Problems and differences may arise between us", he noted. "But we should always follow the basic rules, that is to respect each other's sovereignty and to recognize the need for further development of bilateral relations. And if there are questions to be clarified, we should ask them honestly and directly and answer them in the same manner", Stepashin quoted Demirel as telling him at the meeting.

The FSK chief is to wind up his visit to Turkey on Wednesday night.

Discusses Kurdish Activities in Russia

LD2202223095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2115 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Palaria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara February 22 TASS—Sergey Stepashin, chief of Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) [FCS], spoke on Wednesday against any political organizations whose operation in Russia tends to violate the interstate agreements with Turkey.

Addressing a news conference at the close of his two-day visit to Turkey, Stepashin said the Russian leadership disfavoured the operation in the country of "any organizations violating the existing interstate agreements between the Russian Federation and the Turkish Republic", including those seeking to break Turkey's territorial integrity, "whatever political, ethnic or other screens they use to disguise their activities".

"We will not allow interference into Turkey's affairs by any forces on Russian territory unknown to the state", the FSK chief stressed when asked about the legal status of the "Kurd House" opened in Moscow recently. Stepashin said he had ordered that this issue be thoroughly examined and promised to make an appropriate decision a week later.

Russian Official Comments on Pipeline Through Turkey

TA2202083195 Ankara Show Television in Turkish 2030 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Interview with Albert Chernyshev, Russian first deputy foreign minister, by correspondent Mehmet Ali Birand in Moscow on the "32 Day" program; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Birand] Is Russia not disturbed by the fact that Washington prefers the oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to go through Turkey?

[Chernyshev] No, no, no. The Americans supported you in this. That is very good; however, they did not say something else. We view the issue from two aspects: the economic and the safety viewpoints. First, whether or not the project is economically beneficial. Secondly, the safety viewpoint....

[Birand, interrupting] What do you mean by safety?

[Chernyshev] As you know, this is a region of conflict. These things must be viewed realistically.

[Birand] In other words, you are saying that the project must be viewed economically—the cheapest alternative must be preferred—and secondly, the route of the oil pipeline must be safe.

That is the point on which the Russians insist. The safety of the pipeline. According to Chernyshev, the safety problem is important not only for Russia, but for the Azerbaijanis and the Americans as well. The Russians do not say it openly, but the issue has not yet been closed. What the Russians fear is that the situation in southeast Turkey might affect the pipeline.

[Chernyshev] Of course, the pipeline can go through Turkey. Economically that would be very good—no problems. However, realistically speaking, we are asking whether this issue has been thought through seriously enough in terms of safety.

[Birand] What route would Russia really want, both economically speaking and safety wise?

[Chernyshev] We are not insisting that the pipeline pass only through Russia. As far as we are concerned the Turkey route is not a bad alternative.

[Birand] You are saying that it would be better if it went through Novorossiysk.

[Chernyshev, laughing] Of course, that would be beneficial for us, you know, financially. Such issues must be discussed, because there is a lot of gossip. Everyone is speculating; yet, alternative routes are not being considered and discussed seriously and realistically. [passage omitted]

More on Russia-Iran Nuclear Reactor Deal

'No Threat To International Security' Seen

LD2202210095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1434 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—"It is clear that the international consortium backed by the United States does not want to lose its positions on the world market. For this reason, political pressure is being used in competition with Russia, which is understandable when the national or corporate interests need protection on the market," according to Petr Premyak, deputy chairman of the Federation Council's Defence and Security Committee.

Commenting on the latest moves on the part of the United States over Russia's contract for the delivery of nuclear reactors to Iran, Petr Premyak said "the agreement with Iran poses no threat whatever to international security".

Premyak said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS today that the reactors in question were common industrial energy-generating installations and any objections to the fulfilment of the contract with Iran should be seen as stemming from competition.

Premyak recalled that the United States had raised objections to the agreement signed between Russia and Iran on the delivery of Russian nuclear reactors and had even hinted that it would revise its programme of assistance to Russia if the contract goes ahead.

Moscow and Iran signed the contract during the Russian atomic energy minister's recent visit to Tehran.

Premyak said any fears about the possible use of the Russian reactors to produce combat fissile materials could be countered by the following arguments: The international commercial contract for the delivery of energy sources was signed in strict compliance with the established rules, and the reactors will be used only for peaceful purposes since Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Finally, the international inspection in November 1993 discovered no breaches of Iran's commitments under international agreements in this field.

"The 800-million dollar contract signed with Iran is not only of economic significance for our country; it is a guarantee of social stability in the country because it lets Russia preserve thousands of jobs and advanced technologies at its defence enterprises," Premyak said.

Energy Official: Reactor Can't Yield Weapons

LD2302102595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1014 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] London (ITAR-TASS) February 23 [dateline as received]—The talks about the sale of Russian nuclear reactors to Iran have been going on for four weeks, Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energy Evgeniy Reshetnikov told the London bi-weekly "BUSINESS DECISIONS". He said, however, that Russia did not start the discussions until a full inspection had been made of all nuclear energy research centres in Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They started only after inspectors of the IAEA decided that the country did not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. At the request of the United States, the IAEA had conducted three more checks, and found that Russia did not breach any international agreements.

Mr. Reshetnikov dismissed any claims that it was possible to produce materials for building nuclear weapons from components of nuclear reactors. The country would need to create a huge industry to do that, he said.

"We are not going to ask permission from anyone, including the Americans, to sign deals on civil nuclear projects," said Mr. Reshetnikov.

Initially, in the 1970s, a deal to build the nuclear power station was signed between Iran and a German company, but preliminary work was stopped after the overthrow of the shah.

Official sources in Moscow told "BUSINESS DECISIONS" that the Russian Government had contacted the Germans and offered them the chance to take part in the current project, but the offer was rejected.

Atomic Energy Specialist: No Risk From Deal

LD2302130895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1107 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 23 (Interfax)—Iran will be unable to make a nuclear bomb out of plutonium extracted from a nuclear power station being built in that country with Russia's assistance, Lev Ryabev, first assistant to Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, believes.

He stressed in an exclusive interview with Interfax that weapon grade plutonium could not be obtained at VVER type light water operated reactors. "It is true that plutonium can be extracted from VVER; however, in its characteristics, it cannot be used for a nuclear bomb," he said.

Plutonium received from VVER reactors will have a big neutron and gamma radiation, and "an explosive will merely melt," Ryabev stated.

In his opinion, such plutonium comes from wasted nuclear fuel and must be subsequently treated by radiological and chemical meanss. "Iran does not have appropriate technologies, which are available only in Russia, France, and Great Britain," he said.

Ryabev stressed that the process of plutonium separation, just as other operations with nuclear materials, is controlled by such an international organization as IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], which, as the Russian official noted, should also strictly control the amount of fuel shipped to Iran for operation and the amount of its exhausted fuel, sent to Russia, Great Britain, or France to be reprocessed there.

"Statements that a nuclear power plant under construction at Busher will enable Iran to extract plutonium to produce a weapon can only be made by people who have never had anything to do with the creation of a nuclear bomb and do not understand what they talk about," Ryabev declared.

Moscow Pledges To Strengthen Controls

LD2302113695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1131 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Nuclear reactors due to be delivered to Iran under a 800-million-dollar contract, cannot produce weapon-grade plutonium, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov told a meeting of the Russian cabinet today.

According to the minister, Iran had signed documents guaranteeing its adherence to non-prolifiration of nuclear technologies.

However, taking into consideration international concern about the reactors, Russia plans to strengthen warrants of control, the minister said.

Reactors of the same type will be also delivered to China and India.

According to the minister, in 1994, Russia's exports of nuclear products increased by 20 per cent and will most likely reach 1.4-1 billion dollars this year. Mikhaylov named Brazil and South Korea as possible partners in future nuclear deals.

Environmental Official Opposes Deal

LD2202212195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1739 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry "makes a mistake assisting Iran to build a nuclear power station," an expert of the Russian Security Council's commission for environmental security, Valeriy Menshikov, told a news conference in Moscow Wednesday.

According to Menshikov, Iran is interested in creating its own nuclear weapons. Iranian experts will be able to receive plutonium from the nuclear power station in Busher and use it to create a nuclear bomb, he emphasized.

"Nuclear weapons, though not so effective by its parameters, can be made out of reactor plutonium," Menshikov said. Iran's references to its commitment to the non-proliferation treaty and IAEA monitoring "should not calm anyone down."

"If Iran does not want to play by the rules, Russia will have a nuclear power beside its borders," Menshikov warned.

Iraq is also trying to obtain nuclear weapons, Menshikov continued. A number of third-world countries already have nuclear weapons, including Israel (200-300 nuclear devices), North Korea (3- 5 nuclear bombs), Pakistan and India, he said.

Ministry on Planned Nuclear Accord With India

LD2202171195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1238 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Russia and India are planning to sign an agreement on construction of a nuclear power plant in the Indian town of Kudankulam in the first half of 1995. The agreement is a continuation of bilateral cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Russian and Indian experts have discussed the future agreement, and a contract for drawing up a detailed design of the nuclear power plant will be signed in the near future, sources at the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry's information and public relations department told Interfax.

Russian-Indian nuclear cooperation has provoked the concern of several state-participants in the international nuclear suppliers group (NSG). They note that India has not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its nuclear program is based on plutonium fuel.

The Ministry sources stressed that "concern of NSG states is ungrounded" bearing in mind that the Russian-Indian agreement of November 20, 1988 provides for the construction of two light-water water-condensed reactors of the VVER-1000 type, not capable of "industrial production of war plutonium."

The presidential decree of January 25, 1995 allows Russia to "accept for temporary storage and processing spent nuclear fuel from foreign nuclear power plants build under Russian projects on condition of obligatory return of radioactive products for processing."

More on Russia-China Border Situation

Maritime Duma Protests Concessions

LD2202110495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Eduard Popov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok February 22 TASS—Today's sitting of the Maritime territorial Duma in Vladivostok passed a resolution to send a letter to the Russian president to the effect that all demarcation activities on the Russian-Chinese border must be suspended.

A 1991 demarcation agreement between Russia and China concedes to China over 1,500 hectares of the Maritime territory, Russian Far East. The letter says the president should start renegotiation of the agreement's clauses concerning the Maritime territory.

Duma Chairman Igor Lebedinets stressed, on behalf of all territory's voters, that territorial integrity of Russia must not be dented by unjustifiable concessions to the neighbour state.

Lebedinets said interests of millions of Russians must not be ignored, and to brush aside provisions of the 1860 Beijing treaty which set the borderlines between Russia and China would be a flaming historical injustice.

PRC Foreign Ministry Condemns Kray Action

LD2202193295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1245 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gregoriy Arslanov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 22 Feb—An official Chinese spokesman today described the utterances of several Russian figures about the border between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China as "extremely irresponsible."

Asked by the ITAR-TASS correspondent to comment on the report that the Maritime Kray duma intends to propose a legislative initiative to the Russian parliament requesting that the Russian- Chinese agreement on demarcating the eastern section of the border be reconsidered, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "The Chinese people, who for over 100 years were subjected to aggression and slavery by the imperialist powers, including Czarist Russia, has more grounds for complaints about the history of the Chinese-Russian border."

However, he stressed, the government and people of China, proceeding on the basis of the common interests of friendship and goodneighborliness that exist between the two states and the two peoples, favor a sensible and just resolution, by means of talks, of the border problem that history has handed down to us.

Thanks to many years of efforts based on universally recognized norms of international law, China and Russia have achieved agreement on the western and eastern sections of the border and have signed agreements. Both sides, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "should cherish the results they have achieved."

"However," he continued, "a small number of people in Russia recently, taking advantage of the fact that some specific issues have arisen during bilateral trips by citizens, have made extremely irresponsible statements about the border between the two countries and have created confusion among the population of Russia's border regions."

Such actions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, have a negative influence on goodneighborly and friendly relations between the two states and are contrary to the basic interests of their peoples.

Panov Reaffirms Border Agreement

LD1702154195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1308 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 17 (INTERFAX)—Aleksandr Panov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, believes that no "sensation should be expected" from his chief Andrey Kozyrev's upcoming visits to Japan and China.

"After all, no one waits for sensations from trips by the Russian foreign minister to West European countries. It is a normal practice for the heads of foreign departments to regularly meet and discuss some or other problems of interest for their countries. So, why Japan and China should be an exception? Panov wondered in an interview with INTERFAX in Moscow Friday.

In Tokyo, the Russian-Japanese dialogue, as he put it, would be continued on the whole range of bilateral issues.

Describing bilateral relations as good partnership, he said: "The Russian Foreign Ministry chief will have something to talk about in Beijing. We plan to map out further contacts and visits there."

In Panov's opinion, the demands voiced by the Maritime Governor Evgeny Nazdratenko and other local administration officials to denounce the 1991 Soviet-Chinese accord on the state border in its eastern part "will not mar at all" Kozyrev's visit to Beijing.

"Our position is invariable: Russia will scrupulously comply with this agreement, which has been ratified by the country's parliament and given the status of law, Panov said. "Our stand gets understanding from the Chinese side."

He specifically noted that Nazdratenko's remarks, denying "even an inch of Russian land" to China was Russia's internal problem. "Instead of resorting to megaphones, we will solve it through appropriate state structures and mechanisms," Panov remarked.

He confirmed that Kozyrev's Far Eastern trip, during which he will visit Japan and China had been "preliminary" scheduled to last from February 28 through March 4.

"These are working terms, which can be specified. The official terms of visits by Russia's foreign minister will be made public shortly," Panov noted.

Moscow Radio Comments on Kozyrev Visit to PRC, Japan

OW2202095295 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Japanese 1100 GMT 21 Feb 95

[Commentary by (Korochev)]

[FBIS Translated Text] We will report on Russia's foreign policy toward the East. Russian Foreign Minister

Andrey Kozyrev plans to visit China and Japan in early March. Please, listen to a comment by Voice of Russia commentator (Korochov) on his planned visit to the two countries.

To secure its national interests, Russia needs to adopt an aggressive foreign policy compatible with the realities of the Asian region, the largest region in the world. For that reason, Russia's foreign policy toward Asia is equally important as its foreign policy toward Western nations. Russia's foreign policy, of course, places top priority on Asian nations, like China and Japan.

The Russian Government, announcing a visit to China by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, has pointed out that his visit to China will be made under an agreement reached between Russia and China on the continuation of a high-level political dialogue between the two countries. Talks to be held between the Russian foreign minister and Chinese officials in Beijing will focus on how to develop the partnership between Russia and China. Forty to 50 various bilateral issues, including the border issue, will be taken up for discussion at the talks. The current amount of trade between two countries comes to billions of dollars. However, experts expect that figure to grow between one and one-half and two times.

Meanwhile, the purpose of Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to Japan is to continue holding political dialogue with Japanese Government leaders. According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry source, talks to be held between the Russian foreign minister, Foreign Minister Kono, and Prime Minister Murayama in Tokyo will focus on bilateral issues, including the territorial issue. The question of permitting Japanese fishermen to fish in waters off the southern Kurils will be taken up for discussion at the talks. Observers are pointing out that the Japanese leaders will express great concern over the domestic situation in Russia and the Chechen conflict at the talks with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Articles and commentaries in Japanese newspapers have been asking the Japanese Government to get tough with Russia on the Chechen conflict. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, however, is distancing itself from those articles and commentaries. The planned visit to Beijing and Tokyo by Foreign Minister Kozyrev will, as a whole, undoubtedly make a great contribution to the development of relations among Russia, China, and Japan through mutual cooperation and friendship in the Asia- Pacific region.

This has been Russia's foreign policy toward the East.

Japanese Ambassador Interviewed on Ties

MM2202153095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Savenkov: "Japan Willing To Back Moscow's Eastern Melody"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As if engaging in polemics with the skeptics, Koji Watanabe, Japanese ambassador to Russia, has cited one after another the arguments in favor of dynamic relations between our countries.

During First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets's visit to Japan it was decided to set up an intergovernmental trade and economic commission. Japan does not have such commissions with other countries. Mr. Watanabe is confident that Japanese private capital will respond to the call of the leaders, who have acknowledged that relations between the countries do not match their potential. Japan's commodity turnover with the United States stands at $175 billion and with China at $44 billion, while it is one-tenth of that with Russia—$4.4 billion.

...The ambassador threw some birchwood on the fire and remarked: "Winter in Russia is not so bad." He believes that Muscovites' apartments are warmer in winter than Tokyo homes, which have no central heating.

Mr. Watanabe feels comfortable living in Moscow. In summer he plays golf, while now there is the Bolshoy Theater, the Conservatory, and the Tchaikovsky Hall. He perhaps leads the diplomatic corps in his passion for music.

Koji Watanabe picked two out of the host of facts attesting to Japan's desire to back Russian reforms. A Japanese center has opened at the Plekhanov Academy of the National Economy which will train cadres for the transition to a market economy. Another center was opened in November in Khabarovsk. Lecturers from Japan offer the following subjects: privatization of state enterprises, financial and banking systems, increasing labor productivity, foreign trade and investment. And lastly, study of Japanese.

There have been an extremely large number of people wanting to study at the Japanese center. Regrettably, only one-fourth of them were selected. The training will involve the use of modern computer and linguaphone technology, but the quantity of equipment is limited.

A new business school building will be built shortly with Japanese Government funds, which will house a center attached to Moscow State University. Another center will be opened in Vladivostok.

Japan's Export-Import Bank has allocated $200 million for the development of microwave telephone communications between Moscow and Khabarovsk. Shipment of freight began the day after the contract was signed.

But the most unpleasant thing is Far Eastern border guards' firing on Japanese fishing vessels. "This kind of conflict did not even happen during the cold war," the ambassador remarked. How can safe fishing be ensured around the disputed islands?

The ambassador does not want to anticipate events but he thinks that this is a possible scenario: The Japanese ships will fish in a manner and in quantities on which the sides agree. Something like quotas.

I have formed the impression that people in Russia have somehow forgotten the 1993 Tokyo declaration, which promised to resolve the territorial problem. But for Japan the future of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai is a key issue. So, do we have stalemate? osophical view of the problem. He admits that, given the domestic situation in Russia, it is hard to say that it will be resolved tomorrow or the day after. But that does not mean standing idly by. It is important, for instance, to inform the Russians that prior to 3 September 1945 Russia had never owned these four islands.

This year the head of Japan's National Security Agency may visit Russia. In the ambassador's view, such steps create a favorable atmosphere for the resolution of the territorial problem. Yet if, the ambassador reflected, the Russian side were to say that the four disputed islands are important for Russia's security, it would in principle be impossible to resolve the problem of the disputed islands.

Of late the following slogan has been heard increasingly frequently in Japan, in the newspapers, on television, and in politicians' speeches: "Let us give up Europe and return to Asia." There is the idea of an economic bloc involving Japan, China, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries. For 50 years Japan has been a loyal follower of the United States, supporters of the Asian tendency complain, so is it not time for it to have its say? Russia's Asian melody sounds fairly muffled. Russia did not take part in the recent conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] organization, whose members produce half of the world's gross product. If there is a change of priorities in Japan, will that not have a negative effect on relations between our countries?

Russia should play a more perceptible role in the dynamic Asian region, the ambassador believes, and Japan may provide it with assistance here, possibly by supporting its admission to APEC in the future. But it is very important to prepare the ground for this. Primarily to vigorously develop Russia's Far East region.

"Will the situation in Chechnya modify Japan's position?" I asked the ambassador.

"The Japanese Government has hitherto backed President Yeltsin's efforts at economic and political reform," the ambassador noted, "and it hopes that the Russian Government will continue these reforms and settle the situation in Chechnya peacefully."

Commentary Cites U.S. 'Pressure' on DPRK Reactor Issue

SK2302012895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean 1200 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Commentary by (Yevgeniy Krisk)]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lately, the situation on the Korean peninsula has been allowed to go back to one of complicated tension. Regarding this, station commentator (Yevgeniy Krisk) writes:

There is a lot of evidence to prove that tension on the peninsula is growing. According to recent publications, the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise Team Spirit may be resumed. In the past, Team Spirit played the role of a catalyst that creates tensions between the South and the North.

In addition, the ROK and the United States conducted a joint military exercise around the Military Demarcation Line [MDL], which separates the South and the North in the DMZ, last week. Pyongyang regards this military exercise as a simulated war exercise for a northward invasion.

Meanwhile, Seoul has begun to state again that Pyongyang has set out preparations for war. ROK Defense Minister Yi Yang-ho has stated that North Korea conducted a test fire of a new 1,500- kilometer range rocket. According to him, North Korea deployed 240- millimeter multibarrelled rockets and other military equipment in an area adjacent to the MDL. Minister Yi states that the new rocket equipment is powerful enough to completely destroy Seoul.

The newly-created tension is directly related to the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework signed in Geneva in October 1994. According to the agreement, the DPRK has frozen its nuclear program and will have to completely cancel it in the future. The ROK and the United States believe that the DPRK nuclear program is aimed at developing nuclear weapons. When the DPRK abandons its nuclear program, the United States will provide Pyongyang with light-water reactors that cannot produce plutonium.

Today, however, there is discord over the question of which country's light-water reactors should be provided. The United States is forcing Pyongyang to accept ROK-made reactors, and Pyongyang refuses to accept them, adducing political, economic, and technological reasons. Pyongyang wants to be provided with Russian reactors. Putting pressure on Pyongyang to accept ROK reactors has brought tension on the peninsula again.

By the way, does it run counter to the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework for the DPRK, which is accumulating good experience in cooperation with Russia, to try to accept Russian reactors? No, it does not. In order to achieve the denuclearization of the peninsula, such an absurd pressure should not be put on the DPRK.

Political Issues

Shakhray: Russia Needs New Administrative System

LD2302110095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1033 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yekaterinburg February 23 TASS—The Chechnya conflict has made it clear that "our country has become aware of the priority of Russia's national interests," said Russian Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray.

Shakhray said in his address to the conference which opened in Yekaterinburg today to discuss interaction between regions and the centre that another lesson of the Chechnya crisis was the need for a new administrative system in the Russian Federation.

According to Shakhray, Russia will be strong if its regions are strong and its central power is effective.

He said it would be wrong to expect all 89 component parts of the Russian Federation to become strong overnight and called for enlarging Russia's component parts and cutting their number on the basis of regional economic interests.

A few days ago, St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak called for considering a new re-division of Russia into guberniyas (major administrative regions).

Yeltsin Adviser Views Local Self-Government Issue

MM2102123095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Feb 95 pp 1, 2

[Article by Leonid Smirnyagin: "Why Local Self-Government Is Not Yet Perceived By Us To Be A Power: Leonid Smirnyagin, Chief of the Russian Federation Presidential Analysis Center Analytical Research Section, Considers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is hard to overestimate the political significance of the organization of local self-government, particularly for our country. Primarily because in countries with a developed democracy virtually the whole democracy sprang up out of grassroots self-government, from which citizens themselves began to run their own country. Furthermore, this democracy was built from the bottom upward. Our tragedy is that the opposite has occurred: After the death of our zemstvo system and over 70 years of totalitarianism we have found ourselves completely alienated from government. And the lower the level of government, the less its authority in our eyes.

Local self-government could seem to be the level of government closest to us, but it is for this reason that, traditionally, it is not perceived by us as a power. In 70 years of alienation from power, we have completely lost the habit of thinking that we can make something happen ourselves. As such, the very idea of local self-government has become quite alien to us, as last year's elections to local self-government bodies demonstrated. There were too many cases where an administration leader, that is a functionary, was placed at the head of local self-government. Virtually a majority of the members of local self-government bodies were functionaries—which is categorically at odds with the very idea of local self-government as this is an extra-state form of power.

For us, setting up local self-government must become an ongoing task precisely from the viewpoint of educating of the actual citizens in the idea that they can and must create, implement, and control their own governance. These bodies are important as a means of teaching citizens to solve their everyday problems through their own efforts rather than continuing to demand that "we go to the rayon party committee and ask how long we are going to have to put up with this flood in our home."

That is, the solution of everyday needs has to be the result of organizing citizens at grassroots level—then their demands to the political authority will be purely political, which is how it should be. In turn, the political authority will be spared that kind of triviality. Thus, the work of local self-government bodies is a way of enlivening the political life of the country.

By responding more attentively to local self-government, people will be gradually "drawn into" solving vital problems. Indeed, interest in local self-government in the localities is far higher insofar as local self-government is known to be without political ambitions. The idea of political isolation and separatism does not even enter anybody's head, as they are too small as units, and there (in local self-government) there is a conscious absence of politics, but it is jam-packed with regular problems such as central heating, street cleaning, and so on. All this is very close to home in everyday and social life.

It emerged that, back in 1993, the president, through a series of edicts, opened wide the floodgates to initiative on the part of citizens in the localities in restructuring local self-government. However, legislative bodies were very slow to mold this initiative into any kind of framework. Thus the Duma did not adopt the Law on Local Self-Government which was ready in first draft in 1992. Since then it has not been processed.

By the time of the 17 February conference a law had been prepared by the Duma as a whole. Only now is it ready to put that into effect. So the federal bodies have been exceedingly slow in implementing local self-government, while in the regions this process "took off" at tremendous speed.

It has to be said that actual "initiative" in implementing this idea has long since outstripped us. It may be—and all well and good—that the citizens themselves are forcing these events, and this can only be welcomed. But, owing to the lack of clear federal boundaries and general principles, all this acquires rather strange outlines.

As of the end of 1994 regional laws had been adopted in 13 Federation components (data exists for 75 components); in some, such as Kabardino-Balkaria and Chuvashia, they had been adopted back in 1991, while in Mariy-El and Tuva they were adopted in 1993, and in a few others in 1994.

In addition there are interim ratified provisions in 26 components, and only in 12 Russian Federation components have neither decisions nor laws been adopted.

In three oblasts—Lipetsk, Magadan, and Pskov—it was decided specifically to postpone elaborating the law until the adoption of a Federal Law.

But there is something else which is strange: Elections took place nevertheless in 57 components, and only in 32 were they not held. Admittedly, governing bodies were set up by no means everywhere, but there is another surprising element: Many regions had no law at all, but back in March of last year they held elections for local self-government bodies simply out of inertia when the federal chambers were elected. Khabarovsk Kray, for instance, had clearly omitted to adopt a law on local self-government by the start of 1995 even though, on 13 March last year, it set up the relevant bodies. There is a similar situation in Penza and Kalinin Oblasts.

Some oblasts—Astrakhan, Tula, Tambov, Perm—formed their own bodies on the basis of an interim provision. In the meantime there is no "linkage" between the adoption of laws or provisions and elections.

It is necessary to emphasize something else too. The question often arises: Local self-government needs to have its personnel protected against encroachment by regional authorities. Because in the election period a very major statization of local self-government bodies occurred, and it ended up in many ways simply as an extension of the imperious hand of the regional authorities. In this respect, there are many requests from our local self-government bodies—to protect their rights. Especially financial. Protection must come from the president and the Constitutional Court. Obviously there is a proposal to set up a special local self-government council under the president for constant monitoring, but, nevertheless, it would not be desirable for the matter of organizing local self-government itself to spill over into some kind of confrontation between regional and local authorities.

Perhaps it is possible to understand certain politicians at Federal level who think: If we sow hostility within the regions between the two levels of power, then the regional authorities will become more complaisant. But this is a dangerous, dead-end way of developing Russian statehood. It is essential to press for a harmonization of relations between the two levels of government, and not for a situation whereby in a dogfight between the two some kind of third force, a third power might gain the advantage. The danger of such a trend does exist.

It is wrong to look on the 17 February conference as the panacea for all ills and problems. In actual fact this conference merely opens the lengthy process of constructing grassroots local self-government. This is a long road. The Russian zemstvo, for instance, played a huge political and social role in the 20th century. It was a forge for personnel and a school of genuine democracy. By 1917 the zemstvo was 64 years old. And it had withstood two major reconstructions.

So it is not worth hoping that a similar perfect mechanism will be created overnight. That is a lengthy process. There are not many other questions that are so virtually "in an impasse." And as yet it is not clear how to solve them.

Which principle, for instance, should be the basis—territorial or settlement [poselencheskiy]? Everybody seems to be pressing for a settlement-based principle, which is understandable. But if the settlement principle is chosen, this means that the rayon link does not help in self-government. It remains at the level of a state authority. But if settlements form local self-government bodies, then the rural bodies, for instance, do not get the land plots which belong to the inhabitants of this local self-government body because under the settlement principle the question can only arise within the settlement borders. But this is one the more complex questions.

And another thing. Should city and countryside differ in terms of local self-government structure? Is it really possible, for instance, to compare a large city with a small village? They are, of course, different entities. At the same time, a city does not need adjacent farmland, whereas a village does. So should they be structured differently, or not?

Throughout the world the basis of local self-government finances is made up of taxes on real estate. In our country they do not exist at all; there is no tax on property. What is to be done in that case? All other forms of taxation vary strongly "from place to place." Imagine, for instance, that there are three major enterprises in a city and the basis of local finance is a share in the profits from these enterprises. Let us assume that all three suffered losses this year. What then? Does this mean that the local coffers have nothing at all? On a countrywide scale, all this evens itself out: There are losses in one place, and huge profits in another, and as a whole everything is more or less as it should be, provided there is no economic crash.

But within the framework of a small administrative unit taken separately, it can be said that if all the enterprises make a loss there will be nothing in the coffers. It is necessary to rely on more stable laws. The most stable is, of course, a tax on real estate, with which as yet we have done nothing, and it is not completely clear what should be done.

There is one more question which is hard to settle: Servicemen do not, as we know, pay taxes. But the children of local servicemen—and there are quite a few—study in some population centers. The local schools get virtually nothing in terms of support. Does this mean that these schools have to be subsidized? Hence there must be a flexible policy.

In discussion with legal experts one question is left hanging in the air: Does the Constitution have in mind a "right to self-government" or a duty?

If for some reason a given settlement believes that it wants to work under the state authority and does not want self-government, is it the case that it will be compelled to accept self-government? This is no easy question. Take, for instance, the whole of the North. There is almost no private property, there is a complete statization of life—from top to bottom.

These are just some of the questions to which there are no answers right now. For this reason, the work ahead to create a system of local self-government taking due account of the many, many versions of its development looks set to be serious and lengthy.

Premier Praises Yeltsin's Address to Federal Assembly

LD2302102495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Prime Minister Chernomyrdin described today the annual address of President Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly as "a most specific and pragmatic document, which set practical tasks before all state institutions, primarily before the executive authorities."

Speaking at the first meeting of the government after the president made public his address "on the effectiveness of state power in Russia," the prime minister stressed that the document had set specific tasks before the government. These include, in the first place, financial stabilisation, the creation of a favourable investment climate both for Russian and foreign investors and the formation of starting conditions and potential for a future economic growth, Chernomyrdin said. The president's address mentioned the beginning of a strategic structural maneuver, in which the government will act in three directions: the technological modernisation of the Russian economy, the consolidation of the national industrial infrastructure and the development of export, especially of its science-intensive part. The president's message to the Federal Assembly outlined, at last, a real turn towards the social orientation of the economic reform, i.e. the taking of a number of measures ensuring economic and social rights of citizens, guaranteed by the constitution, the prime minister stressed.

Content, Setting of Yeltsin Message Viewed

MM2002121195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by Otto Latsis: "Boris Yeltsin Hopes to Beat Inflation at the Third Attempt"]

[Text] On 16 February Boris Yeltsin presented his annual message to the Federal Assembly. On the previous evening, in the Kremlin, journalists met with the presidential aides responsible for preparing the text of the message. Presidential aides Yuriy Baturin, Mikhail Krasnov, Aleksandr Livshits, and Georgiy Satarov participated in the meeting, which was organized by Vyacheslav Kostikov.

The President Looked Into All the Details

The journalists learned that the work had taken four months, that all the main government departments, political parties and public organizations and parliamentary structures had been involved, that personal letters had been sent to 30 or so prominent scientific and cultural figures, writers, and journalists asking for their ideas, that the president himself had worked on at least five versions of the text, looking into all the details and making many comments.

Since no paper will be able to carry either the message, which runs to nearly 100 pages, or the 21-page speech to the parliamentarians on 16 February (which is an independent document and not a rehash of the message), excerpts from the message, the main theme of which is determined this year by its headline—"Concerning the Effectiveness of State Authority in Russia"—will obviously be of interest.

This is from the preamble:

"We do not yet have a perception of the state as one of the most significant achievements of world history and social culture. Civilized human intercourse is impossible without it. The state means not only the institutions of authority and the officials employed in them. It is first and foremost the political organization of all the country's citizens, their joint property and common concern. So opposition to statehood as such is extremely dangerous."

"Responsibility for the country's future is borne equally by the state institutions and society."

"A position is constructive when it reflects a sense of civic duty, that is, active, conscious participation in the state's affairs, enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, and, at the same time, conscientious performance of one's constitutional duties," Expressed here (not without polemical zeal) are mature ideas, to be cherished, which certainly merit public attention—in particular about the state as the joint property of citizens and not just the totality of institutions of authority. And, at the same time, it sets the tone for the message as a whole, enabling it to rise above the topics of the day, as it were, when their detailed and painstaking discussion might not always be desirable by any means.

The first chapter is called: "Safeguarding Sovereignty, Independence, and Integrity." The first paragraph is about the economy. The first words are: "Russia will not have reliable guarantees of sovereignty, independence, and integrity until it overcomes the economic crisis." Further on we find a candid statement that much of what was planned in last year's message has not been fulfilled, because of mistakes by the government among other things. It says in part: "We failed to take advantage of the comparatively favorable economic situation that had taken shape by last summer and begin a massive transformation of savings and investments."

Upturn in Store

The message is permeated with the belief that the country is on the brink of an economic upturn and that 1995 could see a definite change: "The task in 1995 is to shape the initial conditions and potential for future economic growth." It notes that over the years of reform two significant attempts have been made to halt inflation: In the first half of 1992, and in late 1993-early 1994 (the two "Gaydar" periods, the reader will note if he has a good memory). For various reasons the job was not completed. "The third attempt must succeed," the message urges. That would be nicer, of course.

The economic section, extensive and pretty specific, could be offputting, at a cursory glance, with its long list of tasks for the state. But it is not that tedious call for state regulation, with its implicit primitive ideas of antireformist revenge. It is a logical list of economic measures creating a competitive environment and favorable investment climate.

We may imagine that the preparation of the economic section did not present any fundamental problems and that even the acknowledgment of the authorities' mistakes came relatively easily. But here is Chapter 1, Paragraph 3: "The right to use state force and the Chechnya crisis." Sure, a pretty good idea: To link the analysis of the Chechnya crisis to certain theoretical questions of statehood. And the actual theoretical notions about the right to use state force are logical and apt. It is also a reasonable attempt to acknowledge the supreme authorities' mistakes, expressed in the following words: "The Chechnya crisis has mirrored all the problems of Russian statehood. These included the stagnant, obsolete system of planning political and military operations on that scale, ill-coordinated actions by a variety of departments, intolerable contempt for the independent media and independent public opinion, which echoed past practices, and much else."

Finally, there was no problem either with the numerous facts and arguments revealing the illegitimacy and criminal nature of the Dudayev regime. There remains, however, the question of why all these sensible ideas were not brought to the notice of the population of Chechnya, the population of Russia as a whole, and the forces sent to Chechnya before the armed operation began. And why does even this document reiterate claims which contradict known facts and are refuted by the actual text of the message? Here is an example: "State force was used in Chechnya when the federal authorities had exhausted all other means of influence." But no one has yet explained why the federal forces moved into Chechnya (11 December) before the start of the planned talks (12 December) and before the Russian Federation president's ultimatum expired (15 December). There are some other facts that refute the thesis that all peaceful avenues had been explored.

Or the following: "In fall 1994 in the Chechen Republic, that is, on the territory of the Russian Federation, armed clashes began between Dudayev's formations and the opposition, involving the use of heavy armaments and military equipment." Now why is this in the president's message? After all, the whole of Russia saw on television "opposition" prisoners from Moscow Oblast troop units, recruited by the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service.

"No!" to Fascism

The second chapter is called "The State's Obligations in the Defense of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms." The topics examined in it elicit nothing but satisfaction: economic and social rights during the reform period, support for culture, science, and education, and the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms throughout Russia.

From Paragraph 2.1: "Cheap labor cannot be efficient. There must be no new restrictions on wages, and we will gradually eliminate the existing ones." It sets the task of providing benefits for every child in a family up to the age of majority. It confirms the intention of formulating and beginning the implementation of a program to restore the population's savings, starting with the reimbursement of a "considerable proportion" of the savings debts to elderly people.

It sets the task of creating an effective system to protect the individual from state tyranny, and proposes the only instrument for achieving this possible in a rule-of-law state, to wit the judicial system. It is currently paralyzed for many reasons, owing to the lack of the requisite laws among other things, as the judges believe; and they are refusing on these grounds to accept cases involving the defense of human rights for consideration. The message disputes that approach: The Constitution, which is a direct-acting law, contains the requisite provisions.

Admittedly, there is no precedent, there is no practice for applying it in this capacity. The message voices the hope that the Russian Federation Supreme Court will provide clarification.

In the third and last chapter ("Collaboration Between State and Public Structures") it is indisputably essential to single out the criticism of the Prosecutor's Office, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], and the Justice Ministry for intolerable passivity in combating political extremism, which in common parlance is known as fascism: "You cannot describe this situation as anything but a mockery of the memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic War," the message says. "It is necessary to end it. And we certainly cannot confine ourselves here merely to the law banning fascist propaganda currently being drafted by the State Duma. It is necessary to adopt a series of measures urgently to allow the law-enforcement organs effectively to combat manifestations of political extremism, defend the equality of Russian citizens, and ensure political stability."

Journalists Under Escort

The final paragraph of Chapter 3 entitled "The Mass Media and the Authorities" contains many interesting ideas. They relate to the honorable role of the first autonomous political opposition which the mass media played during the break to freedom, but which they must not play in a normal political system with a full-fledged party political opposition. They must not, but they are unwilling to give up these alien functions. They relate to the authorities' culpability for the confrontation arising between them and the press. They relate to the unshakability of the constitutional principle of freedom of mass information. They relate to the state's obligation to provide backing and protection for journalists and the need to defend them against pressure, never mind insults and physical reprisals. And they refer to the moral duty of journalists themselves.

The chapter ends with some very good words: "There must be no confrontation between the 'fourth estate' and any other estate. It is the common task of all branches of authority to interact and strengthen Russian democracy and the state." And the journalists' entire discussion with the bright, intelligent people in the Kremlin was very good.

As always one of our colleagues, a journalist, spoiled everything. At the end of the conversation he lingered behind in the room where we had been talking and for some reason telephoned his editorial office. The rest of us had to wait in the corridor. Because we had to assemble so that we could all go to the exit at once. The escort could not take everyone separately. I am not convinced that he is officially called an escort there. He may be called a guide or something else. But that is what he does: He escorts you. This procedure, to wit escorting journalists from the entrance to the prescribed office and back again, was recently introduced in the Kremlin. You cannot stray a step to the left or to the right there. You can, for instance, ask to go to the toilet and you are able to do so; someone has already checked that: You are allowed to go. But you are also accompanied there and back. The visitor's pass ordered by a member of the apparatus, by a presidential aide, for instance, the arch with the metal detector at the entrance, the x-ray machine that your bag goes through as at an airport—all that comes as a matter of course, as does the escort.

It is well-known that in the old days visitors' movements around the Kremlin's corridors were also monitored: Internal posts recorded your movement, But an escort and checks on every office—that did not even occur to people then. So in the old days they were not able to meticulously humiliate guests and compromise the Kremlin's masters. The effectiveness of the current state power has clearly exceeded that of the previous one in this respect. It is a pity that I do not known whom to congratulate: The presidential aides could not tell us who was responsible for the innovation.

Yeltsin State of Federation Message Analyzed

MM2102143095 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by political observer Aleksandr Bykovskiy: "Former Course in New Packaging"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt that the central political event of the past week was the latest annual message from the president to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly. It was essentially the state power's report on the state of affairs in the country last year and a program of action for the year which has started. But in many ways the message was also the president's personal report. After all, according to the Constitution he determines the fundamental avenues of the state's domestic and foreign policy. This circumstance acquires special meaning under the conditions of the approaching elections.

In this connection attention is drawn by the fact that in his message B. Yeltsin emphatically keeps quiet about the subject of Russia's socialist past, although only relatively recently not one of his public speeches was without anticommunist rhetoric. The president probably realizes that any comparison of the Russians' life under socialism, although it was of course far from complete prosperity, with their situation in the present capitalist "paradise" will nonetheless obviously not be in favor of the latter.

And it is no accident that the message speaks so much of the need for the effective functioning of the system for the social protection of citizens and the introduction of fundamental amendments to the budget ideology to elaborate state minimum standards for the main living standard indicators. And in general there was something unprecedented for present times: The president called for the development of free education (or for a very moderate payment) outside school for children and adolescents. It is time to exclaim: Truly, it was worth destroying to its foundation the entire system for the social protection of Russians (both children and adults) in order now to announce the need for its restoration!

One more key thesis of the president's message was just as "unique." The task was set of a relative reduction of the economy's raw material sphere and an increase in the proportion of the processing industry and state support for Russian scientific and technical potential. And that after three years of so-called reforms as a result of which the country has found itself on the verge of complete collapse. Just try to reduce the export of Russian energy raw materials when we now have to import into Russia in considerable quantities not only industrial goods but also food.

Nor does the president's message promise anything good for the agrarian sector, although it would also seem to have been promised state support and sensible protection from foreign competitors and Russian monopolists. But the authorities' real actions convince us that this all remains merely good intentions. It was First Vice Premier A. Chubays who at the conference with regional leaders stated that the Russian Government intends "to halt or at any rate radically reduce the allocation of centralized credits to the agro-industrial complex."

So, the reader exclaims, is there nothing new in the president's message? I shall try to answer. There is something new—primarily the graphically expressed desire of the president's team to direct the present chaos into a more or less controllable channel—the channel of state capitalism with its characteristic high degree of state interference in the economic sphere. And is it not this, and not in any way the events in Chechnya, which is the real reason for the seemingly unexpected disagreement in the relations between the president and his recent passionate supporters like Ye. Gaydar?

To be frank, a certain change in guidelines in the state's development could be considered in general a positive phenomenon particularly after the three-year period of collapse of the most important spheres of society's activity. But we shall not oversimplify the situation. After all, this change which has emerged does not alter the thrust of the present political regime. It is simply that, resolving to seize the initiative from the opposition which is rightly rebuking the Kremlin for its kowtowing to the West, it is trying to become the expresser of the interests primarily of Russian capital.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Russia is by no means the first country to have embarked on the path of state capitalism. History attests that this path has been marked by numerous social eruptions, the repartition of land, the consolidation of the state's military-political might, and the intensification of its foreign expansion. And there can be no doubt that Russia must also experience all this.

Actually, it will experience it only on one condition: If the present political regime receives a further credit of trust from Russians at the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. But that is highly problematic since there cannot be any question of any substantial improvement in the lives of the overwhelming majority of Russians in the time left until the elections. According to all preliminary signs B. Yeltsin and his supporters should suffer a crushing defeat at the future elections. All this probably cannot fail to perturb the president's entourage.

And under the command of the former CPSU "ideologist" A. Yakovlev a social democratic party is hastily being created which is obviously intended to secure if not B. Yeltsin's victory at the future presidential elections then at least his "soft" departure from power while preserving Russia's present course toward capitalization. And in his public speeches the long-standing party "propagandist" is already speaking of the need to go to the people, primarily in the rural regions, to win future votes in the elections.

At the same time the State Duma is hurriedly forming a new faction which to all kinds of promises is recruiting parliamentarians ready to support the propresidential drafts of future electoral laws.

Nonetheless one wants to believe that in contrast to the 1991 elections the Russians will be able to recognize the real seekers of high state office and at the future elections will give their votes not to the latest demagogues but to politicians who can not verbally but in deeds secure peace and prosperity for Russia and its citizens.

Gorbachev Not Ruling Out 1996 Presidential Bid

LD2202202995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1807 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Yelmakov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novosibirsk February 22 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev does not rule out the possibility of running in Russia's presidential elections in 1996.

He told a press conference upon arrival in Novosibirsk today that he would make the final decision when the date of the elections was formally announced.

Gorbachev stressed that he regarded the Russian public opinion as a decisive factor in favour of his nomination. He forecasted that a new political line-up would emerge after the presidential and parliamentary elections.

The new government would assume responsibility for making decisions which, he thinks, will be the most important in Russia's entire history.

Gorbachev praised "the Russian president's firm commitment to holding free and fair elections". He said: "Free elections are very important as a constitutional means of toppling the present regime which has lost the backing of the main mass of the Russian people and is moving towards totalitarianism".

In Novosibirsk, Gorbachev is due to meet workers, intellectuals and students.

Novosibirsk Visit Schedule Previewed

LD2302100095 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0100 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev is in Novosibirsk on an unofficial visit from 22-24 February. Our correspondent Tamara Ventsemerova reports:

[Ventsemerova] Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in Novosibirsk at the personal invitation of State Duma deputy Aleksey Manannikov. And inasmuch as the visit by the ex-president of the USSR is of an emphatically unofficial nature the local authorities as represented by the mayor and the governor did not show an interest in meeting with him. The initiators of this visit were also refused a luxurious reception for Mikhail Sergeyevich. For two days he will be living in an ordinary hotel and not at the governor's dacha where it is the custom to meet eminent guests, as, say, recently Galina Vishnevskaya.

Many observers link Gorbachev's arrival with the forthcoming presidential elections. However, at a news conference, for the time being he did not officially announce that he wishes to take part in the elections.

The programme for Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Novosibirsk includes several meetings. On the morning of 23 February, Defenders of the Fatherland Day, he will lay flowers at the monument of glory to the Siberian Soldiers. However, Colonel General Viktor Kopylov, commander of the Siberian Military district's troops, regarded as inadvisable Gorbachev's proposal to meet with the district's officers. Also on 23 February Gorbachev will meet with the intelligentsia in the state public scientific-technical library and will afterward visit Akademgorodok where he will conduct a roundtable with Siberian scientists on the topic: Russia at the meeting-point of the centuries. This topic was proposed by Mikhail Sergeyvich himself.

On 24 February he intends to visit the Stankosib enterprise.

At his first news conference for journalists Gorbachev expressed his views on a number of serious Russian economic and political problems. He also formulated his attitude to the events in Chechnya, describing the military conflict as an adventure and a strategic mistake by the government. He stressed that the army should not take part in resolving political conflicts. In this connection analogies with the events in Vilnius and Baku did not appear correct to him.

Afghan Veterans Union Said To Back Lebed for President

LD2202134095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1322 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Nomination of General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Russian army, to the post of the Russian president as a candidate from the Union of the Afghan War Veterans "occurred after Lebed agreed to run for this post," commandant of the Tiraspol military garrison Colonel Mikhail Bergman reported to Interfax.

In his words, servicemen of the 14th army "have unanimously backed decision of the Afghan war veterans."

"The army believes that Aleksandr Lebed is one of those who can secure stability in Russia because he enjoys support of all power structures of the Federation," Bergman said.

An extraordinary conference of the Russian Union of the Afghan War Veterans was held February 21 in Moscow. Delegates of the conference proposed Aleksandr Lebed as a candidate to the post of the president from the Russian Union of the Afghan War Veterans.

Lebed Not 'Bursting' To Be President

LD2102170295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1641 GMT 21 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau February 21 TASS—"I am not bursting to presidency and have not called for resignation of Boris Yeltsin in any interviews. It seems that someone wants to make a scarecrow [as received] of me," commander of the Russian 14th Army told ITAR-TASS here today.

A statement to the effect was caused by recent press "interviews" which Aleksandr Lebed claiming the general is planning to run for president and criticizes the current Russian leadership. [sentence as received]

Declines To Comment on Candidacy

LD2202150295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Commander of Russia's 14th Army General-Lieutenant Aleksande Lebed has declined to comment on media reports saying he planned to run for Russian presidency.

"I have never made such statements and I categorically refuse to make any comments. Let those reports lie on the conscience of those who wrote them. My job is to run an army and do not want any one to stop me from doing it", Lebed told Interfax on Wednesday.

In the meantime, a number of Russian and western publications including the U.S. TIME newsmagazine carried reports saying "Lebed does not rule out the possibility of becoming Russia's president".

For his part, Military Commander of the Army Garrison in Tiraspol Colonel Mikhail Bergman in an interview with Interfax on Wednesday said Lebed's nomination follows his agreement to run as presidential candidate from the Union of Afghan War Veterans.

However, Chairman of the Russian Union of Afghan War Veterans (RSVA) Franz Klintsevich has described as provocation yesterday's reports saying that RSVA was planning to nominate Lebed as its candidate in the next presidential election.

Korzhakov Informs Oblast Leader of Yeltsin Coal Edict

MK1802082095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Korzhakov Reassures Kislyuk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A draft edict of the Russian Federation president, "On the Coal Industry," has already been drawn up, says an official communication of the Kemerovo Oblast press service. At Boris Yeltsin's request, this news was given to oblast administration head Mikhail Kislyuk—who asked that such an edict be issued—by Aleksandr Korzhakov, chief of the main directorate for the protection of the Russian president. The draft sets stiff wage quotas based on coal-mining enterprises' revenues, and provides for punishment which includes indictment for nonpayments, something upon which Mikhail Kislyuk insisted.

Goals of 'Regions of Russia' Association Outlined

954F1430A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Aleksey Makhrovskiy: "Remote Areas Against 'Moscow's Hands'; Regions of Russia Is the Name of a New Social Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Against the background of famous scandals that occur from time to time in the State Duma, events slip by at times that are not as outwardly spectacular, but that are no less important in their political content. That is what happened during the weekly break in the plenary meetings of parliament, when the presentation of the public association Regions of Russia that was founded was held in the headquarters of the New Regional Policy deputy group.

This fact has not yet caused any particular stir in the corridors of power, although under certain circumstances this association can almost be transformed into a leading political force.

The credo of the "party of the regions" was formulated at the founding conference with a lot of meaning: "Strong regions—a strong center—a strong Russia." As we see, it is to the regions that priority is given in strengthening Russia statehood; that is, the representatives of the new party intend to build the pyramid of federal power from below, from the province, and not as this has been done until now—from the top, from the Kremlin. This kind of approach, which does not depend on the personal ambitions of one or another politician, proposes a rather tough confrontation on the "province-center" axis. Therefore, the announcement of the leaders of the new association that it will defend the interests of the regions and establish counterweights to the centralist tendencies of the federal authorities can have serious consequences in a Russia that today is in the throes of a systems crisis.

The Chechen events demonstrated simply that neither the president, nor the government has any kind of coordinated regional policy. They do not know how to behave if one of the components of the federation suddenly wants "to take as much sovereignty as it can swallow." On the other hand, the leaders of these components have sufficient justification to be dissatisfied with the clumsy socioeconomic policy of the center. The mistakes of the federal authorities have a painful effect on the situation of the ordinary citizens of a province, but then it is the local leaders who have to put out the inevitable social cataclysm. Who, in addition, have very few economic and social levers at this time.

As was declared at the founding conference of the "party of the regions" by Vladimir Medvedev, the leader of the New Regional Policy deputy group (who, incidentally, was elected chairman of the Regions of Russia Association), in this association a number of components of the federation "are beginning to be drawn to economic centers beyond the borders of Russia, as, for example, is happening in the Maritime Region." Declaring this trend to be extremely dangerous for the state and not responsive to the strategic interests of the regions, Vladimir Medvedev noted that no one can pull out of the economic crisis by himself.

It is from this that the need arises to create the kind of political structure that would be able to adequately represent the interests of the regions at the federal level. For the time being, this task is laid down rather narrowly by the members of the new association—but there are more than 60 regional organizations among its founders: victory in the elections to the new Russian parliament and the establishment there of a strong centrist "bloc of regions." They are not attempting at present to attract to their side any one of the well-known political figures, thereby demonstrating not so much their weakness, as confidence in massive support from the localities.

Security Service Law Seen Creating Consolidated Agency

MK2302122095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov: "A Superorgan That Is Allowed Everything"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its third attempt yesterday the State Duma, at long last, finally approved the law "On Federal Security Service Organs." In the process of the bill's finalization in the parliament lower house, the current Federal Counterintelligence Service not only lost its name but also formally fell under parliament control (the control system, however, is not elaborated in the law). The counterintelligence men's powers have expanded: Their jurisdiction now includes intelligence activity. At the same time the law does not guarantee the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] against a new reorganization: Quite the contrary, with its adoption Yeltsin gets the possibility to undertake, if necessary, a reform of special services and create a Supersecurity Superorgan.

The law approved by the deputies proclaims the Federal Security Service (FSS) the legal successor to the FCS. And it specifies that "the creation of federal security services not provided for under the present federal law is not allowed." But such a formulation does not rule out that the president, by way of implementing the law, will announce transformation of the FCS into the FSS and merge counterintelligence with the Main Protection Directorate headed by General Mikhail Barsukov. Naturally, in this event Sergey Stepashin, whom the deputies granted the rank of army general, will hardly stay on as chief of the new special service.

About FSS powers. Its officers have the right to "enter without hindrance" any premises and land plots regardless of their ownership status, "if there is sufficient evidence to suppose that a crime is being or has been perpetrated there" (this is exactly how the law says it!) which pertains to the jurisdiction of the FSS, or when pursuing not even criminals but persons only suspected of committing crimes. The FSS merely "informs" the prosecutor about such intrusions—within 24 hours. FSS officers are given the right to use transportation means for their purposes regardless of their ownership status, and use, "for purposes of concealing their identity," documents of other ministries, departments, enterprises, establishments, and organizations. Therefore if a cage with a lion reads "buffalo," one had better not believe his eyes. The FSS also gets carte blanche in what is known as "rendering assistance on a confidential basis." The means, methods, organization, and tactics of security service activity with informers (this institution, as is known, was an object of the fiercest attacks during the final days of the USSR) do not come under prosecutor's oversight. Informers may not be deputies, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, or priests. But they may "inform" on a basis other than contractual: without compensation. In addition to informers, the FSS will get special purpose forces.

The FSS' powers within the country, even if impressive, cannot shock anybody: Everybody has long been accustomed to a complete free-for-all with respect to special services (regardless of various party resolutions or laws). But the expansion of the FSS sphere of activity beyond Russian borders is without precedent: The security service is now obligated to engage in intelligence activity. In its time the KGB was divided into several independent structures precisely in order that each of them could do its own business and not turn into an omnipotent monster. And also, as far as is possible, look after the neighbors. The inclusion of intelligence activity in the FSS domain may be due to mistrust in data from the Foreign Intelligence Service and the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]. The law does not say what consequences could result from an increase in the number of "undercover agents" in missions abroad or at whose expense this will be done: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or colleagues from the Foreign Intelligence Service or the GRU. Earlier, this was done at the expense of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nor does it say how the powers between "friends/rivals" will be separated. And will there be any rivals left in the first place? The law points to a trend for consolidating virtually all special services under a single center.

The deputies may have "missed" such nuances owing to their overconcern with another aspect. Namely: oversight of FSS activity on the part of the Federal Assembly. True, no mechanism for this is specified. Signs are that there will be no real oversight, just like there was none before. The Constitution is silent on this count.

Poll Shows Gains for People's Self-Government Party

MK2302103095 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Oleg Savelyev under the "Social Barometer" rubric: "Parliament as Elected Next Sunday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the middle of February, the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion again asked 1,600 people in Russia the question: "If elections for parliament were held next Sunday, for whom would you vote?"

Agrarian Party of Russia (Lapshin): 2 percent
"Derzhava" Party: 3 percent
Democratic Party of Russia (Glazyev): 1 percent
Democratic Russia (Starovoytova): 2 percent
Democratic Choice of Russia (Gaydar): 6 percent
"Women of Russia" (Lakhova): 8 percent
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Zyuganov): 8 percent
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovskiy): 8 percent
Beer Lovers Party (Kalachev): 1 percent
People's Self-Government Party (S. Fedorov): 7 percent
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Shakhray): 4 percent
Economic Freedom Party (Borovoy): 1 percent
Russian Public Union (Baburin): 0.4 percent
Russian Social Democratic Union (Lipitskiy): 0.2 percent
Yavlinskiy's Bloc: 6 percent

For some other party: 1 percent
For no party/not going to vote: 26 percent
Hard to say: nearly 15 percent

Strikingly, Svyatoslav Fedorov's newly formed party placed fourth in the number of "votes scored," ahead of both the "Democratic Choice of Russia" and Yavlinskiy's bloc.

Military & Space Issues

Yeltsin Edict on Eliminating Ossetian-Ingush Conflict

MM2202153595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 first Edition p 11

["Edict of the Russian Federation President on Measures to Eliminate the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992," No. 139, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated 15 February 1995, plus "Postscript to Document" by Aleksandr Linkov, under the general heading "State of Emergency Edict Lifted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a result of the operation of the state of emergency on part of the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic and other measures adopted by the federal organs of state power to eliminate the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush armed conflict, it proved possible to take under control and stabilize the situation in the two republics. However, the events in the Chechen Republic, the attempts by illegal armed formations operating on its territory to penetrate and inflame the situation in adjacent regions, the difficult situation in settlements to which people are returning after having been forced to migrate, and the continuing violations of law and order still constitute a threat to citizens' security on the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic.

These circumstances were not fully taken into account by the Federal Assembly Federation Council, and examination of the question of ratifying the Russian Federation president's edicts on imposing a state of emergency on part of the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic was in effect broken off. On 3 February 1995 examination of Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 87 of 31 January 1995 did not take place because of the lack of a quorum; and on 7 February 1995, at the time of the examination of Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 93 of 4 February 1995, standing orders were violated in the course of voting.

In view of the situation that has developed and in connection with the need to adopt measures to protect human and citizens' rights and freedoms and safeguard legality, law and order, and public safety, in accordance with Articles 72 (Part 1, Point b), 77 (Part 2), 80 (Part 2), 85 (Part 1), and 112 (Part 1) of the Russian Federation Constitution and with the Russian Federation Law "On Security," and also with a view to coordinating the activity of federal organs of executive power in ensuring the fulfillment of edicts of the Russian Federation president and decisions of the Russian Federation Government on questions of the return of forced migrants to their former places of permanent residence and the elimination of the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992, I decree:

1. That there be formed, on the basis of the Interim Administration in Part of the Territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic which was introduced as a special form of government by Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 93, 4 February 1995, "On the Imposition of a State of Emergency on Part of the Territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic," an Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Elimination of the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992 (hereinafter the Interim State Committee).

That the location of the Interim State Committee is to be the cities of Vladikavkaz and Nazran.

2. That it be laid down that the Interim State Committee:

—is an interim federal organ of executive power carrying out the coordination of the activity of federal organs of executive power and their territorial organs, as well as of the organs of executive power of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic in eliminating the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992;

—is the successor to the Interim Administration in Part of the Territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic which was introduced as a special form of government by Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 93, 4 February 1995, including the leadership of bodies created under the Interim Administration in Part of the Territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic, with the legal status of these bodies and their officials being retained;

—pending the ratification of the statute on the Interim State Committee, is guided in its activity by the Statute on the Interim Administration approved by Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 2055, 30 November 1993, with the exception of questions concerning the maintenance of the state of emergency regime.

3. The labor remuneration procedure and social guarantees established by Russian Federation Government Decree No. 113, 7 February 1995, "On the Conditions for Labor Remuneration and Social Guarantees for Workers of the Interim Administration in Part of the Territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic and the Joint Investigations-Operations

Group of the Russian Federation General Prosecutor, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS], and the Caucasus Interregional Prosecutor's Office" are to be extended to staffers of the Interim State Committee and persons coopted and recruited for work in the Interim State Committee.

4. The Russian Federation MVD and the Russian Federation FCS:

—in conjunction with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Federal Border Service, are to adopt measures to prevent armed clashes, protect citizens' rights and freedoms, and ensure the security of the administrative-territorial borders of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic with a view to preventing the emergence of illegal armed formations or the transportation of weapons and ammunition on Ingush Republic territory;

—are to implement a package of measures to ensure public safety and the protection of vital facilities on the territories of the two republics in accordance with the jurisdiction established by Russian Federation legislation.

5. The Interim State Committee is to ensure coordination and monitoring of the activity of the forces and resources of the Russian Federation MVD, the Russian Federation FCS, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency Under the Russian Federation President, and the Russian Federation State Customs Committee located on the territories of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic, and on questions relating to the protection of the state border, are to ensure collaboration between the Interim State Committee and formations and units of the Russian Federation Border Forces in the region.

Russian Federation Government Decree No. 280, 31 March 1994, "On the Procedure for Establishing the Fact of the Fulfillment of Tasks by Servicemen and Other Persons in the Conditions of a State of Emergency and in Armed Conflicts, and for Granting Additional Guarantees and Compensations to Them" is to be extended to personnel of formations and military units of the federal organs of executive power taking part in the normalization of the situation and the restoration of law and order on the territories of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic.

6. The Russian Federation MVD, the Russian Federation FCS, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and the Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office are to adopt measures to disarm illegal armed formations and confiscate weapons unlawfully held by the population.

7. The government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the government of the Ingush Republic, the Interim State Committee, the Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office, the Russian Federation MVD, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance are to present a report on implementation of the present Edict to the Russian Federation Government every month.

8. The Russian Federation Government:

—is to approve a statute on the Interim State Committee within two weeks;

—is to ensure the implementation of measures associated with the fulfillment of the present edict and the activity of the Interim State Committee, including their financing;

—is to finance, promptly and in full, measures toward the comprehensive resolution of the problem of refugees and forced migrants;

—is to monitor the targeted use of the financial and material resources allocated.

9. The government of the Republic of South Ossetia and the government of the Ingush Republic:

in collaboration with the Interim State Committee, are to ensure the continued return of forced migrants to their former places of permanent residence on the territories of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic;

—are to elaborate and implement a package of measures to implement the provisions of the present Edict;

—are to provide medical, social, and municipal services for returning forced migrants and their families, as well as education for the children.

10. The Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 93, 4 February 1995, "On the Imposition of a State of Emergency on Part of the Territories of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Ingush Republic" is deemed to have lapsed.

11. The present Edict enters into force from the day of its publication.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation

B. Yeltsin. Moscow, the Kremlin 15 February 1995.

[Linkov postscript] Postscript to Document

Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has signed an Edict "On Measures To Eliminate the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992." The head of state took this step after the Federation Council refused, on 7 February, to ratify the latest edict on extending the state of emergency on part of the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. On that day, only 76 deputies in the upper house of parliament voted to extend the state of emergency. And that number was insufficient.

But any other turn of events could hardly have been expected. The previous presidential Edict also was not ratified by the Federation Council first time. It was only after work by the conciliation commission that all the discrepancies were ironed out. But on 7 February hopes that deputies would meet the president half-way and consent to the extension of the state of emergency were not great. First and foremost because the senators noted the absence of a mechanism for the implementation of emergency measures. And that gives no opportunity to monitor the operation of the state of emergency and its effectiveness. Moreover many deputies noted that the edict proposed by the president, like its predecessors, in no way takes account of the rather significant changes in the political situation in the North Caucasus due to events in Chechnya.

It must be noted that throughout the operation of the state of emergency, the attitude of the two republics' leaderships to it has been far from uniform. Whereas A. Galazov, president of North Ossetia, took a positive view of the measures being adopted, his Ingush colleague R. Aushev saw them highly critically.

Today even critics of the state of emergency are noting that the operation of this regime has had positive results and make it possible to stabilize the situation in the two republics. The process of coordinating the sides' interests was continuing, albeit slowly and with difficulty. However, at the end of last year all the cards were shuffled by the Chechen crisis. The situation has again become complex. And in these conditions the Federation Council did not consent to an extension of the state of emergency.

Yeltsin Edict on Chechnya Restoration Commission

MM2002101995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 1

[Edict No. 140 of the Russian Federation President, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 16 February 1995: "On Additional Measures To Restore the Economy and Social Sphere of the Chechen Republic,"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of supporting the organization of work aimed at restoring the economy and vital services of the Chechen Republic, I decree:

1. A State Commission for the Restoration of the Economy and Social Sphere of the Chechen Republic (hereinafter the State Commission) is to be formed comprising leaders of the federal executive organs engaged in work to restore the Chechen Republic's economy and vital services. It is hereby prescribed that leadership of the State Commission is to be exercised by one of the deputy chairmen of the Russian Federation Government on the decision of the chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

It is hereby prescribed that the State Commission's decisions are binding on federal executive organs and the executive organs of Russian Federation components, and on enterprises, institutions, and organizations participating in the restoration of the economy and vital services of the Chechen Republic.

2. The Russian Federation Government:

must determine within one week the composition of the State Commission and ratify a Statute on the State Commission, providing therein for the post of deputy chairman of the State Commission. It is hereby prescribed that the deputy chairman of the State Commission is to be provided with material, medical, domestic, and transport services on the same terms as those prescribed for a federal minister;

must form as part of the Russian Federation Government apparatus an appropriate subdivision for the organization of and technical backup for the State Commission's activity, augmenting the numerical strength of the Russian Federation Government apparatus by 20.

3. It is deemed necessary to create within the federal executive organs engaged in work to restore the economy and vital services of the Chechen Republic, as far as existing staff numbers allow, subdivisions to resolve the aforementioned questions, assigning the leadership of these subdivisions to the deputy leader of the relevant federal executive organ. The leaders of the federal executive organs are to submit the relevant proposals to the Russian Federation Government within five days.

4. The Russian Federation Government must complete within one month the elaboration of a federal targeted program to restore the economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic and a draft federal law providing for the level of funding for this program from the federal budget, and also drafts of other statutory legal acts required for the implementation of this program.

5. This edict comes into force from the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 16 February 1995

No. 140

Yeltsin Wishes Soldiers Safe Return From Chechnya

LD2302101095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1001 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speaking to reporters after laying a wreath at the unknown soldier's tomb said "he would like to wish Russian serviceman, fulfilling the duty in Chechnya, to remain alive and return home".

"Today I awarded orders, medals and higher ranks to many servicemen staying in Chechnya", the president said. He noted that the decree he signed today and the procedure of the presentation of awards will "considerably differ from those in the past years".

In connection with the Defender of the Fatherland Day, Yeltsin said: "Our soldiers need not worry. The people are for such a solution of the Chechen question as we chose. No matter what is written about the army, our soldiers never fire at the backs of old people, never use them as a shield, never hide in their houses in order to turn them into gun posts. Our soldiers fight honourably, and this is the main thing".

Regarding the present situation in Chechnya, Yeltsin said that "there are no combat operations now". He said that Russian servicemen moved back to the prepared positions, and servicemen of the interior forces will now bear the brunt.

Yeltsin Ready To 'Privately' Control Military Reform

LD2302130295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1107 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 23 (Interfax)—"Chechnya has proved once more that we are late with the military reform," President Boris Yeltsin said responding to Interfax correspondent Boris Grishchenko after the ceremony of placing wreaths on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin wall Thursday.

In honor of the state holiday, the Day of the Fatherland's Defender, Yeltsin, Chairman of the Russian government, deputies of both chambers of the Russian parliament, members of the Cabinet of Ministers honored memory of those who died for Russia's freedom and independence.

"The life itself necessitates reformation of the army and 1995 will be a serious stage in the renewal of the Russian Armed Forces," said Yeltsin, commander-in-chief of the Russian Armed Forces. "I am ready to privately control the process of the military reform. Of course, it will be difficult from the financial point of view but we shall find assets together with the government because there should be no delays any more—the army starts gradually going to pieces. We should do everything so that our army feels itself confidently."

Yeltsin wished to the Russian servicemen who fulfill their duty in Chechnya to return home as soon as possible. "Russian servicemen should be calm—the people are in favor of such solution of the Chechen issue," he said. At the same time Yeltsin underlined: "Our soldiers fight honestly."

According to Yeltsin, no active hostilities are being waged in Chechnya now, "the Interior Ministry forces are fulfilling their task there."

Kovalev on Support, Sanctions Over Chechnya Policy

AU2302085695 Berlin TANGO in German 23 Feb 95 p 34

[Interview with Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev by Stefan Schellenberg; place and date not given: "Yeltsin Must Not Attend the Summit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Schellenberg] You have criticized the West for acting too laxly against Yeltsin. What should Bonn do?

[Kovalev] Two things: give support and exert pressure.

[Schellenberg] There is probably no lack of support for Yeltsin. What should pressure be like?

[Kovalev] Of course, there is no pressure when Helmut Kohl says: "My dear friend, Boris, we are worried about Chechnya." One must not talk like that when tens of thousands of human lives are at stake.

[Schellenberg] How else?

[Kovalev] There are thousands of possibilities. I am not an expert. Perhaps the fear of economic sanctions is more effective than the sanctions themselves. Perhaps, however, there should also be economic sanctions posed as an ultimatum. One must examine this. Another example: Russia wants to extend the G-7 round into a G-8 round. The West, obediently and with all friendliness, invites Yeltsin to the meeting of the industrial nations. However, one could wait with that until the war in Chechnya is over.

[Schellenberg] Do you fear that the painfully established friendship between East and West might soon be over again?

[Kovalev] The friendship need not and must not be ended. However, the really bad mistake of the West is that it always just supports persons. First Gorbachev, then Yeltsin. Regardless of what they are doing. The West must help bring about a democratic system in Russia.

[Schellenberg] Do you think that Yeltsin still feels like the people's hero that he was during the putsch in 1991?

[Kovalev] I do not think so. He understands very well that there is a crisis of power in Moscow behind the Chechen war. It is a crisis of the system, which tried to be democratic but did not manage it. It ended up in a communist system once again.

[Schellenberg] Do you think that Yeltsin still wants to establish a democracy?

[Kovalev] These are all empty words. I create democracy, you create democracy, we create democracy. One must look at the real things. The war in Chechnya is real. The attempt to seize the press is real. The government's lie is real. Is this democracy? However, I do not want to use such a harsh words like dictatorship, either.

[Schellenberg] Should Yeltsin resign?

[Kovalev] No. He will not be reelected anyway. But it would be better if all elections went according to plan, because the greater the uncertainty among the people, the more likely someone who is even worse will replace Yeltsin. I do not know who this would be. Hopefully not someone like Zhirinovskiy.

[Schellenberg] Does the West now have to fear Russia again?

[Kovalev] Of course, no one will attack the West with a nuclear bomb, but Russia is still very far away from democracy.

Grachev Says Army One 'Guarantor' of State's Integrity

LD2202134995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1321 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Russian Army will be able to implement reforms necessary for it if all power branches understand the need for appropriate financing of Russia's Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev declared in an exclusive interview with Interfax. He is in the composition of the Russian delegation in Minsk where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is to conclude his official visit to Belarus Wednesday [22 February].

"Russia will not be able to resolve its problems, like the Chechen one, without a strong army. We should not forget that the Army is one of the guarantors of the country's integrity, inviolability of its borders in all times," Grachev said.

According to Grachev, "solution of social and scientific-technical problems of the army should enjoy priority." "One cannot build modern armed forces if homeless people serve in it," Grachev said minding officers who have no flats.

As far as technical aspects are concerned, "the Russian armed forces should not loose time for their re-equipping, they should not lag behind the world level," Grachev continued. "Not long ago I saw several kinds of military equipment, perfect scientific-technical achievements, at the test rage in Kubinka (near Moscow). However, we must pay for this and the Defense Ministry has even not paid off its debts to enterprises of the military-industrial complex over the last year," Grachev said.

Lebed Calls For Grachev's Resignation

AU2302091495 Hamburg STERN in German 23 Feb 95 p 202

[Interview with General Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed, commander of the 14th Army in Moldova, by Katja Gloger; place and date not given: "A General Wants To Clean Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gloger] General, why do you claim that President Yeltsin has led Russia into political and economic chaos?

[Lebed] He cannot always blame everything on the mistakes made by other people—Lenin, Stalin, or Gorbachev. Yeltsin has now been in power for four years. One may certainly expect two or three real steps forward. And what are we doing instead? We are running in the other direction. What we have been building here for almost four years now is not a democracy but, at best, a shaky hen-house.

[Gloger] How do you want to change that?

[Lebed] There are possibilities. I would tackle one thing first of all: In Russia, virtually no one adheres to the laws. The entire country is turning into a Mafia state.

[Gloger] Would you advocate a military dictatorship? After all, you are propagating the model of Chilean dictator Pinochet to save the fatherland....

[Lebed] ...I have only said: The so-called bloodthirsty General Pinochet brought order to his country. He forced the people to once again work for their state and their families.

[Gloger] Through torture and the secret police.

[Lebed] As far as I know, Pinochet must be blamed for the deaths of 3,000 people. In our country, more people are killed every week. And, finally, he peacefully passed on power to an elected government. Now Chile is a flourishing country.

[Gloger] Are you a democrat, General?

[Lebed] I am not. There is no democracy in the Army, and there must not be any. Or do you want hold a vote when you have to go to war?

[Gloger] But it is particularly you who is criticizing your superiors because of the war in Chechnya....

[Lebed] ...this war has not been won. Groznyy is still not conquered. Now the fighting is shifting to the east; in the town of Shali a second Groznyy is imminent. And the situation in the neighboring republics is tense. There is the danger that the conflict will spread to the entire Caucasus.

[Gloger] Will Defense Minister Grachev survive this disaster?

[Lebed] Grachev should resign. He sent a cheated and disoriented army to Chechnya. We are fed up with his lies, with the lies about alleged reforms in the Army, about all the alleged successes. Now the professionals must get to it, people who want to do something for their country and not those who just think of their own advantage.

[Gloger] And what about Russia's unity that President Yeltsin is conjuring up?

[Lebed] The constitutional order cannot be reestablished either with artillery or with tanks. Negotiations are the only chance, no matter how long they take.

[Gloger] Should the West continue to support Yeltsin?

[Lebed] Russia must not be isolated. If this happens, everything here may become completely unpredictable. Russia constitutes one-eighth of the world's surface. Just because of that, the West must help, out of pure egotism. And it must help with all available political and financial means.

Lebed Condemns Chechnya War, Calls Yeltsin 'Destroyer'

BR2202160195 Paris LE POINT in French 18 Feb 95 pp 54-55

[Interview with General Aleksandr Lebed, 14th Russian Army commander, by Virginie Coulloudon; place and date not given: "'Boris Yeltsin Is a Destroyer'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Coulloudon] Since August 1992 you have headed the 14th Russian Army stationed in the self-proclaimed republic of Transdnestr in eastern Moldova. This enclave on the left bank of the Dnestr has also been the site of bloody clashes. Can a parallel be drawn between the Chechnyan conflict and the one you experienced?

[Lebed] In Chechnya we have merely reproduced the errors committed in Transdnestr. In both cases the aim was "to restore constitutional order." In both cases nobody took the trouble to sit down at the negotiating table and use their good sense to find a way out of the impasse. On each occasion we merely resorted to using force and strongarm tactics. To no effect. Constitutional order cannot be restored using aircraft, guns, and tanks. This should be clear by now.

[Coulloudon] What do you consider to be the main lesson to be learned from the Chechnya conflict?

[Lebed] There is only one lesson to be learned from it, the most basic lesson of all: Since the dawn of mankind, all wars, even the Hundred Years War, ended in negotiation and the signature of a peace treaty. What is there to be gained by creating more corpses, invalids, and orphans, by exacerbating the agony of an economy that is already virtually comatose, only to embark on negotiations over a heap of ruins at a later stage? On both banks of the Dnestr, good sense prevailed in the end. The towns and villages in question may not exactly radiate wealth, but they are at least intact.

[Coulloudon] How can the forces of the Interior Ministry put an end to the war in Chechnya?

[Lebed] They are incapable of doing so. First of all they should have used economic and financial pressures and profited from the time gained by these to prepare the Army. If this had proven insufficient then they would have had to organize a lightning war. Today there is only one possible outcome of the conflict: We must urgently put an end to it and make peace before the whole Caucasus region erupts in a chain reaction.

[Coulloudon] It is often said that officers would not have been guilty of insubordination if they had received their orders in writing.

[Lebed] In the absence of legally binding written orders, orders given by telephone are equally valid. When I was a divisional commander I was sent to all the areas of conflict within the former Soviet Union without ever being given a written order. All we were told was to set off without delay and "restore order" as quickly as possible, but what does "restore order" mean? To shoot at everything that moves until there is silence? It is not up to the soldiers themselves to make their own decisions at every street corner.

Since 1988, the Army has paid for its short-sighted policies. We are stigmatized by the Afghan war. In 10 years of war, 15,000 men were killed and 30,000 more were injured. Yet who counted those who died after the troops were withdrawn? What are the Russian and Chechen old men, women, and children caught in the trap of Groznyy actually guilty of ? They are innocent, but have still been sacrificed. Let the same soldiers who lost their human face in Chechnya also go home and find no more than a crater where their house once stood. They would no longer be soldiers, but wolves. Wolves howling at death as long as they are alive. That will be our legacy.

[Coulloudon] Some people in Moscow estimate that it is time to help Boris Yeltsin leave the political arena. Do you think this problem is a topical one?

[Lebed] Most definitely. Boris Yeltsin is by nature a destroyer. The only politics he knows involves breaking down and destabilizing his environment. That is a boon in a transitional period, but now it is time to build something, and Boris Yeltsin is no builder.

Says Chechnya Leading to 'Catastrophe'

TA0601134795 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Jan 95 p A12

[Interview with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of Russian 14th Army, by Isabella Ginor on 5 January; place not given; Russian names and titles as published]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "The military intervention in Chechnya is driving the Russian Army and political leadership to a catastrophe," Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the Russian 14th Army, said yesterday in an interview with HA'ARETZ.

Lebed, who has been mentioned recently as a prominent candidate to replace Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and possibly as a candidate for the Russian Presidency, is the most popular army officer in the eyes of the Russian Army and public, according to public opinion polls.

Referring to the compliments that President Boris Yeltsin has recently heaped on Defense Minister Grachev, Lebed spoke scathingly about Grachev and the accomplishments of his army in Chechnya. "The Russian Army, which was reformed under the leadership of the best minister ever in the whole world, has demonstrated its ability. We sailed onto a reef on our way to our destination," Lebed said.

[Ginor] How will the intervention in Chechnya affect the Russian Army's condition?

[Lebed] Surely for the better. We can often benefit by hitting ourselves in the face—it helps one sober up; it will work in this case, too.

[Ginor] Both Deputy Defense Minister Gromov and Deputy Ground Forces Commander Vorobyev disagree with the Russian policy in Chechnya. Is there a whole group of officers opposed to military intervention in domestic affairs?

[Lebed] There is a group of officers with common sense, who are familiar with the history of their country and army, who know how such interventions usually end—both for the Army and the country.

[Ginor] Words of caution against Army intervention in domestic affairs were voiced after the tank gunfire at the Russian Parliament building in October 1993. Would you say they have become reality?

[Lebed] Definitely. An unwholesome precedent has been set. [passage omitted on Lebed's past]

[Ginor] Reinforcements are being sent to Chechnya from all over Russia. Have there been attempts to send units of your army?

[Lebed] No. That is nonsense. There have been none.

[Ginor] You have harshly criticized the political leadership over the economic fiascoes, and you have even spoken of the need to implement the "Pinochet model" in Russia. Will you continue voicing this stand in the future?

[Lebed] It is my own business. I will decide according to the circumstances. I prefer to act first and talk later. It works better that way.

[Ginor] It sounds like good advice for other Russians, too.

[Lebed] Yes, but I do not dare insist on it. After all, I am merely an Army commander.

Army's Problems, Chechnya Lessons Viewed

MM2002150195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Anatoliy Golovnev, deputy commander in chief of Ground Forces for combat training, by Gennadiy Miranovich; place and date not given: "Fighting in Chechnya: Lessons and Conclusions. The Last Thing To Do Is Train Troops Under Fire. Colonel General Anatoliy Golovnev, Deputy Commander in Chief of Ground Forces for Combat Training, Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Miranovich] Anatoliy Andreyevich, critical comments, including with regard to the troops' training, predominate among the wide range of opinions about the military's actions in Chechnya. There is even talk of some military "saboteurs," who, it is alleged, deliberately sent undermanned units and untrained soldiers into battle. I realize how sorry you are to hear this, since you received these units and these soldiers before they were sent off to the combat zone. But is it really any easier for all of us to hear the figures for the losses, more than half of which are losses of Ground Forces personnel?

[Golovnev] It is hard for everyone to hear of the losses although we know that they cannot be avoided in a war. But since some people are impatient to get hold of a "saboteur," let us not play games, let us call a spade a spade. Has the country learned of the problems with the organization of Army combat training only today? This has been discussed impartially at all levels since the presidential edict on the formation of the Army. For three years now we have been hollering about the need to resolve at state level the problems of Army staffing, funding, and technical rearmament and have been asking for the troops to be exempted from performing tasks not associated with their role. But what response did we get?

Big talk by various "experts" and "humanists" about the advent of universal democratic prosperity and the absence of any kind of threat. An unbridled anti-Army campaign, which dispelled young people's idea of the need to do their constitutional duty of defending the fatherland. The destruction of all the fundamentals of patriotic education for the rising generation. A military budget that stifles the Army and kills off all hope of reviving troop combat training....

Incidentally, the Ground Forces Military Council briefed Russian Federal Assembly deputies literally the day before the Army contingent was sent into the Chechen Republic on the catastrophic situation—including with regard to combat training—within its branch of the Armed Forces. But what kind of training can there be when—you can see for yourselves!—there is nothing for the people that we do have to wear.

Do you know how much money was allocated last year to improve the training base? Not a cent! Commanders used to dispatch soldiers for so-called seasonal work at local enterprises in order to earn at least the plywood for their targets. But now there is no one to send. Many district commanders have, so to speak, trained their subordinates on credit on their own responsibility. Thus, the Moscow and Far Eastern Districts for instance "owed" 200 million and 350 million rubles respectively.... But some would not take the risk. Or they worked with what was left from the Soviet Army, used stocks withdrawn from Germany, and tried to get hold of intact simulators. Or.... By and large, if one-third of the company commanders managed to conduct at least one exercise, that is a good thing. The situation is no better in army aviation (an interview with its commander, Colonel General of Aviation V. Pavlov, was printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 February—author's note), artillery, or tactical air defense.

Thus the "criticism of the troops' training," as you kindly put it, is not unfounded. And the main "saboteur" in my view is plain to see. But to say that boys "with no combat experience" went into battle.... I spent almost a month there permanently training the incoming troops. Over 80 representatives of combat training command and control organs, starting with the Main Directorate and ending with the army or corps echelon, received the troop trains, checked out the equipment right there at a makeshift test range in Mozdok, and embarked on training subunits in combat teamwork, firing weapons, and driving, and rehearsed tactics in light of the specific nature of the missions being performed.

[Miranovich] So, you are more aware of the shortcomings than anyone else?

[Golovnev] Everything happened within tight deadlines. And the amount of work.... It takes four days just to put equipment that has been in storage for three or four years on the firing line—even if it is in working order. In practice by no means all the vehicles were in working order. Many had to be replaced. In order to "provide armored vehicles" for a regiment, it was sometimes necessary to reassemble a division's entire fleet of vehicles.

Retraining caused plenty of hassle. For instance, according to regulations it takes over a month to "transfer" a driver from a T-72 to a T-80. Needless to say, we did not have that kind of time. Nevertheless within the five to eight days allocated—and some units were kept even longer at the test ground—we managed not only to man tank and infantry fighting vehicle crews with the requisite specialists but also to slightly "run them in." Before going into battle every driver covered around 100 km. No crew, no artillery or mortar crew left the test ground without being sure of their armor's reliability. Every soldier was trained in firing all categories of firearms. We rehearsed with commanders the squad, platoon, and company fire-control tactics at reduced range and conducted radio training sessions. There were also battle drills at battalion level.

Shortcomings?... I can hardly list them all now. Painstaking analysis still lies ahead and not every slipup necessarily attests to a soldier or commander being poorly trained. Fighting in a city, moreover in your own country, when the opposing side has the same kind of clothing, the same vehicles, is an incredibly complex task. You also have to take into consideration the fact that the incoming subunits were often formed on paper, with no provision being made for the availability of personnel. They were replenished in Mozdok. So, commanders and their subordinates did not have time before the battle to even remember one another's faces.

Undermanning is in my view the most terrible thing for an army. What is an undermanned repair company say? It should after all comprise specialists who take more than a day or two to train. But if they are not available, combat-damaged equipment that could in a number of cases return to the fray becomes lumps of scrap metal.

Commanders can of course also be reproached for the fact that we have few snipers. For the fact that, on finding themselves in a situation where they have to operate in small groups, they sometimes lost command of their subordinates, and so on. But in that case be so good as to tell the commander. Whom is he to train as snipers when there are two or three people in a so-called squad per infantry fighting vehicle? How can you exercise firm and constant command of your subordinates operating in isolated groups in apartment block doorways and basements, streets, and alleys, when owing to shortage of technical facilities the real "means of command and control" is...the commander's voice and flags? Incidentally, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troop and FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] subunits do not have this problem. They have portable radios, which enable a commander to maintain contact with virtually every man. And for some reason their bulletproof vests are half the weight of ours. How can you explain this difference in the equipment provided for subunits performing the same task?

I am not about to protect myself from criticism or the leaders of combat training organs at local level and commanders who have permitted various slipups. There have been slipups in the organization of the combat operations, in command and control, and in tactics. It is not only the state's devil-may-care attitude to the Army's needs that has brought about many of our losses in this war. But this has been one aspect. The last thing to do is train the troops under fire. And we were forced to do this not by some nameless "saboteur in shoulder straps," as people who are seeking a fall-guy in the Chechen tragedy are trying to suggest.

[Miranovich] Comrade Colonel General, I realize that it is hard to expect impeccable combat teamwork and manageability from combined or composite—as they are called—battalions and regiments. But we have heard plenty about the mobile forces which are allegedly well-staffed, well-equipped, and well-trained...

[Golovnev] We do indeed have mobile force regiments and brigades, which are 70-80 percent up to strength. Which, incidentally, made it possible last year to conduct 18 regimental exercises (unprecedented nowadays!). Needless to say, these regiments and brigades are better trained. In particular, we did not have to hastily "take in hand" the training of the 506th Regiment of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division of peacekeeping forces that arrived from Totskiy. The regiment was ready to join battle immediately. The motorized rifle brigade from the Siberian Military District looked quite combat-capable after covering 3,500 km, as did the Leningrad Military District's 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment....

However, your newspaper has already written about many of those who proved their worth. I would like to stress another point now. For all our poverty, undermanning, and other "failings," which complicate the organization of the normal training process, thoughtful commanders find a solution to the situation. I myself saw how Colonel Pugachev, commander of a motorized rifle brigade stationed in Moscow Oblast's Solnechnogorsk, rehearsed combat elements with his subordinates in the city. Elements: How an assault group should act at a particular phase in the mission, how to move along the streets, how to combat snipers.... When there were not enough rough-and-ready "targets" at the test site the brigade commander used...the barracks to rehearse training issues.

"Necessity is the mother of invention"? You can be as ironic as you like about these inventions and attempts to defend an armored personnel carrier in battle with sandbags or use the shell of a washing machine found in a destroyed house to heat and prepare food.... But are these normal Russian peasants not the mainstay of our fighting army today? And perhaps of Russia itself.

[Miranovich] The failure to estimate the enemy's strength must evidently be ranked among the shortcomings. According to Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops, who is now heading the combined command of the group of federal forces in the Chechen Republic, it is clear from Dudayev's captured archives that his army is one of the most significant of the "armed formations in the North Caucasus region." So, did we overlook a whole army?

[Golovnev] The enemy did not indeed turn out to be what we initially thought. It is obvious from the quantity of armored equipment that has been destroyed and captured (over 200 units) along with the various artillery systems, mortars, and flamethrowers (around 200 units, including 16 salvo-fire fighting vehicles) that we were dealing with full-fledged armed forces that might in the event of mobilization have numbered around 300,000 men. The "individual bandit formations and poorly armed guerrilla fighters" opposing our troops that we saw on television and in the newspapers are a fabrication by irresponsible (if not to say worse) journalists.

This army fought scientifically, so to speak, in accordance with our combat regulations. With the exception of its fanaticism, of course: When the guerrillas drove civilian inhabitants in front of them and then opened fire behind their backs on our soldiers, when snipers sadistically finished off the wounded and methodically fired on their extremities.... You will not find that in any regulations. But particularly strong corner buildings with semibasements and basements enabling streets and squares to be bombarded were used in order to create strong points first of all, as required by Ground Forces combat regulations. In the gaps between the strong points obstacles, rubble, and barriers were set up on the streets, approaches to which were mined and bombarded with flanking and cross fire.

As I have already said, there were miscalculations in our actions. I can add to what I have said, for instance, the shortcomings in the organization of security on the move and at rest, in the choice of positions for personnel and equipment, the organization of specific collaboration in the battalion-company-platoon echelon. Commanders often displayed unforgivable carelessness in a combat situation and ignored concealment, which sometimes enabled Dudayev's men to literally knock out the command.

But let us also look at things from another angle. Could we have acted all out so to speak? The very same combat regulations (I am reading—author's note) demand: "On bursting into a building motorized rifle subunits, acting boldly and audaciously, destroy the enemy by firing pointblank and with grenades, consistently clearing the building floor by floor." They burst in. And there were civilian residents there....

No, military intelligence has nothing to do with it, it operated normally. The country's leaders overlooked the creation on their territory of a regular, well-trained army, trained in all the intricacies of combat operations. Dzhokhar Dudayev has given our politicians an object lesson by carrying out in his Ichkeria in the briefest of timeframes the kind of military reform of which people who see reform as the downsizing and humiliation of the Army and cuts in defense spending could not even dream. Only will this bitter Chechen lesson be taken into account?

[Miranovich] Anatoliy Andreyevich, the lesson that you have mentioned is indeed a bitter and brutal one. But let us leave politics to the politicians—war is always on their conscience. There are lessons that we military men should learn. To what would you, as leader of the directorate which to a certain extent legislates in the sphere of troop combat training, draw attention primarily?

[Golovnev] The point is that once again you cannot avoid the politicians here. For instance, a decision to man the troops with personnel, officers included, can only be adopted at state level. Nor can we create full-fledged regiments and divisions and exempt them from the performance of tasks not associated with their combat role if it is not the state's will. Or review the strengh levels of peacetime subunits and units, which, as practice has shown, cannot ensure the performance of combat tasks without additional staffing and combat teamwork training. Evidently, every district should have full-fledged units and formations which contain all the specialists envisaged by wartime strength levels (snipers, mortar specialists, machinegunners, and so on).

With regard to combat training itself, I would review the staffing of its command and control organs. I think that there should be no "dead-end" posts in these organs. After all, for an officer to enter combat training organs today means giving up his career for lost. Here is just one example. Over the last 45 years only one deputy commander of the army for combat training has graduated from the Academy of the General Staff.

The situation is that officers are appointed from the post of company or battalion commander to the district's combat training directorate. Yet a representative of a district-level combat training organ has to work with the commander of a regiment, a division....

In conclusion I would like to say this. The Army's problems have of course worsened during the current conflict. But nonetheless they have made themselves felt and we have seen them in miniature so to speak. Had the combat operations been on a larger scale, God forbid, there would have been immeasurably more problems. But the "Chechen drop in the ocean" has shown a very great deal. And let us hope that those on whom the fate of the Army depends will not overlook anything. Our commanders and combat training organs know how to train people. Provided that they have all the wherewithal to do so.

Russian-American Space Research Experiment Announced

LD2102221795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2132 GMT 21 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—The first Russian-American space-research experiment within the framework of the "Mir-Shuttle" programme is scheduled for March 14, it was announced at a news conference at the Russian cosmonauts' training centre in Zvyozdny Gorodok near Moscow.

On this day, Russia is to launch "Soyuz TM-21" spacecraft with Vladimir Dezhurov, Gennadiy Strekalov (both-Russia) and Norman Tagard (USA). Anatoliy Solovyev, Nikolay Budarin (both-Russia) and Bonnie Dunbar (USA) will be in reserve.

It will be a record mission for an American astronaut, which will last 80 days.

After the docking scheduled for March 16, the "Soyuz TM-21" crew will join Aleksandr Viktorenko, Yelena Kondakova and Valeriy Polyakov on board the "Mir" orbital station, where they will stay for 10 days. Afterwards Viktorenko, Kondakova and Polyakov will come back to earth, while the "Soyuz TM-21" crew will go ahead with the work.

The crew members will go outside the orbital station for four or five times, receive loads to be brought on board the station by several "progress" freight spacecrafts and the "Spektr" module. The latter will bring a substantial part of the equipment needed for Tagard to accomplish his individual programme.

During the mission, Tagard intends to obey the orders of crew Captain Dezhurov, whereas officers of the American space Mission Control Centre will only give advice, Tagard said.

Thus, Lieutenant-Colonel Dezhurov, 32, who has never been on a space mission before, set himself a tough task: He will have to exercise authority over Strekalov, 54, and Tagard, 51, each of whom has experienced four space missions.

Dezhurov, Strekalov and Tagard will witness the first docking between the "Mir" orbital station and space shuttle, which is scheduled for June 12, 1995. Solovyev and Budarin will be on board the space shuttle at the time. They will stay on board the orbital station, whereas Dezhurov, Streklov and Tagard will come back to Earth on board the space shuttle.

Federal Assembly

Duma Delays Budget Vote After 'Fierce' Third Reading

LD2202203995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1923 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] MOSCOW, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Russian State Duma has adjourned the voting on the 1995 draft federal budget for Friday, February 24, State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin announced Wednesday after a fierce and prolonged third reading of the document.

The proposed budget has the following parameters: revenues of 175 trillion rubles and expenditures of 248 trillion rubles with a deficit of 73 trillion rubles, or about 8

of Russia's gross domestic product.

The chairman of the State Duma budget committee, Mikhail Zadornov, told the session that his committee had considered about 600 amendments introduced by parliamentary factions, committees and individual deputies. The committee managed to increase the budget revenues by 17.6 trillion rubles by cutting the expenditures on servicing the internal debt by 2.6 trillion rubles and those on the maintenance of interior bodies, subsidies to the Moscow government, etc. The revenues were increased by another 5.3 trillion rubles by imposing a special value-added tax of 1.5

, proposed by the agrarians. As a result, more funds will be set aside to finance agriculture, coal-mining industry, construction of housing for servicemen and support of science, culture, education, etc.

First Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov told the session that the government could cut the expenditures on servicing the internal debt by another 1.1 trillion rubles. He said the money released could be used to support agriculture (550 billion rubles), coal-mining industry (300 billion rubles) and celebrate the 50th anniversary of the victory in the WWII (250 billion rubles).

Nikolayev Calls FBS Financing 'Utterly Unsatisfactory'

LD2202103595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0917 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Russian Federal Border Service (FBS) director Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev addressed a letter to the State Duma before today's third-reading scrutiny of the draft 1995 federal budget.

The letter voices concern with "utterly unsatisfactory" financing of the FBS.

If the State Duma approves budget-projected 1995 appropriations for the FBS, Russia's state border security system will be in fact destroyed, Nikolayev stressed.

The FBS director calls on parliamentarians to do anything they can to have at least minimal financial needs of the FBS provided for in the year ahead.

Duma Fails To Override Yeltsin Veto of Criminal Code Changes

LD2202141195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1209 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—The State Duma could not overcome today the presidential veto on the law concerning amendments to the Russian criminal code.

The law would add to the criminal code an article, reading that deliberate violation of constitutional and federal laws by federal and regional authorities through issuing legal acts, detrimental to state and public interests, is punishable by sentences of up to five years in prison.

The article specified that in case such acts cause severe aftermaths they are punishable by up to 15 years in prison with or without confiscation of property.

Arguing for his veto on this law, Yeltsin said in his letter to the State Duma chairman that the wording of the article "is unprecedented in the contemporary Russian criminal law since it introduces responsibility for violation of laws in general rather than for specific acts, which violate certain legal provisions".

The law's architect, pro-communist chairman of the State Duma Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin told the parliament today that his committee found the president's staff "was prejudiced against the draft law and was looking for a pretext to reject it".

Parliamentary Hearings Held on Soros Fund

MK2202141095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 pp 1, 2

[Report by Andrey Vaganov under the "Clash" rubric: "Thank Soros, Bring Stepashin to Account. Science in Russia Is Being Increasingly Financed by Charities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hearings on the activity in Russia of the International Science Fund [ISF] (the Soros Foundation) were held in the Russian Federation State Duma 20 February. The occasion was provided by the inclusion in the State Duma's agenda of the question of Soros Foundation activity. The foundation's activity is known to have come into the spotlight of many mass media outlets in the wake of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's publication (10 January 1995) of excerpts from a Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] report. This report, in particular, accused the Soros Foundation of intelligence and subversive activity. Your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent has come to learn from sources close to George Soros that the American financier is seriously considering stopping his charity programs in support of fundamental science in Russia unless the State Duma refutes the accusations against the foundation.

An ISF statement circulated on the eve of the hearings welcomes an unbiased and public discussion of the foundation's activities and expresses the hope that this discussion will put an end to numerous rumors and conjectures.

Also in the wake of the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA report, a special commission of deputies chaired by Nikolay Vorontsov was created to look into the ISF's activity. Much as was to be expected, the commission discovered nothing criminal in the ISF's activity. An official telegram asking for an assessment of the publication in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was forwarded to FCS Chairman Sergey Stepashin on behalf of the State Duma education, culture, and science committee. No answer to it has followed up to now. The FCS representatives invited to the hearings did not come. It is perhaps for this reason that some of the speakers in the hearings moved that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editors be brought to account.

Reporting during the hearings on the activity in Russia of various funds financed by George Soros were academicians Vladimir Skulachev, Boris Raushenbakh, Lyudvig Faddeyev, Vladimir Zakharov, Vladimir Fortov, Vladimir Kudryavtsev; Nikolay Karlov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; some other invited scientists, and author Grigoriy Baklanov. The main proposition of all these speeches was: all suspicions that the ISF is working to effect an irreversible export of Russian intellectual potential to the West have no foundation; fundamental research cannot by definition be secret and it is accessible to the entire world civilization.

According to information from Boris Saltykov, Russian Federation science and technical policy minister, who also took part in the parliamentary hearings, in 1994 some $50 million was channeled via the ISF toward financial support of Russian fundamental science; 100 billion rubles was channeled via the Russian Fundamental Research Fund, while the Russian Academy of Sciences received from the state budget 300 billion rubles. According to the minister, the budget appropriations for science accounted for approximately 50 percent. (Thus, the ISF share in financing science in the Russian Federation, according to rough estimates heard during the hearings, amounted to nearly 10 percent.) It is for this reason that the financing of science issue is the subject to be discussed in the 23 February sitting of the Russian Federation Government.

Quite logically, by the end of the hearings the albeit very important but isolated topic concerned with the ISF developed into a discussion of state policy in the field of science, culture, and education. "They do not realize in our country the entire catastrophic nature of the situation in science," stated Academician Vladimir Zakharov, for one. "It is already a byword in the West that Russian scientists are a dying species."

It has not been decided yet if the question of ISF activities is going to be put to a plenary sitting or if it should be discussed by the State Duma council. Be that as it may, the draft decision summing up the hearings read by Nikolay Vorontsov calls for the approval and support in every way of the Soros Foundation's activities in Russia. It also calls for stepping up work to create a legal base of foreign charitable activity here in our country. The parliamentarians are still expecting a reaction from the FCS. The entire body of deputies, however, was rather indifferent to discussing the dying state of Russian science: two-thirds of those in the parliament chamber were scientists and journalists.

Regional Affairs

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Armored Vehicles 'Infiltrated' Chechen-Aul

LD2202145695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Interfax correspondent in Groznyy reports the situation in the Chechen capital was relatively calm on Wednesday morning. Artillery shelling of southwest suburbs controlled by Dudayev's supporters has practically stopped. According to the correspondent's estimates, on Tuesday night the Russian artillery and tanks conducted "disturbing" fire at Chechen positions.

Several dozen federal armored vehicles which blocked the Rostov-Baku highway near Groznyy Tuesday evening remain at their positions.

They do not attempt to enter Chernorechye, controlled by the Chechens, but have trenched in at a distance of about 1.5 kilometers from the highway keeping it in sight.

An influential Chechen field commander, Shamil Basayev, told Interfax that Russian armored vehicles which encircled the Chechens from the southwest of Groznyy are infiltrating Chechen-Aul (several kilometers to the south of the city). He claimed that the situation there remains under the control of the Chechen military command.

Dudayev Cited on Mercenaries, Other Topics

WS2302115095 Tallinn BNS in English 1000 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Feb 22, BNS—The Baltic states and Chechnya have similar destinies especially taking into account that Russia wants to restore an empire in the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev told BNS.

In Estonia, Russia would press on the Narva region before effecting partial occupation. It would station military bases in Latvia and seize the Kaliningrad corridor in Lithuania and Belarus.

"All these plans are familiar to us, just like the fact that the Russian leadership has not given up using force in international relations. Russia has become extraordinary dangerous and aggressive," Dudayev said.

Dudayev praised Estonia's courage when it raised the issue of supporting the Chechen independence. Estonia, thus, assumed enormous responsibility because of the potential pressure from Russia.

Estonia, however, will not remain the only supporter of Chechnya's statehood, he maintained.

Commenting on rumors about Baltic mercenaries in the Chechen war, Dudayev said he can swear that his country hires no mercenaries.

"We have enough of our own people. What we are lacking, it's weapons," he said.

Dudayev claims that the conflict can be settled only by peaceful and political means. If no solution is found, the warfare will continue for 50 years, he added.

"But Moscow is ruled not by reason but by a war party which benefits from the pre-war tension in the entire territory of the former Soviet Union," he said.

When asked with whom of Russians he would sit at the negotiating table, Dudayev answered that he would do it with anybody who has the power to decide.

Dudayev assessed the current death toll in Groznyy at 350 Chechen warriors and 20,000 Russians.

Grachev Plays Down Chechen Capabilities

LD2202202595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1923 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Dzhokhar Dudayev's men are incapable of staging significant military operations on February 23, the 51st anniversary of the deportation of Chechens. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said so in an Interfax interview when he commented on the declaration by the National Congress of the Chechen People that February 23 would be the day of popular retribution.

Grachev did not believe that Dudayev had enough manpower or material to undertake any large-scale attacks. Grachev said that the federal troops were reliably entrenched, their orders were clear-cut, all approaches to Groznyy were under firm control and any assaults would be repelled.

He argued that all organized Chechen units had been defeated in the Groznyy fighting. What they have become are gangs of 10 to 15 men, some of them obeying orders from nobody.

Grachev said that in the night between Monday and Tuesday Dudayev's men tried to counterattack from the south, east and southeast but were repelled. He felt that this actions were more of psychological than of military significance because, as a rule, one or two tanks and several armored personnel carriers were involved in them.

Grachev Cites Conditions for Talks

LD2202202795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1923 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that "several more years might be required for eliminating all bandits in Chechnya."

He told Interfax today that the experience of the events of the past in Chechnya proved that much time would be required for restoring peace and calm on the Chechen soil.

Grachev said he believed it "useless" to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev. "This is a state criminal. He is wanted by the law enforcement," Grachev added.

Grachev said talks in Chechnya could be held with "reasonable persons trying to put an end to bloodshed among their people." He said talks could involve the elders of villages and field commanders, "many of who have already independently proposed that talks be held." However, Grachev said that talks with field commanders could take place only after they unconditionally surrendered and handed in their weapons.

Kulikov Says Moscow 'Wants Peace'

LD2202205395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2041 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok February 22 TASS—"We want peace more than anyone else," Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of Russian troops in Chechnya, said as he addressed a group of peace envoys in Mozdok on Wednesday.

Kulikov said that people are tired of war and want it to end as soon as possible. A core of healthy and sober-minded people have been formed in four districts of the republic over the last 10 days. They want militants to leave their villages, he said.

The general read out letters sent to him from several Chechen settlements, in which people asked him not to deliver strikes on their homes and said they were ready to let Interior Ministry troops in.

Kulikov lashed out at the mass media, which, he said, did not publish the proposals set forth by the Russian side during the talks with Chechen field commanders last week.

He cited a radio intercept of a conversation between Chechen military chief Aslan Maskhadov and President Dzhokhar Dudayev's government spokesman Movladiy Udugov to justify Russia's refusal to continue talks unless its proposals are accepted. Replying to Udugov's question "what are the results of the talks?" Maskhadov said "we continued to play." "Can we resume talks after this?" Kulikov asked emotionally.

Speaking about the situation in Chechnya now and in future, he said that "the war holds no hope for Dudayev, but there will be no winners. We have suggested to stop the war, but the reply was no."

Kulikov cited another intercept of radio communication between Udugov and unidentified person with a code name "13." In reply to the question "do you have any decision regarding February 23?" the other said "to all—national retaliation."

Chechen militants have repeatedly threatened lately to "celebrate February 23 with actions against Russian troops."

Kulikov expressed the hope that the peace envoys will help bring the position of "common sense" home to the people of Chechnya.

Dudayev Addresses Chechen Congress

LD2202184495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1739 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The Chechen people has "every reason and ability to protect its life, freedom and independence," Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev told a national congress of the Chechen people today.

The congress ended in the settlement of Kurchaloy, 40 kilometers southeast of Groznyy, after being attended by some 700 delegates from throughout Chechnya, representatives of Chechen troop command and the clergy, head of the Chechen information service Movladi Udugov informed Interfax.

The Chechen leader criticized the world public which, in his opinion, "is not using every chance to press on the Russian leadership and to achieve cessation of bloodshed and the genocide of the Chechen people."

Dudayev called on representatives of the International Monetary Fund to "think well" about issuing a credit to Russia. In his words, the credit "will be used to re-equip the Russian Army and to support the Russian Federation's neo-imperial policy."

23 February Declared 'Retribution' Day

LD2202184095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1739 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Feb 23 (Interfax)—The Congress of the Chechen People has ended a meeting at Kurchaloy village (40 kilometers southeast of Groznyy) by declaring February 23 as the Day of "People's Retribution".

Head of the Chechen Information Service Movladi Udugov told Interfax that an appropriate resolution was approved by some 700 delegates arriving from all parts of the republic.

However, he did not say what exactly the resolution meant.

In the meantime, the Chechen leadership had recently threatened Russian troops with a bloodbath on February 23 timed to coincide with 51 years since the deportation of Chechen and Ingush people.

In one other resolution, the Congress warned that any attempts by Moscow to contact any groups other than democratically elected bodies of the Chechen republic would be absolutely counter-productive having no legal consequences, Udugov said.

The resolution declares all Moscow-appointed Chechen leaders as criminals and renegades who will be held accountable to the Chechen state and its people.

Maskhadov Ready for 'Revenge' Against MVD

LD2202193395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1833 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran, 22 Feb—Representatives of Dzhokhar Dudayev's authorities and the Memorial society today accused the command of the combined federal forces in Chechnya of breaking off the cease-fire talks. An improvised news conference was held here today by Baudin Tsamayev, Chechen housing and communal services minister and Andrey Blinov, member of the Memorial human rights center. They said that the negotiations, which should have been held on Tuesday [21 February] were broken off through the fault of the representative of Russia's military leadership.

Tsamayev made public a letter from Dudayev's chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov to General Kvashnin. Taking full responsibility for my words, I declare that I have played an honest game and that all of the rest was the invention of the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Interior Ministry [MVD], the letter says. Maskhadov spoke of his willingness on behalf of the Chechen people to declare revenge on all of those connected to the Interior Ministry, with the exception of the ordinary soldiers.

Blinov confirmed that he had witnessed a categorical refusal by the heads of the Interior Ministry to conduct talks with an authorized delegation of the Chechen Republic.

In the meantime, a source close to the command of the allied group of the federal troops in Chechnya told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that there was no response to the Dudayevites' invitations to talks because the commanders of illegal armed formations had not responded to earlier proposals of the federal side, including the demilitarization of Groznyy.

Address on Deportation Anniversary Issued

LD2202220395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2118 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—The press service of the government of the Russian Federation released an address by Umar Avturkhanov, chairman of the provisional council of the Chechen Republic, made in Groznyy in connection with the 51st anniversary of the deportation of Chechens and Ingushis.

Following is the full text of the address:

"February 23 will mark the 51st anniversary of the tragedy of the Chechen and Ingush people. On that day, the criminal Stalin regime deported our peoples to cold

Kazakh steppes. Thousands kilometres away from their beloved motherland, almost half of the Chechens and Ingushis perished.

"Today we call things by their proper names—that deportation was a real genocide against Vainakhs.

"Now we are in trouble again. One third of our population has left their homes. The capital of the republic and several settlements are destroyed. We live in conditions of war unleashed by the criminal Dudayev regime, not the Stalin one.

"The provisional council, established by the will of the Chechen people, has favoured law and order, a law-governed Chechen state and normal economic and political relations with all peoples from the very beginning. We told the people the truth openly and straightforwardly: If we, citizens of Chechnya, fail to handle the Mafia-like and Fascist Dudayev regime, this regime will provoke the Russian Army to move in. Unfortunately, this is exactly what happened.

"Federal Armed Forces sent in to restore the constitutional system have been in the Chechen Republic since December 1994. While fulfilling their task they met fierce resistance from Dudayev's militants who have used civilians as a living shield.

"It is necessary to stop the war, cease fire on both sides, return to peaceful life and establish local bodies of power. We urge all sides involved in this conflict to withdraw from the state of war and move on to the state of civil peace.

"The provisional council has adopted a decision declaring February 23 in Chechnya a day of nation-wide mourning. You should know that the time of peace is close. To near it, we need to rise beyond all this irrespective of our political views."

Aushev Comments on Deportation Anniversary

LD2302132095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran February 23 TASS—"The consolidation of the efforts of nations in the restoration of constitutional rights of our compatriots is the only thing that can stop bloodshed in the Northern Caucasus and avoid the recurrence of such tragedies in the future," President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev said here today, addressing a public conference, held on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of the deportation of Chechens and Ingushes in 1944 on the order of Stalin.

Aushev said that lesson drawn from the past are usually the subject of such conferences. "But this time no lessons have been drawn. This year we are observing the anniversary of the deportation in conditions of an undeclared war, waged by the state against one of its nations. The majority of those killed at that war are guiltless civilians."

Guests at the conference include leader of the Russia's Democratic Choice Party Yegor Gaydar, who is expected to address it today in the afternoon.

Troops On Alert for Deportation Anniversary

LD2302090995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0852 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok February 23 TASS—There were no combat operations along the line of contact between the sides in Chechnya last night. There were only ocassions when troops returned the fire of Dudayev's supporters aimed at Russian positions, a spokesman for the press centre of the United Group of Federal Forces Command told ITAR-TASS.

Today, when Russian soldiers celebrate the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland, Chechens observe the grim day of Chechens deportation in 1944. All units were put on the alert. The Dudayev regime threatened with "actions of retribution". Although the command believes this is not in the power of Dudayev's gangs, the federal forces are ready to rebuff any provocations.

Russian Command's 'Proposals' Listed

LD2302084795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0833 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok February 23 TASS—A high- ranking member of the command of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told ITAR-TASS today that the federal command had never refused to hold talks with Dudayev's officials and that if interruptions ocurred, it was no fault of the federal troops command.

He categorically rejected as false the statement made by Dudayev officials and representatives of the human rights centre "Memorial" at a press-conference in Nazran on Wednesday [22 February] who alleged that "the talks which were due to be held on Tuesday, were disrupted through the fault of a representative of the Russian military command".

As earlier reported, Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Russian troops in Chechnya, told representatives of different religions at a meeting late on Wednesday that the Russian side had handed over specific proposals to the Dudayev delegation during three meetings in the middle of February, but received no reply.

The Russian side thinks it reasonable to put off further negotiations until the Dudayev side replies to the federal side's proposals. The more so since a radio conversation between Dudayev's chief of staff Maskhadov and leader of the Dudayev press service Udugov intercepted by an intelligence group of the federal troops contained the following: asked by the latter about the negotiations, Maskhadov replied "we continued to playact".

"Ought we to resume negotiations after this?" General Kulikov said.

The command's proposals were as following:

- terminate all hostilities immediately;
- release all hostages and prisoners of war;
- transfer all dead bodies to burial grounds in keeping with respective rituals;
- turn in heavy arms held collectively;
- return to places of permanent residence;
- proclaim Groznyy a demilitarized zone;
- maintain self-defence groups in residential centres until effective local law-enforcement bodies are formed;
- not to send troops into residential centres which renounce armed resistance;
- persons who renounce armed resistance are guaranteed exemption from criminal responsibility.

Federal Command Appeals to Chechen People

MM2302101195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 1

[Appeal from the Command of the Joint Grouping of Forces on the Territory of the Chechen Republic: "To the Population of the Chechen Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops Press Service has received an appeal to the population of the Chechen Republic from the command of the joint grouping of federal forces. It says:

We Russian servicemen, who are well aware of what war is, appeal to the population of the Chechen Republic and to everyone who is following the development of events in the region with pain, alarm, and hope, in the sincere hope that peace and harmony will be speedily restored.

Over the past week at the initiative of A. Maskhadov, the command of the joint grouping has met on three occasions with field commanders with a view to immediately stopping the bloodshed and creating the conditions for the comprehensive resolution of the conflict.

The proposals we have made fully take account of the features of the situation, the Chechen people's national traditions and customs, and the rights and legitimate interests of the entire population of the Chechen Republic.

It has been proposed:

to immediately end hostilities;

to completely release all hostages and prisoners;

to transfer the bodies of the dead to places of burial in accordance with custom;

to hand over heavy collective weaponry; that people disperse to their permanent places of residence;

to have self-defense detachments in population centers prior to the formation of effective local law-enforcement organs;

that, if armed resistance is abandoned, troops will not be sent into population centers;

persons who do not put up armed resistance are guaranteed that no criminal proceedings will be instituted against them.

Our numerous meetings and conversations have shown that these proposals met with support and understanding from most of the population, the clergy, and elders. Only a small group, that did not want to change its mind, is prepared, as before, to embark on the destruction of thousands of people and their homes for the sake of their own political ambitions.

Throughout the entire period of talks the united grouping of forces has fully met the conditions of the accord. We have strictly controlled the implementation of the agreements reached on the nonuse of arms by the troops and internal affairs organs. But, violating the truce, at 1600 on 18 February federal troops were attacked with artillery and grenade launchers on the southern outskirts of Groznyy. There were some fatalities.

We have all been on the threshold of peace, sincerely believing in the possibility, and doing everything to achieve it. Unfortunately, the adventurism and criminal ambitions of a small group of persons prevailed over common sense. Leaders who had made a good living in the recent past at the people's expense have for the umpteenth time destroyed their hopes of the speedy restoration of peaceful life and have again led them into bloodshed.

Inhabitants of the Chechen Republic!

Use this peace interval to speedily organize a peaceful life.

Stop your sons, brothers, neighbors, and friends from engaging in senseless bloodshed and recklessness. Do not place combat equipment outside your homes, schools, and hospitals. Do not let gunmen hide behind your backs or fire on Russian servicemen.

Expel from your population centers anyone who fires on federal troops or wants to bring trouble to your homes.

Set up your own organs of self-government and enter into talks with representatives of federal forces. Know that we will never open fire on population centers that have given up armed resistance. The troops will not enter them.

Nobody needs senseless casualties. Our long-suffering fatherland needs peace. We state with pain in our hearts that, having exhausted all existing opportunities to stop the armed confrontation through talks, we will be forced to take appropriate measures.

Nonetheless, we hope that for the sake of saving mothers, sisters, children, old men, and for the sake of the future of the Chechen Republic, reason and wisdom will prevail among its people.

[Signed] Command of the Joint Grouping of Forces on the Territory of the Chechen Republic

Northern, Southern Groups 'Repulse' Attacks

LD2302131295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1222 GMT 23 Feb 95 TEXT:

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 23 (INTERFAX)—In the past 24 hours units belonging to the Southern Group of federal troops waged military actions in Groznyy to prevent the surrounded Dudayev loyalists from breaking through their lines in the area of Novie Promysly, Aldy and Chernorechie.

As Interfax learned from the public relations center of Russia's Interior Ministry, the Northern Group of troops repulsed the attacks of small mobile groups of militants with armored vehicles and automobiles, these groups stepped up their activity at night time.

Last night federal troops prevented a group of fighters, numbering about 80 men, from breaking through the encirclement in the southern suburb of Groznyy. Two groups of militants supported by seven tanks attacked positions held by a regiment of Russian airborne troops west of Cantonment No.15.

On Wednesday federal artillery launched strikes on Dudayev's armored vehicles and heavy weapons in the area of Chechen-Aul, Novie Promysly, Chernorechie, the Terek Mountains, Vinogradnoie, Petropavlovskoye and Argun.

Two men were detained at the Chervlenaya-Uzlovaya station. Two hand grenades and two sets of Russian Army uniforms were confiscated from them.

12 submachine guns, 11 grenade thrower missiles, 33 rifles and 79 hand grenades were confiscated directly in Groznyy during reconnaissance operations.

According to Russia's Interior Ministry, on the whole about 100 militants were liquidated in the past 24 hours. A tank, an armored vehicle and five cars were destroyed. Two militants and a heavy weapon were captured.

German Paper Carries Khasbulatov Statement

AU2202190695 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Feb 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "The Kremlin in a Dead End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When Russian troops invaded Chechnya at the end of last year, one did not hear anything about him any more. Ruslan Khasbulatov, who had openly opposed Chechen President Dudayev until that time, withdrew from the theater of war to Moscow and started again teaching as a professor of economics at the Plekhanov Institute. One year earlier Khasbulatov, who was born in Groznyy in 1942 but was deported as a small child to Kazakhstan under Stalin, had to accept a heavy defeat: As chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, he was deprived of his power by Boris Yeltsin through military force after he had called for the overthrow of the Russian head of state together with former Vice President and Air Force General Rutskoy. Yeltsin continues to be an enemy for him, as Khasbulatov points out in a statement on the events in northern Caucasus:

"A war is raging in Chechnya. Russia's political leadership has chosen an inadmissibly cruel way to solve the problem: a military punitive expedition, oppression of the entire population by terror, intimidation, the physical elimination of both guilty and innocent persons. This road leads into a dead end. There will be protests against Chechnya's occupation and the attacks by the occupation army on the civilian population. In this way, the neighboring people, in their turn, are also being involved in the armed conflict."

How was this terrible conflict brought about? Khasbulatov asks and answers this question by referring to the outcome of his own struggle against Yeltsin:

"Some people who exercise power in Moscow try to put the blame on the Russian Parliament, which was battered down in October 1993. All the same, it is clear that the coup committed by the Kremlin in the autumn of 1993 only made the present tragedy in Chechnya possible."

Chechen Khasbulatov attacks Chechen Dudayev even more sharply and continues by singling his activities out for praise:

"During Dudayev's three-year rule in Chechnya, his troops terrorized villages and cities. Several thousand people were killed or disappeared without a trace. The Groznyy City Assembly and the Chechen Parliament were dissolved by force of arms and pensions and salaries were not paid. Instead, the criminal regime traded in trucks, machines, oil, real estate, arms, and drugs. Last year when I returned to Chechnya, the people began to call for Dudayev's resignation more and more resolutely. On my proposal, a peace troop consisting of recognized intellectual authorities was founded and more than 1,300 representatives of the people from several villages, cities, and districts were elected until mid-November 1994. My peace troop already negotiated with Dudayev's field officers to increase his isolation, to deprive him of his power peacefully, to form a committee of national unity, and even to hand arms and heavy equipment over to the Russians. Unfortunately, however, the armed Chechen opposition under Avturkhanov and Khadzhiyev strove for a military victory. Avturkhanov wanted to replace Dudayev's military regime by one of his own with Moscow's help. The Kremlin leadership relied on misleading "information" when it decided in favor of an initial military thrust last November. In December Moscow started its real campaign, so that power in Chechnya would not be given into the people's hands."

From all that Khasbulatov draws the following conclusion, which is shaped by wishful thinking:

"International political circles are heaving a sigh of relief. The Kremlin has made itself so 'ridiculous' that one finally can count the days until the 'desirable changes on the political Olympus of the Russians.' As is generally known, the West approved of the 'violent measures' against the Russian Parliament in the autumn of 1993 only reluctantly and since that time it has been waiting for a possibility to discontinue its support. It has gotten what was to be expected of this regime."

Russian Troops Allegedly 'Running Amok'

AU2302093795 Paris AFP in English 0920 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Russia, Feb 23 (AFP)—Russian soldiers are running amok in the Chechen capital Groznyy, looting, beating people up and sometimes murdering them, residents alleged here this week.

Aslambek, 32, a resident of Chechen, told how a group of soldiers stopped him and two friends in January, took their identity documents, then shot them. Aslambek's two friends were killed. He escaped with a shoulder wound.

"They took our documents, stepped away to talk among themselves for a minute, then they came back and just started firing at us," he said, showing his wounds. Such stories are common in Groznyy and surrounding areas.

At the time, Russian troops were battling to drive Chechen secessionist rebels out of Groznyy. It was not until mid-February that the Russians won control of most of the capital.

Oleg, 25, a resident of a northern Groznyy suburb, said he and two friends were interrogated on February 14 by elite troops of the Interior Ministry's OMON unit.

He said they took their documents, lined them up faces to the wall, and beat them. "They said to us 'You remember Stalin. We're going to do the same thing to you.' Then they fired just above our heads and left us," he said.

The reference to Stalin was about the forced deportation of all Chechens into exile in Kazakhstan and Siberia in February 1944.

Many Groznyy residents allege that Russian soldiers have moved into their homes and will not leave.

The residents had fled the city at the height of the fighting, then returned last week during a cease-fire to reclaim their property and possessions.

Vakha, a Chechen woman, said she found a group of Russian OMON forces installed in her home. "They said it wasn't my house any more and that I should get out," she said.

A neighbour, Kursum Vakhayeva, 36, said he had seen Russian soldiers stripping a house and piling its contents in their tank.

Russian soldiers were comfortably installed in many Groznyy houses this week. Some did not deny that looting was taking place.

Colonel Sergey Kondratyenko said: "The longer houses are left empty, the greater the risk that they will be looted. Maybe it's the neighbours who are doing it, maybe the soldiers. The owners should come back," he said.

The Russian Defence Ministry in Moscow would not comment on the allegations of murder and looting "because they are not official but simply reported ny residents."

No official enquiries have been launched into what Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev has called "minor and isolated" occurrences.

Shumeyko Views Elections as Solution

LD2202153795 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1454 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Free elections are needed in order to prevent a guerrilla war in Chechnya, Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council, believes. He visited the hospital for border troops in Golitsino, near Moscow, on 22 February.

[Begin Shumeyko recording] Free and democratic elections should be held in the Chechen Republic late this year. Elections alone will solve the problem, and then this guerrilla war will be avoided and there will be no dead or wounded. [end recording]

[Correspondent] After a republican leadership is elected, armed resistance will become senseless. Vladimir Shumeyko congratulated border guards who had been injured in Chechnya and Tajikistan, on Day of the Defender of the Fatherland and presented them with commemorative watches. It was no mere coincidence that the chairman of the Federation Council came to the border guards.

[Begin Shumeyko recording] In my view, Army reforms should be started with border troops in order to protect us from everything else for the period of reforms. [end recording]

Kovalev Set To Tour Filtration Centers

MK2302090095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 3

[Report by Lev Aleynik under the "Commissioner" rubric: "Sergey Kovalev To Set Out for Chechnya Once Again. Human Rights Commission Delegation Still Wants To See Filtration Centers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Kovalev, Russian Federation human rights commissioner, is due to set out for the Chechen conflict area once again today. It should be recalled that today Chechnya marks the mournful anniversary of Stalin's deportation of the Chechens in 1944, as a result of which one-third of this people died. Sergey Kovalev has not given up his intention to familiarize himself with the situation at filtration centers where people detained on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia are being held to establish their involvement with Dudayev's armed formations.

Sergey Kovalev's previous attempt to examine the filtration centers failed: he was not allowed to enter the plane bound for Chechnya with representatives of the OSCE on board; in his judgment, it was the Defense Ministry leadership that imposed the ban. The Defense Ministry is unlikely to agree with the five-digit estimate of casualties among the civilian population during the Chechen war, a figure that was cited by Sergey Kovalev in his annual report "On Observing Human Rights in Russia;" it contains data received from eyewitnesses and participants in the military conflict that have yet to be verified.

Commission members' stance on talks between Russian and Chechen military commanders remains unchanged: they should be continued "at least for the sake of exchanging POW's and releasing the dead:" although "cease-fire conditions have been violated by both sides, hostilities have not been carried out on the previous scale and much fewer people have been killed or wounded."

One of the main subjects to be dealt with by the Human Rights Commission on the ground is the use of the Russian aviation against civilians outside the conflict area in southern Chechnya.

Finance Ministry Draws Up Republic Budget

MM2302121395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" rubric: "Russian Finance Ministry for Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Ministry of Finance has finished drawing up the Chechen Republic's budget, the Russian Federation Government Press Service has reported. It is too soon to speak of the realization of this program, IMA-PRESS, which transmitted this report, emphasizes, since it has not yet been approved by Chechnya's local organs of power, which are only starting to be formed.

Vorkuta Miners To Begin Political Strike on 1 March

LD2202163495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1322 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VORKUTA, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Miners in Vorkuta, Komi republic, North Russia, will begin a political strike on March 1. The decision was made Tuesday [21 February] evening at an emergency session of the local federation of miners' unions, its leader Yuriy Vishnevskiy told Interfax.

According to him, miners insist on early presidential elections, the resignation of the government and a social policy in the interests of working people. They also demand immediate payment of belated wages to local miners totalling 28.7 billion rubles.

The biggest mine of the Pechora coal basin Vorgashorskaya which previously refused to join such actions might take part in the political strike.

The leaders of the two key miners' unions of Vorkuta Vishnevskiy and Aleksandr Marmalyukov told Interfax that if by March 1 a government commission arrives in Vorkuta, the postponement of the strike can be negotiated.

Shakhray Warns About Migration From Siberia, Far East

LD2302132795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1227 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yekaterinburg February 23 TASS—Russia may lose Siberia and the Far East as soon as in 20 years unless it manages to curb migration of inhabitants out of those territories, Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray told an international conference on relations between the Russian regions and the centre.

Shakhray said in his address to the conference which opened in Yekaterinburg today that China, Japan and the United States were closely studying these Russian regions with a view to organising their settlements there.

According to Sergey Shakhray, the country needs an emergency state programme for the development of Siberia and the Far East, providing for normal living and working conditions in their harsh climatic conditions.

He said new inhabitants could be attracted to the areas by free distribution of land and providing tax exemption for enterprises which create new jobs.

The vice-premier also called for granting Russia's border regions the status of federal territories which would expand their administrative independence. Shakhray said his proposal referred [to] the Kaliningrad enclave as well.

Maritime Kray Duma Chief Urges Caution on Charter

954F1442A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Igor Lebedinets, chairman of the Duma of Maritime Kray: "The Kray Charter Is Its Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A little more than a month ago, as a result of the expression of the will of the people of Maritime Kray, an organ of legislative power appeared. The voters hardly have a right to expect fateful decisions from the Duma in this amount of time, but nonetheless the increased attention paid to the deputies today is evoked precisely by the anticipation of their first independent steps. What will they become? In which direction will the deputy activity develop? I do not think that anyone who is not indifferent to our present and particularly our future can be indifferent to these questions.

From this standpoint, one cannot but welcome the attempt on the part of a group of deputies to develop and raise for discussion in the Duma the draft charter of Maritime Kray, since the effectiveness of further efforts of the representative power to normalize the socioeconomic situation in the kray will depend directly on its content. The absence of such a document makes it impossible for us to take full advantage of our constitutional possibilities as a full-fledged subject of the Federation.

But, in my view, this circumstance does not justify the principle of "Produce at any cost, and in the shortest possible time." Moreover, it is precisely in the adoption of the charter that we need maximum caution and flexible development of all of its articles and provisions.

I have no doubt that if the deputies manage merely to prepare and adopt a charter that meets the kray's interests, this alone will justify the long torments in which the Duma was born. But, unfortunately, the draft charter proposed by the deputy group is not without certain shortcomings of a general and particular nature, so that it is difficult to count on its becoming a full-fledged document of state construction in the kray.

For instance, one cannot but note the contradiction between the conceptual premises of the draft charter and federal legislation and the Constitution of Russia. Its first article stipulates a special political-legal status for Maritime Kray as a "state-territorial" formation, which in no way accords with Articles 1 and 5 of the Constitution. Nor can one accept the provision of the charter that gives it unconditional priority on the territory of the kray over other normative acts, regardless of who may have adopted them.

In Article 4 of the draft charter, our colleague deputies have written that Maritime Kray will independently resolve the question of changing its name. It is attractive, but what about the Constitution of Russia, to which this is already assigned in its present form? Need we not consider this?

These proposals in the draft charter cannot but raise certain misgivings. In the quite explicable desire to achieve full-fledged status of the kray, it is wrong not to see willful or unintentional encroachment on the state sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the beginnings of separatism.

Another shortcoming of the draft is that it is not always coordinated with the principal of separation of powers, and it contradicts legislation that defines the position, authority, and conditions for the activity of organs of representative and executive power of components of the Russian Federation. The authors of the draft in the proposed version of the organization of state power in the kray are oriented toward the triad of "Duma-governor-government headed by the chairman." In principle, without denying the possibility of such an approach, I want to draw attention to the fact that here the governor (chief of administration) is basically turned into a "ceremonial general," deprived of a number of significant aspects of authority assigned to him in the Statute on the Chief of the Administration of a Kray, Oblast, City Under Federal Jurisdiction, Autonomous Oblast, and Autonomous District of the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Edict No. 1969 of 3 October 1994. One is struck by the circumstance that, on the other hand, the proposed draft is overloaded with mechanical duplication of constitutional provisions. In particular, the section "Rights and Freedoms of Citizens on the Territory of the Kray." Would it not be better to enrich the charter with provisions on additional guarantees of rights and freedoms of our compatriots?

Or another example. Article 8 of the draft charter lists all the rayons of the city and worker settlements of the kray. What for? By assigning them a status and name in the charter of the kray, we make it considerably more difficult to subsequently solve problems of administrative-territorial structuring of the kray, since any changes in this part would be illegal without making the corresponding changes in the kray charter.

At the same time, excessive detail is accompanied by vexing problems in the draft charter. It would not be out of place to supplement it with sections pertaining to state and municipal services for social protection of the population in the kray.

There are also questions about the section of the draft charter devoted to the Duma itself and the status of the deputies. Thus, it is written in Article 45 that the Duma is elected for four years, and in Article 47—in addition to this—its deputies work only on a staff paid basis, although the edict of the president of Russia that is in force regulates these issues in a fundamentally different way.

In Article 47 of the draft, we find that deputies of the Duma of Maritime Kray have immunity throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation throughout their term of office. Of course, if Maritime Kray is a state-territorial formation with absolute priority of its own legislation, why not define the status of the deputy outside the kray as well!? But how will the federal authorities and other components of the Federation view this?

There is no doubt that the shortcomings that have been noted in the draft charter can be explained by the contradictoriness of existing federal legislation, the instability of the constitutional foundations of the Russian state, and the clearly experienced legal problems in regulating the status of components of the Federation. And of course they can be explained by the time restrictions that were placed on the authors of the draft. But, no matter how urgently we need it today, we cannot and must not give in to haste and sacrifice quality. It must take into account the specifics and peculiarities of our region and include the experience in the development and adoption of similar documents by other components of the Russian Federation. It seems to me that it would be very good if the initiative of the group of deputies were supported by the entire Duma, the kray administration, and representatives of judicial and law enforcement organs, political parties and movements, and the legal community of the kray. Through our joint efforts we will be able, without too much delay, to draw up the draft charter jointly, preserving all the best that is in it now.

Further on Kray Charter Deliberations

MK2202111095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Kryuchek under the "Power" rubric: "They Tried To Abridge Yevgeniy Nazdratenko's Rights. Maritime Kray Duma Remains True to Its Governor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Maritime Kray Duma, almost completely manned by representatives of the region's executive authorities, came up during its sitting with a sudden unpleasant surprise for Maritime Kray Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Shortly before the sitting, virtually all interested persons were saying that the main point on the agenda was going to be a discussion of the Russian-Chinese border problems to be taken up later by the Russian State Duma. The working sitting of the Maritime Kray lawmakers, however, turned into a standoff between the Duma and kray administration head Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. It has now become clear that a group of deputies decided to put to discussion their own draft kray charter that enshrines the principle of supremacy of the representative branch over the executive branch. The draft presented assigned to the governor the honorific right to ratify Duma decrees and to defend the Duma's ideas and aspirations before the president. Legislature chairman Igor Lebedinets, however, stepped in right away to protest the attempts "to reduce Mr. Nazdratenko's status to that of the British queen," and following a brief but stormy debate, the draft charter was turned down as unconstitutional, inherently controversial, and out of keeping with federal laws. Also, the Duma decided to confirm a new commission to work on the region's charter. Notably, no lawmaker was included among the new members. It is to be composed of jurists, economists, and representatives of the administration and the kray prosecutor's office. As for the deputies, they will now be allowed to work on the draft charter only as specialists and only on a contractual basis.

Tyumen Legislature Scores Yamalo-Nenets Charter

954F1219A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by V. Gorbachev: "Reaction Was Swift..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] An extraordinary session of the Oblast Duma convened yesterday dedicated to one and only one issue: "The Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug." What happened?

This is what took place. On 15 December of last year, the above-mentioned charter was adopted by the highest representational organ of power of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. On 22 December it was confirmed by Yu. Neyelov, okrug head of administration. L. Roketskiy, head of administration of Tyumen Oblast, received the document 31 December and it went to the Oblast Duma this year. When they read the Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the highest oblast organs, though not denying the legal right of the okrug to have its own fundamental law, they strongly disagreed with its procedure of adoption and, most importantly, with the content of a number of articles, seeing in them one more attempt to prepare the legislative basis for secession from Tyumen Oblast, as well as violation of a number of articles of the existing Russian Federation Constitution.

L. Roketskiy made the request to Oblast Duma Chairman N. Baryshnikov that an urgent session of the highest representational organ of the oblast be convened, which in fact began yesterday at 1400 in the House of Soviets.

But two hours previously, with a large gathering of our brother journalists in the premises housing the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug representation in Tyumen, Yu. Neyelov conducted a press conference. Specifically, he categorically denied accusations of attempting to split the okrug away from a unified Tyumen Oblast. Neyelov stated that the charter had not entered into force—that this would happen only following its publication, that there was every opportunity to amend errors if such exist, and that adoption of the charter was prompted primarily by the need to have a legislative basis for resolving economic problems, of which a great number had accumulated in the Yamal region—reindeer breeding being destroyed, fish-farming facilities being shut down, oilfield areas being torn up by the oil companies, etc. Outside assistance cannot be expected here. All problems must be dealt with by the okrug. But the local authority is powerless to a great extent—appropriate laws do not exist enabling them to function with the necessary decisiveness.

Despite expectations, discussion of the question proceeded fairly calmly in the session of the Oblast Duma, where, incidentally, all the heads of administration of all our Federation entities and all the corresponding Duma chairmen were present for the first time. Yu. Neyelov and N. Babin, chairman of the Duma of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, laid out their point of view, but did not object to the fact of a number of articles of the charter should be reviewed.

Speeches were made by L. Roketskiy, N. Baryshnikov, A. Filipenko, head of administration of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Okrug Duma Chairman S. Sobyanin, and many deputies. No one wants the oblast to disintegrate, but all wish to take advantage of their rights. The assortment of rights is determined by the laws, however, first and foremost by the fundamental law—the Russian Federation Constitution. But legal experts who spoke noted that the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Charter contains significant violations of the Constitution. For example, the okrug is endowed with the status of nation-state entity, with all the intrinsic attributes this entails (State Duma, state emblem, etc.), although according to Article 5 of the Russian Federation Constitution, only republics within the Russian Federation hold the status of state formation, with the applicable state attributes. Generally speaking, the Yamals are attempting in fact to change the status of the autonomous okrug, but this can be done only upon consent of the federal organs of authority.

But it is from the legal experts themselves that a practical proposal issued—to adopt charters of the oblast and autonomous okrugs simultaneously, including in each of them a section declaring the indivisibility of Tyumen Oblast territory, principles of mutual relations between the oblast and okrugs, delimitation of their authority, etc.

A working commission was established to finalize the draft resolution, which will today be discussed and adopted by the Oblast Duma in its session. Most likely the Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug will be suspended.

Decree Suspends Yamalo-Nenets Charter

954F1219C Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Decree of the Tyumen Oblast Duma: "On the Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having examined the Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug adopted by the State Duma of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug on 15 December 1994 and signed by Yu.V. Neyelov, head of administration of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, on 22 December, and Letter of the Tyumen Oblast Head of Administration No. 31/4-94, dated 5 January 1995, addressed to Tyumen Oblast Duma Chairman N.P. Baryshnikov, the Oblast Duma:

DECREES:

1. To concur with the proposal of the organs of state authority of the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs on suspending the Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and on adopting the Charters of the Khanty—Mansi Autonomous Okrug and of Tyumen Oblast prior to implementation of Points 2 and 3 of this decree.

2. That the organs of representational and executive authority of Tyumen Oblast, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug shall ensure coordination of the texts of the Charters of Tyumen Oblast, Yamalo—Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug by 15 February 1995, taking advantage of conciliatory procedures, to include sessions of Duma soviets.

3. To propose that the organs of executive authority of Tyumen Oblast, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug shall finalize their coordination prior to 15 February 1995 and prepare for signatures the Treaty on Mutual Relations, which shall comprise an integral part of the respective charters.

4. That responsibility for the supervision of implementation of this decree shall be entrusted to Oblast Duma Chairman N.P. Baryshnikov.

'Rumbling' Over Charter Viewed

954F1219B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by V. Gorbachev: "A Rumbling, But Nothing More"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The concluding portion of the extraordinary session of the Oblast Duma, dedicated to the matter of the "Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug," was held yesterday and concluded quite rapidly.

The drafting commission presented a revised draft resolution (published in today's TYUMENSKAYA

PRAVDA) radically suppressing the conflict that flared up between oblast and Yamal authorities and ricocheted to affect Khanty-Mansiysk. On the one hand, the "seditious" Charter of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug was suspended. On the other hand, the definitive portion of the draft decree previously drawn up by the Oblast Duma, which exposes the separatist machinations of the Yamals, was removed. As a result we see a resolution on coordinated adoption of the charters of all three Federation entities present in the oblast in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, and a proposal to sign within one month a treaty on mutual relations that would become an integral part of all three charters.

The proposal of an oblast administration representative to retain in the decree the definitive portion of the previous Oblast Duma draft decree did not stand up to a vote. Nor did the appeal to B. Yeltsin, V. Shumeyko, and I. Rybkin drawn up by the Oblast Duma on legally eliminating the contradictions arising in determination of the legal status of Tyumen Oblast and its component okrugs and in the adoption of a Russian Federation law on this account.

Drafting commission member Viktor Gorodilov formulated the reasons for this with absolute precision: The conflict had arisen to a great extent because of the ambitions of certain responsible officials, and we did not consider it necessary to consolidate these. But Vladimir Yudin, another commission member and perhaps the most irreconcilable opponent of okrug separatism among Oblast Duma deputies, stated that we should not exacerbate the situation, that in the committee yesterday he understood for the first time that we are all interested in finding a constructive resolution to the problem involving the presence of three Federation entities in the oblast. He stated that turning to the central authorities would mean failing to trust our own people, that we could hardly expect to receive any assistance from above and must ourselves resolve our problems.

Thus, once again we have heard a rumbling, but once again the storm has passed. Nevertheless, I believe that this time the rumbling has been somewhat useful. If the Oblast Duma decree is implemented, the question of mutual relations between the oblast and autonomous okrugs will acquire a certain legal status. And that is quite something in itself.

Tatarstan Prepares for Parliamentary Elections

954F1351A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with Marat Sirayev, chairman of the Central Election Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Republic of Tatarstan, by journalist Anvar Malikov; place and date not given: "The Line Has Been Drawn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Another stage of the election campaign is behind us: Registration of candidate deputies to the State Soviet of Tatarstan has been completed. Journalist Anvar Malikov speaks with the chairman of the Central Election Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Republic of Tatarstan, Marat Sirayev.**

[Malikov] Marat Ashrapovich, have many people registered to run for deputy mandates?

[Sirayev] As of today all 130 district election commissions have submitted to us information on the registration of 462 candidate deputies to the State Soviet. Of these, 155 individuals are running in 61 administrative-territorial districts (remember that these districts coincide with the borders of cities under republic jurisdiction and rayons, and the deputies from them will not be excused from their basic employment—A.M.). There are 307 hopefuls running for 69 places in the professional part of parliament in the territorial districts (with an equal number of voters—A.M.). As you can see, the competition is serious. There are a considerable number of districts where eight or nine candidates have started to vie for one deputy mandate.

[Malikov] But who are they, these potential members of parliament?

[Sirayev] In terms of how they were nominated it is possible conventionally to divide them into three approximately equal groups of candidates: those nominated from assemblies in their place of residence, in their place of employment, and from parties and social formations. More than 70 percent of them are from 30 to 50 years of age, one-fourth are older than that, and only 10 individuals are younger than 30. There will be 33 women vying for deputy mandates. The majority of the candidates have a higher education.

[Malikov] Has the Central Election Commission had to change the decisions of the district committees regarding candidate registration?

[Sirayev] Yes, we received 15 complaints and reports on these questions. All of them were verified on the spot. As a result we had to overturn one decision to register a candidate because of a violation of the law on elections, and three candidates, conversely, had to be reinstated.

The case of the deputy of the State Duma of Russia on the party list of the Yabloko bloc, I. Grachev, was special. The district committee of the Kazan administrative-territorial electoral district refused to register him as a candidate, incorrectly justifying this by saying that he had not signed a declaration renouncing his authority as a deputy to the State Duma in the event that he was elected to the State Soviet of Tatarstan. We considered the appeal from Ivan Dmitriyevich and also gave a rejection but with a slightly different justification. The fact is that at the present time he is working in Moscow and living there with his family, while according to Point 8 of Article 21 of the law "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Republic of Tatarstan," only citizens working or residing on the territory of the corresponding electoral district may be candidates from administrative-territorial units. In order to remove any doubts, I will quote Article 20 of the Civil Code of Russia, which was adopted by the State Duma and took effect on 1 January of this year: "The place of residence is deemed to be the place where the citizen resides permanently or predominantly."

[Malikov] There are candidates—the line has been drawn, the election campaign is getting into full swing. Can you remind us of the basic requirements of the law regarding this?

[Sirayev] Any citizen and any social organization has the right to campaign "for" or "against" candidates as long as they do not use fabrications that defame the candidates or impeach their honor and dignity. It was not without reason that the law established a mandatory condition for any printed campaign materials: They must contain information on the organizations and individuals responsible for publishing them. There are restrictions on posting leaflets and posters: They must not appear in buildings or in premises where election committees are located or in public transportation. They may appear on other objects only with permission from their owners. The campaigning must end on the day of the elections, and on the pages of the periodical press—a day before the elections.

[Malikov] Is it possible to vote early, before 5 March?

[Sirayev] The law on elections provides for such a possibility. The ballots must be prepared by 20 February, and by 23 February those who will be absent on 5 March may come and vote in the district election commission, and on 3-4 March, in the precinct election commission.

[Malikov] So, is everyone going to the elections?

[Sirayev] I think that even without our appeals to voters, they will not be indifferent to these elections. After all, the future of the republic and the well-being of each family will depend largely on whom we elect to the new parliament—the State Soviet. Let us not forget that at the same time the people of Tatarstan will be electing representatives to the local soviets of people's deputies, and their role in the life of the cities and rayons has increased significantly.

Economic Issues

Premier Cited on Economic Reform Program for 1995-1997

LD2302103095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1016 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced today that the government would have to discuss and adopt, by the end of March, a new programme for the development and deepening of economic reforms for 1995-1997.

Speaking at today's cabinet meeting, the prime minister said the Economics Ministry had already been instructed to prepare, by the middle of March, all necessary documents for a wider-format meeting of the government, which will meet in the Kremlin to discuss and adopt the programme drawn up in line with the president's annual message.

Chernomyrdin also said the draft programme should be discussed, where needed, in Russia's regions and in conferences with industrialists, entrepreneurs and bankers.

He said the president's administration has appealed to the government to work jointly in preparing the new governmental programme. The government responded by forwarding to the president's administration its proposals for the organisation of joint work and for candidates to the joint working group.

Chernomyrdin said he had asked First Vice-Premier Anatoliy Chubays to lead the group and signed an ordinance to that effect on Wednesday.

Chernomyrdin also announced that the plans for cabinet meetings and for work of the collegia of the ministries and departments will be brought in line with the provisions contained in the president's annual message.

Budget Approval May Not Be Assured Despite Spending Growth

MK2202125095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Boris Boyko: "The 1995 Budget Is Ready! For Third Reading...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The budget process, which in the past month has been hidden deep in the State Duma, has again come to the surface. At their press conference yesterday Mikhail Zadornov, Budget and Finances Committee chairman; and Oksana Dmitriyeva, chairperson of the budget subcommittee, said that the committee, having considered approximately 600 amendments, finalized the preparation of the draft budget for third reading at a State Duma plenary session. This notable event could take place as early as today. It will be recalled that under standing orders, on third reading parliament is to approve budget expenditures article by article, within the basic budget indicators already approved in second reading: revenues, expenditures, and deficit. Therefore the budget committee (which, eyewitnesses say, has been working on the budget day and night) has been confronted with the rather difficult task of appeasing various lobbyists (whose representatives sometimes did not even fit into the sessions hall), interested in increasing their shares of budget spending.

Moreover, it had to walk a tightrope, seeking not to sharpen relations with the government, which acts as an advocate of spending cuts.

Judging by the mood of participants in the press conference, they thought that they have coped well with this task. The basic challenge in their work apparently consisted in distributing the additionally raised 18 trillion rubles among the spending articles, 13 trillion of which emerged back when the draft budget was being prepared for second reading; and 5 trillion was obtained by cutting spending on current maintenance in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (500 billion rubles), reducing subventions to the Moscow City budget (942 billion), deferring the payment of part of the Central Bank's debt to the government (2.5 trillion), and reducing deliveries to state reserves and supplies (1 trillion rubles). The funds thus obtained allowed to increase spending items to finance the defense order, the agro-industrial complex, the coal industry, social programs and—a point Zadornov specially made—a number of investment programs. On this count Zadornov noted proudly: "We were able to give an impetus to investments in the most effective sectors." True, Oksana Dmitriyeva was more skeptical on this point, noting that financial support of high technology in the budget is clearly insufficient.

It is noteworthy that in reworking the budget spending articles, the committee acted on the assumption that Boris Yeltsin would still veto the minimum wage increase to 54,100 rubles, as approved by the Federation Council, and as a result it will rise only to 34,400 rubles. It is also envisioned that as of March not only allowances and student stipends will be increased, but also salaries to 30 percent of state sector employees. The remaining 70 percent—salaries of law enforcement workers, state administration employees, and servicemen—will be indexed as of 1 April.

True, although they were satisfied with their work, committee members stopped short of predicting the Duma's unconditional approval of the budget in third reading. It was only at the beginning of the press conference that Mikhail Zadornov observed philosophically that "simply because the budget has been reworked, the factions have not changed their critical attitude to it," and at the end of the press conference Oksana Dmitriyeva remarked—just as philosophically—that budget shortfalls are natural because the budget is "a result of interaction of political forces." The fate of the budget will also be complicated by the fact that the committee had to reject most amendments from Duma committees and factions. This is quite natural in principle: It is impossible to take all amendments into account. But this can give committee and faction representatives an additional cause to criticize the budget.

Finance Ministry's Petrov on Budget Outlook

MM2002112595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Irina Savvateyeva: "Finance Ministry Promises Financial Stabilization, Given Political Stability"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prior to discussing the third reading of the 1995 budget the interested parties are clarifying their positions and honing their arguments. First Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov set out his ministry's viewpoint in an interview with IZVESTIYA.

Judging by Petrov's comments, what the Finance Ministry fears most is a mass attack by all kinds of lobby groups, which could turn into a total review of specific budget items. In order to prevent unpleasant clashes with the large agrarian faction during the Duma hearings, the ministry is holding vigorous talks with its representatives right now.

The bartering with the agrarians is going on over two figures. It is known that at the end of the year the state wrote off 5.6 trillion [rubles—R] of agricultural enterprises' debts as well as half the sum accumulated as interest on loans—R3 trillion. The peasants are now demanding that the second half—another 3 trillion—be written off too, and that they be given another 6 trillion for the sowing campaign.

But first, the Finance Ministry does not want to write off all debts at a stroke, insisting that there are some agricultural producers are perfectly strong economic units which are able to make budget settlements. Second, it is inclined not to issue any more loans, since they will simply not be repaid, but to allocate money for financing sowing directly from the budget. And not 6 trillion but 1.1 trillion in the first quarter and an as yet unknown sum whose size "is still to be fixed" in the second.

Another headache for the government has been the increase in the minimum wage adopted between the second and third readings. According to Finance Ministry estimates an additional R159 trillion will be needed if the minimum wage and all the attendant payments are increased by 160 percent. An additional R67 trillion will be needed if it is a 70-percent increase.

"Of course, all this can be put in the budget," Petrov observed, "but this budget would then become absolutely ridiculous: All expenditure would go on wages alone. If so, we will not be able to build or sow anything, produce any investment, transport goods to the North, or finance the military...."

In order to somehow solve the problem the Finance Ministry has made compromise proposals: from 1 March through 1 April to increase wages in the budget sphere by 30 percent and allowances and grants by 70 percent. This increase will affect teachers, military personnel, students, and other low-paid sections of the population. According to Petrov's information the measure will cost R11.7 trillion, and budget sources to finance it have already been found.

As regards expenditure on Chechnya, the deputy finance minister painted the following picture. For carrying out military operations "money is being found from within the expenditure of the ministries and departments carrying out this operation." The Finance Ministry will have information about how much these operations have already cost based on the first quarter's results. "So far we have not given any money over and above that recorded in ministry and department estimates," Petrov stated.

But budget resources are already going on financing humanitarian aid. In February R11 billion will be spent on this. A total of R2.5 trillion expenditure on Chechnya in the current year has been included in the budget. Meanwhile, according to the latest Economy Ministry estimates, rebuilding Chechnya's national economy in 1995 will require 5.6 trillion.

But Petrov insists that these are most probably inflated figures, since Economy Ministry estimates were based on requests by ministries and departments. And they, the deputy finance minister believes, are considerably inflated. It cannot be ruled out that many departments will now try to solve their own problems "on the back of Chechnya."

In his interview with IZVESTIYA Petrov expressed bewilderment at the criticism to which the government is being subjected in connection with the decision to finance the budget partly by attracting resources from international financial organizations. He observed that the terms for the granting of loans are extremely favorable: They are preferential in terms of both repayment periods and interest. The deputy minister also regards the possibility of obtaining this money fairly optimistically: "Last year when the mission departed for the last time prior to signing, we had three times as many unagreed questions as now...." True, Mr. Petrov agreed that the government cannot keep to the planned schedules as regards the times of receipt. "We were hoping that by now we would have successfully completed the talks and that we would be receiving part of the loan in the first quarter." But "certain complications occurred," because of which first-quarter expenditure suffered. Consequently the state once again ended up with a debt to the budget institutions, which was not cleared until the end of last year.

As regards all last year's government debts to the sectors, Mr. Petrov briefly outlined their fate as follows. The state's biggest liabilities are to construction workers and scientific institutions. Repayment of the debts to construction workers has to a considerable extent been incorporated in the 1995 budget. It is now a question of also repaying R1.8 trillion to defense complex enterprises. The miners have been promised that what they are owed from 1994 will be covered in stages; the schedules have already been drawn up. "Incidentally," Petrov observed, "while on average we financed all sectors at the rate of 74 percent, we financed coal workers 88 percent...."

Forecasts regarding the level of inflation were more optimistic. The deputy finance minister stressed that there had been no increase in the money supply in January and that a certain reduction had even been recorded. February was proceeding with a small increase, and overall based on the first quarter the government hopes to emerge with an 8-percent increase in the money supply. Unless there is at the same time a sharp increase in the rate of money circulation—for which read: inflationary expectations; for which read: political cataclysms—some time toward April Mr. Petrov promises us 3-percent monthly inflation. "The inflationary situation now largely depends on the presence of political stability," the deputy finance minister stressed.

Belyayev Cited on Pace, Aims of '95 Privatization

MK2102133095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Mikhail Lantsman in the "Privatization" column: "The State Property Committee Promises To Salvage the Budget. And Invites Directors To Go to Court Over Land Disputes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the latest from the State Statistics Committee, by early 1995, 11,265 privatized enterprises were registered in Russia, with an aggregate property value of 2.3 trillion rubles. Proceeds from privatization approximated 2 trillion rubles. These figures were cited at an expanded session of the State Property Committee [SPC] Collegium which was held on 17-18 February. Assessing the three-year performance by his creation, First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays noted without undue modesty: "The SPC is the most efficient system of all state administrative bodies. This is an indicator of the quality of work done by the professionals who have gathered here."

True, the professionals (heads of SPC regional committees, the Russian Property Fund, and the Federal Bankruptcy Agency) gathered in Moscow not so much to hear victorious reports as to receive guidelines. The urgent need for a briefing was dictated among other things by the fact that SPC ex-chairman Vladimir Polevanov has still managed to sow some confusion in the professionals' minds. Moreover, a second front against many of Chubays' achievements was opened by governors in those regions from where the professionals came.

New Chairman Sergey Belyayev had to spend 40 minutes of his policy speech to neutralize the effects of government zigzags. Belyayev, by his own admission, was unpleasantly surprised by the governors' applause during the course of a conference with the president on local self-government, when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn proposed suspending privatization for five or six years, and to think well. Belyayev assured his subordinates that the Federal Program will prevail over any regional regulations and "in this respect you are absolutely protected by law and the president."

As of now the pace of privatization will be set by the federal budget. Under the 1995 plan, the privatization campaign should ensure 9.1 trillion rubles of budget revenues. Therefore privatization, Belyayev noted, will become more radical.

The SPC, by freeing the national economy from planned economics, will itself be affected by a tough plan. By 1 April the SPC central apparat will formulate a schedule for the sell-off of state property. Similar plans are to be prepared by regional committee no less than two months ahead of the first sell-off. The sell-off schedule should be fitted to the state treasury income schedule. Implementation of the schedule by territorial administrations will be stimulated by a progressive normative for the distribution of funds received from privatization between the federal and regional budgets. Local authorities thwarting the privatization campaign will deprive themselves of additional income.

Although at present 60 percent of GDP is constituted by the nonstate sector of the economy, according to the SPC there is still plenty of reserve for privatization. The greatest reserve are state blocks of privatized enterprise stocks.

According to Belyayev, more than 70 percent of aggregate demand by potential investors is for state blocks of shares in oil companies which are to be sold under presidential Edict 1403. At the federal level, a special program will be prepared for sell-offs of stock in the most profitable Russian enterprises in sectors which are the most popular with investors: the oil and gas industry, nonferrous metallurgy, and telecommunications. To this end, a special interagency commission will be set up under SPC auspices.

The stocks of holding companies are a substantial privatization reserve. Many holdings were created to preserve the old ministry structure of administration. Based on audit results, the SPC will abolish holdings created in circumvention of legislation. This will allow a large number of shares of privatized enterprises paid in as contribution to holding companies' charter capital to be released. Yet another reserve is privatization of the social sphere (public health, culture, recreation, and sports facilities, and hotels). Yet the state will be giving priority to getting rid of bankrupt enterprises. In the very near future the government will present a bankruptcy law to the State Duma.

Nonetheless, Belyayev thinks, the privatization campaign should not be turned into a machine for pumping money to the state budget. The basic guideline, according to him, was formulated by the president. "Our task is to build a bridge between an inflation- ridden past and an investment-rich future." To attract investments, the SPC chairman called on those present actively to bring land plots and real estate into play. In his opinion, the main economic intrigue of 1995 will focus around the sale of land plots underlying privatized enterprises. The requisite normative enactments are already in place: the federal Constitution and a corresponding presidential edict. SPC Deputy Chairman Petr Mostovoy, recalling that the Constitution is a direct-action law, advised the directors of privatized enterprises to contest in court any decision by local authorities banning the sale of land.

Yasin Says Chechnya Has Not Affected Military Budget

LD2302082195 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chechen operation has in no way affected the military clauses of the budget for the current year. This is what Economy Minister Yevgeniy Yasin believes. He noted that the slight increase in military expenditure that has been proposed by the government, compared with the original draft, is linked not with Chechnya but the need to maintain the army's technical level.

State Property Sell-Off in 'Sensible Phase'

MM2202112095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Sergey Belyayev, chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, by Lyudmila Biryukova; place and date not given: "Production Will Increase When It Is in the Hands of an Efficient Owner, Russian Federation Goskomimushchestvo Chairman Sergey Belyayev Believes"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a delay of almost three months Sergey Belyayev, new chief of the State Committee for the Management of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo], has finally taken up his position as chairman of this department which is of the greatest of importance for the future of the reforms. Both Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays and Russian presidential aide Aleksandr Livshits, as well as other people in authority in the state, had earlier been grooming him for his new post (Chubays and Livshits have only considered it possible to speak about this now). However, the policy for appointments in the higher echelons of power is an unpredictable matter. In this specific case it was diverted, in a development which cost the country a billion rubles. This is the level of damage which specialists have assessed was caused by Vladimir Polevanov during his short term in office as Goskomimushchestvo chairman.

In reply to our correspondent's questions, Sergey Belyayev said that he does not intend to begin work by putting together any particular privatization program. He will continue to follow the course set before his time.

[Biryukova] Do you consider that during the first phase too much haste was permitted, with the pace of privatization unjustifiably forced, depriving the treasury of expected income from the sale of state property?

[Belyayev] With hindsight much can be seen in a different light. Sure, a whole series of enterprises could have been privatized in a different manner using a different organizational framework. But this is a specific feature of the initial phase and it is extremely desirable to get through it in the shortest possible time. The delay at the beginning threatens to complicate matters throughout. What was required was a spurt. All the more so as you will remember that there was strong opposition to the reforms and a campaign was mounted to discredit them. It is important that in these circumstances they succeeded in not deviating from the plan.

[Biryukova] The pace of privatization has recently slowed down somewhat. What do you intend to do in the light of this?

[Belyayev] Indeed, earlier on during the voucher phase of privatization, Goskomimushchestvo did set the ministries and departments the task of selling shares in enterprises. Then this procedure was withdrawn. We intend to resume the practice in the new monetary phase of privatization because it proved to be justified. Before 1 April we are going to present to the Russian Federation Government for confirmation a list of enterprises in which it is expedient to sell the state-owned portion of their shares by the end of this year. Experience has shown that the state cannot perform the duties of a zealous production manager. What is more, it does not have money to invest. Meaning that it is necessary to sell everything that is up for sale.

[Biryukova] But won't foreign capital buy up all our industry on the cheap? Such fears are expressed regularly.

[Belyayev] We have now entered a sensible phase of selling securities. There will be no haste here. Blocks of shares in state enterprises will be presented for sale at money auctions only if they have a good rating on the market and circumstances are favorable. Goskomimushchestvo intends to prepare the shares prior to their sale. In short, the lessons from the previous round of privatization will be taken into consideration.

[Biryukova] Are you sure that those who have money will be able to manage their property effectively?

[Belyayev] If they cannot do so, they will lose that property. Those are the laws of the market. In order to implement them, a mechanism for bankruptcies has been activated here. All procedures linked to the declaration of bankruptcies are designed to hand over enterprises to the most capable owner.

[Biryukova] What will you be dealing with as a priority in your new post? What matters do you consider urgent?

[Belyayev] First of all, the problem of Russian property abroad needs to be resolved. This important question has been neglected for too long. Of course, the most urgent matter is to continue privatization. A key task is to step up investment activity, which only a developed real estate market will facilitate. I am sure that the investor will "take the bait" as far as real estate is concerned. It is also time that we went over from the right to dispose of land to the right to own it.

[Biryukova] It is well known that in the vast majority of joint-stock companies the average shareholder does not have a chance to influence the joint-stock company's leadership, which goes absolutely unchecked in its conduct. What can be done about this?

[Belyayev] Unfortunately we still do not have a law on joint-stock companies. There is a draft law on them under scrutiny in parliament's lower house. Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin intends to request the State Duma to expedite the law's adoption. But without waiting for this to happen, Goskomimushchestvo is planning to continue its campaign to explain shareholders their rights and to educate people through the mass media about how to use those means of influence on the joint-stock companies' leaderships that they already possess.

[Biryukova] A Russian Federation presidential edict has given a legal basis to the features specific to privatization in Moscow. Aren't you afraid that other federation components will follow the capital's example?

[Belyayev] The law provides the federation components with wide scope for their activities. The presidential edict does not run counter to current legislation. But in order to gain particular powers for themselves, it is necessary for them to assess their opportunities properly. Time will tell if the Moscow model of privatization is right. The city's authorities have obtained controlling blocks of shares in several enterprises. It follows from this that it will be necessary to invest in the development of production from city budget funds. Will it bear such a load? The city has many needs on top of this. There is a fear that the Moscow model will not work effectively and that time will sort everything out.

Labor Minister on 1994 'Paradoxical' Salary Situation

LD2102174195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1543 GMT 21 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Paradoxical situation with salaries came about in Russia in 1994: Percentage of one's salary in overall revenues declined gradually and reached 47 percent by the end of the year, Russian Minister of Labour Gennadiy Melikyan told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.

By the end of 1994, minimal wages amounted to 20,500 rubles. Notably, this amount was re-adjusted only on one occasion, whereas according to the Russian legislation it should be indexed once each quarter. Remarkably, in the beginning of the year the minimal wages accounted for 28 percent of the living wages; in December it receded to 12 percent.

Federal government's indebtedness on unpaid wages poses an acute problem. In the field of industry, construction and agriculture, total indebtedness increased ninefold during the 12 months of 1994. In the beginning of the year, there were 9,000 enterprises with overdue indebtedness; in December, there were 30,900 such enterprises.

Differences in wages paid in what are known here as "budget" and "non-budget" sectors of the economy also posed painful contradictions. For example, average monthly wages of gas workers was by the end of the year almost eight times larger than that of agricultural workers; seven times larger than that of light-industry workers; five times larger than that of workers employed in machine- builkding industry.

Those employed in the field of crediting and insurance system proved to be the most well-paid category of employees in Russia in 1994: their salaries were 2.5 times larger than the overall average registered in national economy.

In general, material standings of those employed in the "budget" sector worsened markedly by the end of the year. According to Melikyan, salaries of those employed in the field of education, culture and arts amounted to only 50 to 60 percent of wages of industrial workers.

Melikyan named the following guidelines for perfecting remuneration system in Russia in 1995: gradual growth in percentage ration between one's salary and one's total income; enhancement of its dependence on the results and productivity of one's labour; cutting back on the differences in remuneration; and elimination of the causes which result in delays in paying the wages.

According to the ministry's experts, minimal wages should be raised most urgently; besides, it is necessary to index the wages periodically, as prescribed by the law, in proportion to the rise in prices.

Federal Commission Views Regulation of Securities Market

LD1702181195 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1454 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Commission for Securities and the Stock Market, brokers and lawyers assembled for a conference on Friday [17 Feb] to discuss the ordering and regulating of the spontaneous processes of the Russian securities market, which astounds the world by its stormy, unpredictable, and uneven development. Boom and frenzied activity suddenly give way to stagnation and decline. An almost uncontrolled process is taking place, which frightens off both Russian and Western investors.

The federal commission's head Dmitriy Vasilyev believes that the Russian population has at its disposal at least $10 billion, which could be involved in investment.

However, after the scandals with the notorious MMM and Vlasteliny joint-stock companies, which essentially were selling surrogate securities, people are afraid of entrusting the money they earned by the sweat of their brow to anyone at all.

The government has decided to take effective measures to restore investors' confidence in securities, in the first place by creating laws protecting investors' interests and by setting up an information system that makes it possible for investors to penetrate the shroud of fog that so far this sphere of financial activity is cloaked with.

All-Foreign Capital Enterprises Topped 5,000 in Jan

MK2102123095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Number of Enterprises With Foreign Capital Up in Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yuliya Filippova, State Registration Chamber administration deputy chief, has announced that the number of enterprises based 100 percent on foreign capital, with a total capital of $318.9 million, topped 5,000 in January 1995. The greatest activity is shown by businessmen from the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Hong Kong. The total number of enterprises with various proportions of Western partnership operating in the Russian Federation is 16,284. Their investments amounted to $1.6 billion.

State Expected To Take 10-Percent Stake in Agent Bank

MM2002134995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Yaroslav Shimov: "The State Has Decided to Buy a Little Piece of 'Menatep'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The acquisition by the state of a large block of shares in the Menatep Commercial Bank could prove a significant event on the Russian financial market. Although a deal has yet to be clinched, the Menatep Bank management does not deny its intention to sell a sizeable proportion of its new issue, which is connected with a shareholders' meeting decision to increase the company capital of Menatep two and a half times, to the state in the very near future.

Cooperation between Menatep and the federal and municipal structures has been ongoing for several years. Among other things, Menatep is the authorized bank for a number of state programs. According to Dmitriy Firkalo, chief of the securities administration at

Menatep, "since it entrusts the bank with such important tasks, the state has a right to become one of its shareholders."

As D. Firkalo announced, by acquiring "a sizeable but not controlling" block of the bank's shares the state will obtain certain rights in the management of Menatep—in the sphere of the fulfillment of state investment programs. In the light of this, certain changes may have to be made to the bank's charter.

A representative of the Finance Ministry or of another structure which will join Menatep shareholders on the state's behalf will, obviously, get a seat on the bank's board of directors. Hence it is possible to conclude that the state intends to purchase no less than 10 percent of the shares, as this is the quantity which brings with it the right to join the board of directors. Menatep representatives resolutely disagreed with the theory that state involvement in Menatep's work is linked to a weakening of the bank's positions.

Where will the state get the funds for this pretty hefty purchase? Neither the Menatep managers nor the representatives of the state (that is, the Finance Ministry) have been able to answer this question as yet. Several options are being examined, including payment in state securities.

Annual Oil Leakage Valued at 72 Trillion Rubles

LD1902180395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1700 GMT on 19 February carries a two-minute report claiming that approximately 5 million tonnes of oil seep out of Russia's pipelines annually and "the total loss caused by the drop of pressure in oil, gas, and other pipelines amounts to 72 trillion rubles, a sum equal to the entire federal budget deficit for the year 1995."

The report includes recorded remarks by Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the interdepartmental commission for ecological safety, saying that the commission has drawn the president's attention to this state of affairs twice duirng the past six months.

"Western companies spend as much as 15 percent of their operating costs on pipelines; we spend one percent. Automatic stop valves are installed at intervals of five kilometers in the West; in our country they are separated by distances of 50 kilometers," Yablokov said. He called for a thorough revision of policy and for oil corporations to have to pay for the damage they cause to the environment.

International Affairs

Russian Defense Official Signs 'Important Documents'

WS2202131095 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2201 GMT 21 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb. 21—Ukrainian Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion Minister Viktor Petrov and Russian Defense Industry State Committee chief Viktor Glukhikh signed two important documents on Tuesday [21 February].

The first document is to further the development of the cooperation in the supply of materials and machinery for each country's state enterprises. The second concerned establishing a joint Ukrainian-Russian financial-industrial group venture, International Aircraft Engines.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov received the Russian delegation members. The discussion centered on the prospects of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in the aerospace industry and in production of various weapons. They also discussed the prospects of construction of another AN-70 plane to replace the plane that crashed several days ago during a routine test flight.

The two signed agreements will provide workers of about 300 Ukrainian and 500 Russian industrial enterprises with jobs.

Russian Embassy Assists Crimeans in Obtaining Citizenship

LD2202190195 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1315 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Crimea, 22 Feb—On 21 February the Supreme Council of Crimea received a fax signed by Abdulakh Mikitayev, the chairman of the Commission for Issues of Citizenship under the president of the Russian Federation. The document notes: "In response to your appeal to the president of Russia of 19 January, I am authorized to state that in accordance with the desire of some inhabitants of the Republic of Crimea with regard to granting them Russian citizenship with permission from Ukraine, a group of consular officials from the Russian Embassy in Ukraine will arrive in Simferopol in the next 10 days. Please provide organizational and technical assistance for the group."

Latvia Congratulated on Council of Europe Membership

LD2202223395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has congratulated his Latvian counterpart, Guntis Ulmanis, on Latvia's admission to the Council of Europe.

In a letter passed to Ulmanis in Riga by a Ukrainian delegation, Kuchma expressed the hope that "Latvia and Ukraine will become good partners not only in bilateral cooperation but also in matters of international stability and security," a source at the president's office said.

The delegation, which stayed in Riga on Tuesday and Wednesday, reached an agreement with the Latvian side that in March the two presidents would set a date for a visit by Kuchma to the Baltic country, the source told Interfax.

"The relevant ministries must do their best to ensure that the visit results in the signing of important documents," he said.

The delegation, led by Kuchma's chief of staff, Dmitriy Tabachnik, is returning to Kiev on Wednesday evening.

Agreement Reached Over Allocation of $1.2 Billion

LD2202192895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1148 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 22 Feb—The IMF intends allocating $1.2 billion to Ukraine to implement economic programs. Oleh Nalyvayko, the head of the press office of the Ukrainian Economics Ministry, told the ITAR-TASS correspondents that preliminary agreement was reached at talks that ended today between official Kiev and representatives of the IMF.

Oleh Nalyvayko said that the IMF representatives were "pleased with the results of the talks." A number of technical issues remained for Ukraine to resolve. First and foremost, the Ukrainian Supreme Council must adopt the 1995 budget. The memorandum on the credit being allocated by the IMF will be signed in Washington only once this has been done.

Black Sea Fleet Repairs Hampered by Debts

LD2202164095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1238 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sevastopol, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The repairs of Black Sea Fleet vessels have sharply worsened mainly because of the big debts of the fleet to Crimean ship-building companies, the Deputy Commander of the fleet Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Aladkin told Interfax Wednesday [22 February].

On February 15 debts totalled 320 billion karbovantsy out of which the fleet owed naval ship repair facilities 95.3 billion.

The problem of repairs is directly linked with the fleet's funding. Aladkin stressed that for the second year Ukraine has not been financing the fleet.

With the present level of funding, the rear-admiral said, in two or three years the defence capability of the fleet can slump radically.

According to him, last year over 30 ships were repaired and 40 sent for repairs.

Aladkin said that at the talks on the future of the fleet Ukraine claims only the ships that have been recently repaired or those under repairs. "One gets the impression that the command of the Ukrainian navy and the official Ukrainian delegation are dragging out the negotiations in order to get the technically best part of the fleet and leave the remainder to Russia," the deputy commander said.

National Affairs

Spokesman: Kuchma's Tasks Upon Return From Vacation

WS2302093695 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2100 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Report by Halia Pavliva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb. 22—President Leonid Kuchma returns from a brief vacation in the Western Ukrainian town of Truskavets later in the week to tackle a project on financial industrial conglomerates, Mykhaylo Doroshenko, Kuchma's spokesman said Wednesday [22 February].

Kuchma signed a decree on the creation of financial industrial conglomerates on Jan. 27. The decree commanded the Cabinet of Ministers to prepare legislation for Parliament's consideration within a month's time.

Doroshenko affirmed that the Cabinet of Ministers' proposal would be ready by Feb. 27, emphasizing that Kuchma's team was actively involved in the project. "Without the help of the president's administration, it would be difficult for the Cabinet to draft such a project," he said.

Kuchma also will review a proposal on changes to Ukraine's scientific and industrial policies. "The President is planning to submit this proposal to Parliament for review so that it can eventually take the form of legislation," Doroshenko said.

In addition, a decree on credit debt repayment is being drafted, Doroshenko said. The decree foresees resolving Ukrainian enterprises' debts through the issuing of shares.

Following Kuchma's visit to Donetsk in early February, an administration proposal on the development of Ukraine's coal industry in 1995 is ready. Kuchma will sign the document upon his return to Kiev, Doroshenko said.

Effects of Recent Kuchma Power Decrees Viewed

WS2202124595 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2201 GMT 21 Feb 95

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Olha Ansimova: "Kuchma's Power Decrees: A Strengthening of Democracy?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A set of presidential resolutions and decrees issued over the past two weeks on strengthening of power institutions have passed without comment in the Ukrainian mass media. Nevertheless, this process can be interpreted either as a mechanism to strengthen democracy or as an obstacle to its development.

To begin with, the first document of this chain was the presidential decree on reorganization of the National Guard. Readers might remember that after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the Ukrainian internal forces, well-trained personnel from the Internal Ministry who had been generally used to disperse meetings and strikes, were reorganized in a separate structure—the National Guard, answerable both to the president and the Parliament. In other words, the president could not independently take a decision to use the National Guard without permission from Parliament. All these changes were supposed to de monopolize the Internal Ministry, the functions of which, under the totalitarian regime, were to protect the system, rather than to fight against criminals.

President Kuchma has recently returned the National Guard to the jurisdiction of the Internal Ministry. By doing so, the president has not only strengthened a power institution but also a punitive mechanism of the executive, hence his presidential power, because the internal affairs minister is part of the cabinet, and therefore directly fulfills the resolutions of the president.

The Internal Affairs Ministry was also strengthened from another side. While Crimean authorities had been trying to entirely subordinate the power structures of the peninsula, any attempt at creation of municipal or local police authorities have now been ended in Ukraine. In other words there has been recreated a vertical structure of the Internal Affairs Ministry, subordinated from village to city, to the internal affairs minister, abrogating any legal influence from local authorities (people's deputies councils) on police structures. These orders on reorganization were issued by the internal affairs minister. The president, of course, was aware of it.

Taking into account Kuchma's resolution to replenish the Internal Affairs Ministry with better-trained servicemen from the Security Service, one may easily paint a picture of the recreation of a monopolized police structure, accountable only to the president.

What these structures are being strengthened for? If we remember the words of Deputy Prime Minister Evhen Marchuk (former Security Service chair) who has said "Ukraine will never allow anything similar to Chechnya in Crimea," one may assume the new structures of the Internal Affairs Ministry will be first of all used to call the Crimean authorities to order. It will look "more civilized" than, say, using the army to suppress separatist tendencies on the peninsula.

These forces can also be used in the other regions of Ukraine as a barrier against opposition to the current course of the president—in particular against leftist political forces, which, in connection with the last price increase, have issued a statement and then leaflets in which they appealed to the people for civil unrest, political meetings and all-Ukrainian political strike.

In addition to getting the police under his power, Leonid Kuchma has stepped up his reorganization of the Security Service. The only difference in this case is that the president gave a certain degree of publicity to this process.

Kuchma held a meeting of the Coordinating Council for criminal problems (a presidential structure), having invited all power ministers, administration staff and parliamentary representatives, where the president announced the necessity of a new attack on criminality, stressing on the danger of transitional period in all post-totalitarian states. "Criminal clans have a real chance to control the state power, including the top level," Kuchma said. As an example of such attempts in Ukraine, the president cited the criminal case against former acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskiy.

Thus, having reasonable ground, the president announced the necessity of strengthening and reorganizing the Security Service. A special group in the Justice Ministry has been created to work out corresponding documents. According to some documents, the Security Service is supposed to be divided into several structures, and each of them will be subordinate to the National Security Committee. The committee consists of the president, as its chair, and Volodymyr Horbulin, Kuchma's crony, as its secretary. Another very important thing in the planning of the Security Service subordination is that the influence of the former Ukrainian KGB chief Marchuk, who, as a deputy prime minister, currently supervises this institution, will be automatically removed.

Simultaneously with reorganization of the Security Service, a special analytical center is being created, which, according to Kuchma, will collect and analyze information about organized crime. This center, however, is better considered as an attempt to create a mechanism to control first of all the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers, which is currently beyond Kuchma's presidential power.

Thus, the reorganization of the power ministries, initiated by President Kuchma, leads to concentration of immense power in presidential hands, taking into account that the president is the commander-in-chief of Ukrainian Armed Forces. This situation cannot be otherwise correctly interpreted in the post totalitarian period, when the process of real division of power has not yet been completed. On the one hand the concentration of immense power is being declared as a mechanism to make order in the country. While on the other hand such a monopoly can be dangerous not only in the future, if less tolerant politicians come to power, but also with the possible toughening of the position of the current president.

As far as the reaction of political circles is concerned, they have, as expected, evaded this subject with wait-and-see silence. Only former President Leonid Kravchuk, recently returned from his visit to the United States, has called these moves a step backwards. The debate, set in Parliament, about the correspondence of the presidential decrees to the current Ukrainian legislation, has suspended, at least until the situation with the Power Bill is clear.

Kuchma Appoints Bannykh Commander of Border Troops

LD2202124995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1120 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev February 22 TASS—Chairman of Ukraine's Committee for the Protection of the State Border Viktor Bannykh has been appointed commander of the Republic's border troops. The decree of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma appointing Viktor Bannykh to a new post was circulated by the Republic's mass media today.

Colonel-General Viktor Bannykh is 45 years old. In 1970, he graduated from the Moscow border troop command higher school as a lawyer, and in 1979, he graduated from the KGb higher school.

His service record includes work with the intelligence department of the border troops of the former Soviet Union, in operational division of the western border district.

Bannykh was later appointed head of staff of Ukraine's border troops.

This past January, Bannykh was confirmed as chairman of Ukraine's State Committee for the Protection of the State Border.

Press Secretary Denies TV Picketers' Complaints

LD2202140695 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0950 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—"Despite the changes that have recently taken place in our society, Ukraine's 'left-wing' forces have sufficient opportunities to reflect their views through the mass media," Mykhaylo Doroshenko, press secretary to the Ukrainian president, said at a briefing on 22 February. He was commenting on the picketing by "left-wing" forces of the premises of Ukrainian State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting.

He said that the mouthpiece of these forces was 'HOLOS UKRAYINY'—the newspaper of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, which consistently publishes their articles.

Kuchma Will Not Dismiss Presidential Spokesman

LD2202162995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1311 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev February 22 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will not dismiss Dmitriy Tabachnik from the post of presidential administration head, Kuchna's spokesman Mikhail Dorosheko told a news conference today.

Doroshenko said that the parliament, passing a resolution which described Tabachnik as unfit for the post and demanded a probe into financial activities of his department, "demonstrated its political skill to elude the handling of really pressing matters".

The real motive behind the controversy is that some deputies, who were not allowed to attend a sitting of the presidential crime-fighting committee, decided "to settle political accounts with the president", Doroshenko explained.

"It is Kuchma's own business" to find associates, the spokesman said adding that the president will not bow to the parliament, although he is not going to embark on confrontation with it either.

President's Office Denies Balaklava Decision

LD2202174995 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian president's press service has refuted reports circulated in the media about an alleged agreement on Balaklava as the main base of the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea Fleet. Speaking at a briefing in Kiev, press service head Mykhaylo Doroshenko stressed that there was no final decision on the issue. During Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Ukraine, the two countries will sign only a declaration on the principles of Black Sea Fleet division, he said.

According to Doroshenko, it has been agreed so far not to retain Sevastopol as the base of the Black Sea Fleet, but to allow its Russian part to lease the base in Sevastopol.

Moroz Appeals to Union Leaders for Support

WS2202130895 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2201 GMT 21 Feb 95

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Oksana Hasiuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb. 21—In an appeal for the support of trade union leaders, Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz attacked the government's version of privatization.

"The legislative branch of power and trade unions always will be in opposition to the executive brunch," he said at a meeting of All-Ukrainian regional union committee leaders. "If this opposition becomes real tension, one of these branches will simply disappear."

Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine should have the right of legislative initiative, he said. "We have to write down this right as part of the special law on trade unions."

The best example of such legislative initiative was, Moroz said, when Oleksandr Stoyan, leader of the Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine, submitted to Parliament the social protection law on minimum wages, which Parliament passed Jan. 26 on the first reading. The law provides fixed minimum wages set at the official poverty rate and was supported by the members of the Social Protection Committee of Parliament.

But on Feb. 16, the second reading of the law was postponed until the March 1 parliamentary session because the government does not have enough funds to support a minimum wage law.

"People should receive as much as they earned," Moroz said.

He asked that trade union leaders influence Parliament to solve the issue of social protection. "Parliament is supported by at least 20 million Ukrainians and the trade unions are supported by the same number of people."

Moroz also spoke about maintaining the gradual privatization process. He reiterated that the legal status of privatization certificates needs to be determined and their uses should be defined. "As far as I understand, privatization certificates are part of the state property," Moroz said. "But this is abnormal. After selling the certificates, people can go to the restaurant twice. This is not a real price of the state property which your fathers and grandfathers have earned working their entire lives."

He suggested that state property be leased and joint stock companies be created, instead of the government giving away privatization certificates.

Moroz, who heads the Socialist Party, also supported the temporary ban on the privatization process imposed by Parliament last July.

Kuchma Economic Adviser Opposes Dollar Ban

WS2302093895 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2100 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Report by Lesia Rudakewych: "Kuchma Adviser Blasts Dollar Ban"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb. 22—Oleksandr Paskhaver, economic adviser to President Leonid Kuchma, said Wednesday [22 February] that taking the dollar out of circulation in Ukraine initially would be an "outrageously negative" move.

The National Bank of Ukraine decided Nov. 10, 1994 a decree banning hard currency sales would go into effect

Feb. 18, 1995. The ban was repealed at the last minute. Nearly 60 percent of Ukraine's gross national product now belongs to the shadow economy where the dollar, rather than the karbovanets, is used for transactions.

"The shadow economy is not only flourishing in the private sector, but also in the government," said Paskhaver, speaking to Ukrainian and American business persons at the monthly meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine.

The shadow economy saved Ukraine during the period of the Soviet government's disintegration and its command economy, he said. The shadow economy's function is amassing initial capital, he added.

But Ukraine will need to proceed out of a shadow economy and into a "civilized" route of transformation. Large capital will be needed to pull Ukraine out of the current situation, Paskhaver said. At the moment, however, large capital is forming slowly.

"I don't know why it's forming so slowly, but it is," he added.

Paskhaver blamed a lack of an elite and a developed government system for Ukraine's failure to proceed more rapidly on reform.

However, Paskhaver also said that at least two economic indicators, construction and car sales that are on the rise, prove Ukraine's economy is not on the brink of collapse.

"I wouldn't say we've entered a crisis," Paskhaver said. "Instead, we're witnessing chaos—a chaos that could be destructive."

Crimea's USRC Urges Meshkov's Resignation

MK2202131095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Pilat under the "Crimea" rubric: "'Union in Support for the Republic of Crimea' In Action. The Party Plans To Urge President Meshkov's Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second congress of the "Union in Support for the Republic of Crimea" (USRC), attended by 145 out of 150 delegates elected in all regions of the peninsula, has been held in Simferopol.

USRC Chairman Sergey Kunitsin's report focused on the party's strategy and tactics in connection with local elections due to be held in the peninsula 29 April. "Whether some people like it or not, presently the Republic of Crimea is an integral, inalienable part of Ukraine. This is how wee see our republic and as such we support it," the reporter said. Kunitsin was highly critical of the Ukrainian president's mission in Crimea, "which does not pursue state policy in the autonomous republic." According to the USRC leader, his party maintains direct contacts with centrist Ukrainian parties—the Interregional Reform Bloc (IRB), the Ukrainian Labor Congress (ULC), and the Party of Ukraine's Democratic Revival, the "Gromada" association—and also Russian parties under Yegor Gaydar and Sergey Shakhray.

According to Sergey Kunitsin, his party is going to campaign for a federal administrative arrangement in Ukraine and for Russian to be given the status of second state language in Ukraine. The party also stands for the proportional representation of all ethnic groups in all bodies of state authority from the bottom up. Sergey Kunitsin stressed in particular that the USRC ran the incumbent president's election campaign in Crimea, fully supporting Leonid Kuchma.

Vladimir Grinev, IRB leader and regional policy adviser to the Ukrainian president, thinks that Crimea should become a bridge of friendship between Ukraine and Russia. "One cannot do anything good in Crimea without Ukraine, or in Ukraine without Russia," Grinev remarked. The Ukrainian presidential adviser also emphasized that he stands for a sovereign Ukraine. "We cannot reform the economy without agreeing our stances with those of our neighbors, primarily Russia," Grinev added.

ULC Chairman Anatoliy Matviyenko was highly appreciative of the USRC's activity. He thinks that the future will belong to this party. Matviyenko also put forward the idea of uniting all centrist parties of Ukraine on a confederative basis.

Delegates stressed that responsibility for the current woeful state of the economy and the worsening of the Crimeans' living conditions rests with the president and the Crimean Supreme Soviet. This was also set forth in the congress' resolution, which says in particular: "We ask the Crimean Supreme Soviet to pass a decision on conducting a poll among the citizens of the Republic of Crimea on confidence in the Crimean president and parliament 29 April. The party stands for the Crimean president's resignation and early parliamentary elections."

Crimea: 10 Killed, 78 Wounded Since 1 Jan

LD2202223495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2119 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol February 22 TASS—Seventy-eight people were killed and ten wounded in the Ukrainian peninsular semi-autonomy of Crimea since January 1995. Thirteen out of 78 murders were recognized as contract ones. In the same period, the local police has revealed 101 criminal groups, including 16 major ones. In the Crimean capital alone, nine facilities owned by one of the major Mafia groups have been blasted.

The statistics was disclosed at a news conference held here on Wednesday by Ukrainian Deputy Interior Minister Valeriy Chernyshov, Crimean Interior Department chief Vitaliy Kirichenko, and heads of the Crimean police security services.

On the night from Tuesday to Wednesday, the Crimean police reported two blasts in Evpatoria and an arson of a shopping centre in downtown Simferopol.

Chernyshov said he brought to the peninsula a 200-men-strong group of experts from nine Ukrainian regions to assist the Crimean police in investigating into cases of contract murders. The police will be supported by motorized units of the national guards. Under a recent presidential decree, about 11,000 of national guards will be transferred to the police service in Ukraine.

Economic Issues

Supreme Council Resolution on Spring Sowing

WS2302110395 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0830 GMT 21 Feb 95

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 7, 13-19 Feb 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On February 14, the Verkhovna Rada [Supreme Council] of Ukraine adopted a resolution "On Creating Favorable Economic Conditions for Carrying Out Vernal Sowing of Agricultural Crops in the Spring of 1995."

The parliament's resolution notes, in particular, that insufficient efforts on the part of the government and NBU [National Bank of Ukraine] have placed the State's food procurement plans for 1995 in jeopardy.

All criticism notwithstanding, the resolution recommends supporting some of the cabinet's moves, which can be reduced to the following:

—Ukrainian agricultural producers should be granted a budgetary loan to compensate for losses caused by inflation, before returns are available from marketing products which were shipped to procurement agencies and processing enterprises under the state's 1994 contract;

—the aforementioned budgetary loan should be repaired through incoming funds to special accounts involving revaluation of remaining stocks of grain, oil seeds, oil, sugar, and other agricultural products as their marketing proceeds by procuring agencies and processing enterprises;

—the Regulations on Redemption of the Budgetary Loan should be enacted within a three-day term. According to information available to UKRINFORM, this clause of the parliament's resolution has not been complied with.

—purchases of agricultural products including acquisition of 10 million tons of grain by the State, as well as purchases for pooling the state's reserve and elite seed funds and pedigree livestock, should be carried out at the expense of general allocations provided for by the national budget of Ukraine for 1995. The above purchases are supposed to be forward ones;

—in compliance with the budgetary loan's terms, selection, analyses, and feasibility studies involving projects to be financed through the World Bank's rehabilitation credit to Ukraine to the tune of $150 million, should be ensured with top priority given to manufacture and shipment of agricultural machinery, spare parts, fuels, lubricants, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, as well as to acquisition of agricultural crop seeds meant for sowing in 1995;

—wholesale and retail trade enterprises and organizations, whatever their proprietorial status may be, should remit, not later than the next day, all incoming from selling agricultural products acquired from producers within Ukraine's agroindustrial complex (AIC), barring trade margin, to the relevant agricultural producers' bank accounts.

The National Bank and non-state-run banks of Ukraine have thereby been instructed:

—to open a credit line to agricultural commodity producers to bridge the seasonal gap between their production costs and proceeds from marketing agricultural products against the future harvest's products and monetary gains;

—to prolong redemption of credits, which were granted to agricultural growers and producers, processing enterprises and other enterprises involved in supplying agricultural producers with petroleum products, spare parts, materials, etc., under the State Contract irrespective of their proprietorial status, to a five-year period starting with January 1, 1995, with the credits to be redeemed in equal parts beginning with September 1, 1995 with the interest rate amounting to 10 percent a year, margin included;

—to withhold penalties imposed on non-state-owned banks for overdue and prolonged credits, which were granted to agricultural producers in 1993 and 1994;

—interest on overdue and privileged credits, which failed to be repaired as of January 1, 1995, as well as the difference in interest rates involving privileged credits to both agricultural producers and processing enterprises, are not subject to liquidation, but should be involved in the relevant non-state-run banks' reduced budgetary payments.

NBU's response to the Verkhovna Rada's resolution, by way of a circular directive recommended board directors of non-state-owned banks to make decisions on the following issues:

—granting credits to agricultural producers against future harvest incoming;

—prolongation of credits which were granted to agricultural producers in 1994.

In addition to the above stated provisions, the Verkhovna Rada resolution exempts from customs material and technical supplies involving Ukraine's so-called critical imports (agricultural machinery and spare parts, trucks, equipment, and spare parts for processing and food industries, fuels and lubricants, seeds, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, pedigree livestock, genetic materials for animal husbandry, and the like), which are imported directly to Ukrainian agricultural producers.

Western Firms Bid for Nuclear Fuel Plant Project

MK2202130095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Viktor Zamyatin: "Nuclear Power Plant Safety Problems in Ukraine. Lots of Plans, but Energy Is Lacking"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian press reported the other day that the Ukrainian State Committee on the Use of Nuclear Power announced the holding of a closed tender among four foreign firms vying for the construction project to build a nuclear power station fuel manufacturing plant. Your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent turned to committee member Nykola Oberkovich for comment, which were as follows. The republic does need such a plant—at least because currently its nuclear power industry completely depends on nuclear fuel supplies from Russia. These cost Ukraine $300 million a year. For this reason, Mr. Oberkovich said, it was decided to draw up a program for creating a closed nuclear power generation cycle. At the same time, analysis of the situation in the republic's nuclear power industry shows that for the time being Ukraine's path toward nuclear power self-sufficiency promises only bumps ahead.

According to Mr. Oberkovich, officially the tender has not yet been announced, but Ukraine does intend to carry it out. What will be at stake, however, is only the right to design a plant for the initial enrichment of uranium, so for the time being there is no point in talking about its projected capacity or cost. If the tender does take place, its results are planned to be determined in May. Offers have indeed been sent to four firms, ABB, Westinghouse, the Russian TVEL concern, and a French-German consortium. So far only ABB and Westinghouse have confirmed their participation. Conditions of the tender have not been disclosed to committee members. Nor has it been definitively determined where the prospective plant, which is expected to engage only in initial uranium enrichment, will be located. Nonetheless, by some Ukrainian specialists' estimates, the area of Zheltyye Vody in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where Ukrainian uranium is being produced, and Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the vicinity of the Pridneprovskiy Chemical Plant, are locations suitable for such a construction.

Ukraine sees the creation of its own nuclear fuel cycle as the key condition for achieving stabilization of its national nuclear power industry as a whole, Committee chief Mykhaylo Umanets said. Its importance for Ukraine can be illustrated at least by the fact that 15 power units of Ukrainian nuclear power stations generate up to 45 percent of Ukraine's entire electric power in winter. Mr. Oberkovich thinks that this is enough to satisfy both the people's household needs and industrial requirements. In addition, electric power generated by nuclear power plants remains the cheapest source of electricity. Still, it is being plagued by internal problems. First, nonpayments that have thwarted the financing of a number of power programs, including on increasing the safety of nuclear electric power stations. Second, these stations are running short not only of fuel, but also of equipment and spare parts. Moreover, technical personnel are fleeing stations in droves because of low wages, mostly to Russia (a total of 8,500 people over the past two years, according to the State Nuclear Power Committee). But there are advantages, too. Ukraine had advanced technologies for the production and processing of uranium and zirconium—Mykhaylo Pavlovskiy, head of the Supreme Council commission on nuclear policy, said that these reserves are enough to last for another 150 years. This is the key argument of Ukrainian nuclear power specialists, who think that the plans for the industry's modernization are quite feasible. The period of implementation (with sufficient financing, sources of which have yet to be specified) ranges from five to seven years, the tentative cost being $1.2 billion. Precisely such amounts have been cited in press estimates of construction of the fuel plant.

Ukrainian nuclear power specialists' optimism is encouraging. Still, Ukraine's previous experience of cooperation with the West elicits somewhat different feelings. According to Mr. Umanets, the absence of legislation determining responsibility for damages in case of accidents (to which Western partners refer in the first instance) has brought to a standstill cooperation programs with the European Union Commission (calling for $66 million to be lent under the TACIS program to modernize nuclear power stations and another $52 million in order annually to buy spare parts for them); and with Germany (which promised $20 million to increase safety standards at the Rovno nuclear power plant). Nor has the initiative by a number of Western country signatories to the Lisbon agreement on supporting the Ukrainian nuclear power industry yielded any results.

What is more, the West has not given up its demands that the Chernobyl power plant be closed, even if it generates 5 percent of the entire electric power output. Some at the Nuclear Power Committee say that they do not oppose its closure in principle, but insist that the world community "do as the United States did with regard to the DPRK," that is, comes up with financing required to replace RBMK-type reactors. But partners have so far stopped short of promising that.

Belarus

Reportage on Russian President Yeltsin's 2-Day Visit

Yeltsin's Speech at Academy of Sciences

LD2202153995 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1000 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Speech by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at a meeting with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lulashenka and Belarusian intellectuals at the Belarus Academy of Sciences in Minsk—live, in Russian]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear friends, this is the last meeting on Belarusian soil before the end of my visit. So, perhaps at the end of my speech I shall give a brief account of what President Lukashenka and I did.

Dear friends, our visit to Belarus has been very important for me. Both in Russia and Belarus today many people are seriously concerned as to whether the thread that has linked our peoples for centuries will be broken, whether we shall forget that the Russian and Belarusian peoples have the same roots. This must not be allowed to happen in any circumstances. It would deal irreparable damage to our states. It would be mocking history, an act of violence against the fates of our peoples.

Soon we shall celebrate the 50th anniversary of the great victory. It was gained at a cost of much blood of Russians, Belarusians and peoples of other nationalities. Precisely in 1995 we are obliged to make decisive steps towards drawing closer together, towards supporting each other. There is no alternative to the line of strengthening equal, good-neighborly relations between Russia and Belarus. I am convinced that the main bulk of the Belarusian and Russian intelligentsia will warmly welcome this process. After all, you feel specially how hard it is to exist apart, how harmful for the well-being of our peoples are the stripes of artificial alienation. For centuries the reciprocal enrichment of our cultures has been in operation. They have developed in close interaction. The constant intercourse between scientists and people in the arts has long been a vital requirement and a most important condition for creativity.

We must do everything to ensure that this beneficial process under no circumstances comes to a halt. It is important to speed up our states' movement toward each other. I feel that this should be less a matter of assurances in words of eternal love and friendship and more a matter of deeds and specific work. A few days ago, I made the annual message to the Russian Federal Assembly. We attempted honestly to speak about our problems. Once again we declared our priorities and the aims of our country. The basic theme of the message, about the effectiveness of Russian state power, is of interest not only to us. It is also directly connected with the problem of effectiveness of both bilateral and multilateral relations of Russia with its nearest neighbors, and perhaps first and foremost with Belarus, since we consider a priority in our foreign policy to be the CIS in general, and within the CIS a priority is Belarus. And this is natural.

I think you know that in Russian society today there are various viewpoints coming up against each other on the issue of the nature of the national interests of the Russian Federation. There are forces in our country that are aspiring to restore the political domination of Moscow over the whole territory of the former Soviet Union to restore the Russian Empire in its previous dimensions. I think that such views are not only incompatible with international law, they are dangerous primarily for Russia itself. They threaten to turn into innumerable misfortunes both for it and for the other peoples. History cannot be turned back and attempts to restore the former Soviet Union under a new name are doomed. Russia's adherence to respect territorial integrity of independent states cannot be doubted by anybody. This equally applies to both our western and southern neighbors.

However, we expect that everybody will adhere to this principle. We will not go for any redrawing of borders. This is the road to nowhere. This is the road to new artificial crises and conflicts.

Genuine interests of our country lie elsewhere: consolidation of stability of genuinely democratic states situated near its borders and the development of equal and mutually beneficial relations with them. This is our stance and we will not shift from it.

Development of our mutual relations has nothing to do with some kind of absorption of Belarus by Russia, as some people say in Belarus and in Russia. We do not how such intentions and, of course, we won't have them in future. In depth integration, more in depth integration than it is today, close interaction, this is the choice and this choice [pauses] has been reinforced in the documents, in the treaty, and in several agreements which we signed yesterday together with Belarusian President Lukashenka.

I regard the independence of our countries not as an obstacle but as a foundation for the firmest mutual trust. The development of cooperation within the framework of the CIS provides our states with the best, and probably the only realistic possibility to get out of the most acute crisis and to embark on the solution of problems that have accumulated.

I have just visited the Minsk car factory. Of course, 80 percent of problems are connected with various supplies from Russia and, accordingly, also with sales of cars in Russia. We are also interested in this, however, the lack of organization and the lack of balance during those few years resulted in the fact that the contact is not there. Therefore, in depth integration, up to setting up, say, Russo-Belarusian large car manufacturing corporations. This is the way out. Therefore, practically the entire world has been currently proceeding along this path. The largest companies are merging in order to survive.

Integration became a prevailing tendency in the CIS last year, moreover, Belarus and Russia went for the maximum speed [as heard]. I would like to confirm once again that we stand for the closest, the most intensive Russo-Belarusian relations in all spheres. And indeed, Belarus was the first country among all the CIS countries, with which we decided to sign ten packages of agreements on in depth integration. After Belarus and Russia, it is possible that Kazakhstan may join the process. Thus in this way, a certain nucleus will emerge in the Commonwealth and states will be bolder and more resolute in coming together.

Now we have to put in every effort so that our agreements start working, and working efficiently, as soon as possible the more so in that the process of the three states getting closer to each other corresponds to the fundamental interests of their peoples.

On 27 January, leaders of 12 border regions and territories of Russia and Ukraine spoke for the reaching of the similar agreements, and I will say it straight: there will be no obstacles from our side for doing this.

Yesterday we—President Lukashenka and myself—signed a treaty on friendship, good-neighborly relations, and cooperation between the Russian Federation and Belarus. Our relations thereby acquired a firm legal base.

Preparation of the treaty took a long time and it was thorough. Twenty-eight Russian scientists, ministries, and government agencies took part in this work. Several rounds of bilateral negotiations have been held.

As a result, we now have a fundamental document, which defines main directions and principles of our cooperation for years to come.

Our states had firmly decided to create a common market for goods, services, capital resources, and work force and to cooperate closely in the spheres of investments, finance, and industry. In particular, our states agreed to unify the principles for investment activities and acquisition of real estate as well as their protection. Concrete measures will be taken in creating industrial and financial groups.

We have agreed today—and we will draw up a specific document to this effect—that our enterprises and organizations will enjoy equal conditions in terms of price, customs duty, and taxes. [applause]

Agreements on a customs union and on joint guarding of state borders have been signed—just imagine, what a saving it is: We protect the external border of the CIS; we protect the border of Belarus; we protect the border of Russia, and we do it together, and we do it all in Belarus. Thereby, of course, the expenditure is smaller and the quality and efficiency of border protection is higher.

Just recently, a program has been adopted for actions of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in implementation of accords on further expansion and intensification of mutual cooperation. This program includes specific measures that are designed to help all of us in overcoming the economic crisis more quickly, so that people can, at the long last, feel positive changes.

I know that science and culture in Belarus are facing not the best of their times nowadays. I have to say, however, that it is not all so sad, because science, artists' unions, and culture managed to survive during the hardest times, both in Belarus and Russia. It does stand straight, albeit its legs are a bit weak. [as heard] What we have to do is to offer it a little support, and the science will again be as well-known and famous worldwide, as it was before.

This is because the largest part of intelligentsia in your country is still faithful to its mission and keeps on working and creating persistently.

Regular contacts of Russian and Belarusian scientists became more complicated due to the formation of independent states, exchange of information deteriorated, a number of new problems emerged. Because of this very reason, creation of the united—I mean it, united—scientific and technical space is one of the most important tasks. It is the way towards the most rational utilization of intellectual, scientific, and technical potential of our countries.

Cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere became one of the most important priorities of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Interaction in the scientific, technical, and cultural spheres adds new impetus to the processes of integration of the CIS countries.

A long-term plan for the integrational development of the CIS was approved last October. It includes such questions as preparation of draft agreements on joint innovation activity, developing joint scientific projects in the fields of ecology, health protection, space utilization, training scientific cadres, restoration of a single information support system for scientific research.

By the way, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, when I put forward my proposal regarding cadres, I did not only mean science. I meant cadres in general: industrial cadres, social cadres, cadres involved in health protection, culture, education and so on and so forth. I meant cadres at different levels: managers, middle management and others. In essence, this would be an attachment and training at an enterprise or organization involving a person who already has higher education and who will then become a well-known director or manager in Belarus. That is what we are proposing.

I think that this system is more effective because we are using it with Western countries. Two thousand of our people study in Japan, 1,000 in the United States, 1,000 in Great Britain, 1,000 in Germany, and 1,000 in France. The duration of study is one year in each case.

We managed to negotiate an agreement under which we are only paying for their food, while the cost of the entire process of study is covered by the host country. I will tell you about our initial experience relating to specialists who have already returned. They are indeed gaining modern experience, especially in advanced technologies, which can then be immediately invested.

Scientific and technical ties among CIS member states are regulated by an agreement on interstate scientific and technical cooperation. But it must be admitted that the agreement does not meet the requirements of the day. We became convinced that it is too unwieldy. That is why the strengthening of our scientific and technical cooperation on a mutual basis has come to the fore. That is why we have decided to establish contacts—taking into account the wishes of the Belarusian side—between Russia and Belarus. This is first of all. And, let us see what happens in the future. Above all, you will see it.

It is necessary to determine the legal position of joint projects, scientific research projects, and joint scientific organizations, to solve issues concerning the registration of these institutions, including issues concerning material and intellectual property. Both Russia and Belarus have a number of unique installations and sites—Alyaksandr Rygoravich has told me about some of them—which are, of course, of mutual scientific interest. An agreement is needed which would determine the special features in the use of such installations. This particularly concerns problems relating to ecology, nuclear physics, and other fields.

It is necessary to agree on the mutual recognition of doctors' and candidates' certificates. We are neighbors who lived together for such a long time, and now we do not recognize each others' certificates.

At the present time, almost all exchanges of scientific journals and books have stopped. There are virtually no joint publications. Our science has taken a unilateral step and decided to send, at its own expense, journals that are of interest for your academy to the Belarus academic library. This is a just beginning.

In addition to that the Russian Academy of Sciences has fully preserved the membership of the Belarus scientists in the editorial collegium of its journals, and its scientific councils, and in all the commissions. A number of the Russian scientific societies are including the teams and separate scientists of Belarus as their members. However, these initiatives and initiative measures of the Russian scientists are not sufficient. Our nations sharply need an inter-governmental agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, and it should be signed as soon as possible. The work is being finished on this agreement, and I think that the agreement will regulate many issues, which are currently hampering the cooperation between the scientists of our nations. I think that the agreement will be signed no later than the middle of this year.

We have signed an agreement on cooperation between our nations in the fields of culture, education, and science. It also envisages to help to activate of the cultural and scientific ties, which have been noticeably weakened over the past years. I think that the creation of the cultural and information centers in the capitals of our countries will be useful. This could ensure the fruitful development of the Russian-Belarusian contacts in the humanitarian sphere. According to some figures nearly every fifth Belarus family has relatives in Russia, and we are interested to ensure that there are no obstacles for a free communication between the citizens of our states.

The integration from the bottom between Russian and Belarus peoples is under way, and we should help this natural process. I mean financial assistance as well. Of course, we will find some solution to this matter, let us suppose that first, it should not be said that I have brought something in my pocket, but at least we have decided that we will allocate or to say in other words give the first R150 billion as a long-term credit. Later, we shall find some other kind of financial support.

The people felt by themselves the consequences of the disruption of the ties. As far as we know, nowadays the absolute majority of Russian and Belarusian people—and I was convinced at the factory now about that as well as everybody speaks loudly about this—want the rapprochement of our states, and closer rapprochement means deeper integration.

Dear friends, there is such a close degree of relationship of trust and mutual understanding between Russian and Belarusian peoples, which rarely exists between two close neighbors. This is a reliable guarantee that all the difficulties on the way of our close cooperation could be overcome. In this field, our intentions and those of the Belarus president are the most serious, and I think that you will support us in these efforts.

Thank you. [applause]

A few words about the visit I have already mentioned that the aims of my visit....[pauses] this is the first visit since the creation of the CIS, and I think that the visit was very successful, and it was very well planned and organized. We have signed absolutely all the documents, treaties, and agreements that have been thoroughly prepared by our joint group of experts and scientists.

I visited the tractor works. Of course, they also have problems. I saw how people in your country greet people in public, how they talk with each other at work and in public. I became convinced that despite the fact that you have a somewhat lower income level compared with Russia, the mood of people is still not bad. People believe still believe. This, I feel, is the most important thing that I got from this visit—people's moods are positive. But Belarusians were always noted for their hard working nature, tolerance, and modesty. So there are many positive qualities—I mean, considering that our characters are different, but we also have these qualities.

Of course, the visit was brief. Yesterday, we arrived at midday and today we are already leaving at midday. But nonetheless a very big group of us—ministers, deputy chairmen of the government, experts, specialists—they naturally dealt with a considerably greater range of issues. And we have agreed—Alyaksandr Rygoravich said this—all this is to be drawn together in a general protocol to be signed to ensure that nothing of what we agreed on gets dropped. Otherwise things can happen this way—you arrive, you talk, you eat well, then you part....[pauses] well, we ate quite well—[laughter and applause].

I want to thank the president of the country, Alyaksandr Rygoravich Lukashenka. I want to thank Prime Minister Mikhail Mikalayevich Chygir. I want to thank your president of the Academy of Sciences. I want to thank you all for listening, for being patient. I want to thank all those whom I met at enterprises and organizations wherever it was. I want to thank the entire Belarusian people, which has an attitude of such warmheartedness and tenderness to Russia and this will not be spoiled by trifles.

Of course, there are times when....[pauses] but this is all transitory. We shall survive it. We shall live together with Belarus. I am convinced of this. Thank you. [applause]

Lukashenka Speech at Academy of Sciences

LD2202190995 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1000 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Speech by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka given at the Academy of Sciences in Minsk—live; Lukashenka speaks in Russian]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed friends, esteemed representatives of science, dear comrades! It seems to me that our meeting here today with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the president of a friendly country, a friendly, fraternal people—the Russian Federation—is absolutely not an accident. This is evidenced by the fact that literally over the past years there have been the most eminent people here—politicians, Bill Clinton, Butrus-Ghali. [passage omitted]

As for my talks with Boris Nikolayevich, I can encourage you—they are going very well and openly with full mutual understanding. There will be more details about this in the press. It will have to report on these talks and agreements signed. The main thing is that the Russian president and I have just made the decision that, as a result of this visit—it was the Russian president's idea—so that people are not disappointed with our talks and meetings, we will create a special protocol listing all that was decided, in what time-frames, what will be carried out on our part, and on the part of the government. This protocol will be drawn up in the near future. [passage omitted]

I want to inform you that literally in a few days an edict will be signed and it will be developed by a government resolution on raising your appropriate social guarantees and wages approximately two-fold. We will enact this next month. [applause] [passage omitted] We must not break up the ties that have existed between us for ages, especially in the scientific sphere, for that would be to lose the most important thing, to lose the future, if we break up. What does this mean? We created this academy of sciences, and science in the Republic of Belarus was developed not only for our own people, but for our society. This mighty science was intended for the entire Soviet Union, for all countries. Naturally, the Republic of Belarus by itself cannot rescue this behemoth. This is the main reason for the presence here of the Russian Federation president, and I am pleased to offer the floor to the Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. [applause]

Yeltsin Looking Forward To 'Belo-Rus'

LD2202140995 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today is Boris Yeltsin's second day in Belarus and it started with a meeting with CIS Executive Secretary, Ivan Korotchenya. During the conversation ways to implement the decisions adopted at the recent Almaty summit were discussed.

The second day of Boris Yeltsin's stay in Belarus started with a visit to the Minsk Car Factory (MAZ). The directors of Belarus' large industrial enterprises precisely that have to call for immediate reintegration with Russia. Supplies of components have been discontinued and Belarus tractors, trucks, and refrigerators are losing the vast Russian market which is their only market. A joint project with a German company cannot save the factory. But the results of yesterday's talks between the two presidents hold a real chance to improve the situation for the production managers and engineers and workers of Belarus state enterprises who, together with the republic's entire population, are coping with yet another 50-100 percent rise of food prices.

[Begin recording] [Yeltsin] We will move, first, towards a deeper integration and the setting up of individual large corporations and then we will simply unite and there will be a Belo-Rus.

[Lukashenka, laughing] Yes, Belo-Rus! [end recording]

MAZ Visit Stems From Defense Interests

LD2202173095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Minsk experts believe the visit by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the Minsk car plant (MAZ) is tied to Russian defense interests.

According to local observers, the president showed keenest interest in the plant of wheeled truck/tractors which is an adjunct of MAZ. The plant makes multiple-axle chassis which are used in missile transporters and launchers. This is the only plant of its kind in the Commonwealth, and Belarusian wheeled truck/tractors have become a strategic export item.

Talks in China held by Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, late in January 1995, resulted in an agreement on truck/tractor supplies to China.

Russia is interested in partnership production of the truck/tractors due to the Russian Armed Forces' adoption of new types of missiles.

Belarusian government sources have reported Moscow's strong interest in creating a financial-industrial group with MAZ to cater to the Russian military-industrial complex.

However, Minsk has rejected the idea due to the absence of corresponding laws and for fear of losing control over export production, the more so given that Belarusian truck output has halved since 1990 and 1994 truck exports amounted to only 57% of the 1993 level.

Yeltsin 'Very Pleased' With Visit

LD2202145195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1405 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk February 22 BELINFORM-TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today told the journalists, who accompanied him on his two-day visit to Belarus, that he was "very pleased" with the results of the visit.

The Russian president said he had made friends with President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus during his two-day stay in Minsk.

Asked how he felt, the president invited anyone from among those present to play a game of "tennis, volleyball, football or any other sport" against himself.

Yeltsin and Lukashenka signed the treaty of friendship between the two countries and two major agreements during the Russian president's visit to Minsk.

Yeltsin Departure for Moscow

LD2202170895 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1552 GMT 22 Feb 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin's two-day visit to Belarus ended today. As he left by air for Russia, the Russian president told the journalists seeing him off that he was very satisfied with the results of his visit.

[Nikolay Ivanov] The hall of the Academy of Sciences where President Yeltsin made his final speech on Belarusian territory was stirred by two statements made by President Lukashenka—on raising the pay of local scientists and on creating a special protocol that would set out the specific time periods for carrying out all the Russian-Belarusian accords reached during the visit.

The latter intention is caused by the Russian president's wish to make as few assertions as possible about eternal love and friendship towards the Belarusian people and to implement as many real projects of mutual cooperation as possible. These agreements, Yeltsin said, imply a policy aimed at creating a common Russian-Belarusian goods market and close cooperation in the investment sphere. However, the development of bilateral relations does not mean the swallowing up of the Belarusian economy by Russia.

Yeltsin, Lukashenka Sum Up Results

LD2202184395 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1630 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Now, some more details about one of today's main events. By that I mean the Russian president's visit to Belarus, which has just ended, and an appraisal of this visit from the mouths of the two presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] Further, everything that we have signed must be put into practice. A number of problems have not found their way into the agreement. We must also bring them together and discuss them among the representatives of both states, and include them in one document—a protocol—so that absolutely all issues are included in them. At the same time, both presidents must have control over them, so that not a single issue is forgotten. We have problems in the motor vehicle construction industry, where there are a number of factories. Now the world has begun a policy of deepening [cooperation]; let us set up a common corporation in motor vehicle construction between Belarus and Russia. It must be advantageous to everyone and in everyone's interests. Of course, everything must be considered, and some kind of model of this idea must be made, and then we can begin to implement it.

I liked the president; and just now at this conference and in the academy we also said that we must restore the system that existed before in education, in the exchange of post-graduates and students on special courses, and so on and so forth. We decided that we will do this. We also spoke about issuing diplomas of various kinds, as many as we could. So, we have now immediately issued instructions on this and we are to immediately issue a general edict, we are going to sign it together, and the diplomas will be jointly on the territory of Belarus and Russia. [end recording]

[Lukashenka] For me personally, a young politician, Boris Nikolayevich's coming here was important to me. You will probably recall how people were saying that nothing could be decided between Lukashenka and

Yeltsin, they could not talk to each other or come to any agreement. I will say to you frankly, and I can, of course, say this publicly, that we have become friends. It could not be any other way. I think that this is a tradition of our fraternal relations and our fraternal states.

Boris Nikolayevich feels somewhat—well, if not shy, then embarrassed when we say that we need not simply to integrate but to join together in certain areas. We spoke about this one-to-one. I am happy to speak about this—I am not afraid that when people talk about Russia devouring Belarus or, God forbid, Belarus devouring up Russia! I am not afraid of this. I promised the people one thing at the elections—complete integration with the fraternal Russian state, and integration between the peoples. Therefore, I am moving toward this directly, including by way of a referendum. And we will be holding this referendum. So we are implementing a concept of the two presidents—to move on behalf of the economy and the lives of the people. And this will without doubt lead to a solution to political questions. The lives of the people will lead toward this. I am not afraid of that either. I would simply like to thank the Russian delegation and the president. They have responded to our request in a very positive manner. Practically all the questions have been solved, and the main thing is that we are placing equal conditions on all our enterprises—Russian and Belarusian—as of today. These are our common enterprises, and the MAZ [Minsk motor-vehicle works] is not just a Belarusian but a Russian enterprise, too, and we must together show concern for their development and the benefit of our peoples. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Parliament Disagrees With Presidency Law Changes

LD2202204295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1748 GMT 22 Feb 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature No. 35 (778): compiled by Nikolai Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Belarusian Parliament disagreed with the amendments of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to the Presidency Law. A Tuesday [21 February] evening session voted for approving the law in the wording adopted on February 1.

Lukashenka found the article of the law on dismissing the president on the grounds of a referendum contradicting the Constitution. In his opinion the Constitution contains an exhaustive list of cases in which the president can be removed from his post therefore a referendum on confidence in the head of state would be unconstitutional.

Lukashenka also suggested dropping the article under which in the event of the president's disability his powers should be transferred to the chairman of parliament and returned to the president when the parliament receives a report of his recovery. Lukashenka thinks the article runs counter to the Constitution which says nothing of the temporary disability of the head of state.

Supreme Soviet Debates, Passes Bill on President

WS2302110595 Minsk BELAPAN in English
1800 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 21 February, the Supreme Soviet was occupied with urgent questions which were not on the agenda of the session. As is known, on 16 February the president turned down the bill on president. It was supposed that the Supreme Soviet, having adopted the president's method, will treat the bill in the way it did with the other two bills which the president refused to sign—on the Supreme Soviet and on the Cabinet of Ministers—and confirm the approval of this bill in its initial version by two third's majority, constitutional majority. However, less than two thirds of the MPs voted for this. That is why the parliament started debating nine amendments which the president proposed, each taken separately. Nevertheless, none of the amendments was passed. The debating of the president's amendment to Article No. 11 was especially interesting. Alyaksandr Lukashenka suggested that the clause on the possibility of a vote of non-confidence in the president by means of a nationwide referendum should be excluded from the bill.

The head of the legal board at the President's Administration, Mr. Alyaksandr Maryskin, substantiating the suggestion, compared it with the bill on the Supreme Soviet and pointed out that the latter did not envisage the vote of non-confidence in the parliament by a nationwide referendum. According to him, "this, to a certain extent, violates the balance between the branches of power."

MP Uladzimir Stankevich proposed to approve the president's amendment to Article No. 2 which reads that the president is to be given rights and be discharged of duties entrusted to him in the field of economy, foreign policy, defense, national security, and other spheres of state government in the forms and limits established by the Constitution, the law on president, other laws, and the decisions of national referendums. According to him, it is necessary to remove the resolutions of the Supreme Soviet from this list.

Out of the nine amendments, only this amendment was introduced to the final version of the bill which was passed on its second reading by 183 votes literally five minutes before the end of the working day and submitted for signing by the president.

Chief of Presidential Security Interviewed

WS2302090095 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
28 Jan 95 pp 1,3

[Interview with Vyachalaw Heorhiyevich Karalew, head of the Belarusian President's Personal Security Service, by INTERFAX correspondent Vyachaslaw Zyankovich; place and date not given: "So Far, There Have Been No Attempts on the Life of the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Data from the INTERFAX file: Colonel Vyachalaw Heorhiyevich Karalew is 43 years old, he has been serving in various KGB offices for 20 years; he has served in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Moscow. Previously he headed the local KGB office in Borisov.

[Zyankovich] **Vyachalaw Heorhiyevich! The Personal Security Service of the head of our state has acquired the status of an independent body reporting neither to the KGB nor the Interior Ministry. What are the reasons for this?**

[Karalew] First of all, I would like to note that this is a normal thing: Similar structures reporting to the president have been established in all sovereign states.

The primary task of our service is to provide personal security for our state top officials—the president, prime minister, and the Supreme Soviet chairman. In addition, our officers provide security for the chairman of the High Economic Court. The list of individuals under our protection, however, can change depending on instructions from the president and the Security Council of Belarus, to whom our service reports directly.

[Zyankovich] **What about providing personal security for the head of the Supreme Court and the KGB?**

[Karalew] The Chief State Security Department in the Belarusian Interior Ministry handles their safety.

In addition to securing the safety of top state officials, we oversee protective measures when foreign delegations and heads of state visit Belarus. Our service is in charge of providing security and overseeing entrance procedures at the House of the Government and the residences of the people under our protection.

[Zyankovich] **Reports claiming that the President's Personal Security Service deals with regular investigative activity have appeared in the press. It this true?**

[Karalew] We are not dealing with regular investigation activity now, because there is no appropriate legislative basis for such a thing. But taking into consideration the fact that the Personal Security Service, according to the specifics of its work, simply cannot function without the regular receipt of information, we have established close contacts with the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the Border Troops. We obtain necessary reports from them.

I will cite an example which supports the Personal Security Service's need to obtain certain data. According to data provided by the militia, they expect that armed criminal groups will "sort things out" in a certain place. Therefore, we must change the routing of the president's motorcade to avoid potentially dangerous areas.

We also need to regularly receive up-to-date information. Various accidents—such as traffic accidents and jams, or the failure of the thermal electric power network, which could complicate the movements of the state leader—can take place along the route of the presidential motorcade.

We receive reports about the situation in the state from the Interior Ministry, the situation along the border—the Border Troops, terrorist threats against top officials—the KGB. A "T" subdivision was established within the KGB to obtain such reports and investigate them. Therefore, due to the specifics of our work, we should be in close contact with these departments and exchange reports with them.

In the future, when the Personal Security Service is allowed to conduct regular investigations legally, it will, of course, do this, however, again in close collaboration with the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the Border Troops.

[Zyankovich] **Tell me please, what is the Personal Security Service's strength, in manpower?**

[Karalew] I will not speak about this. The number of our officers is an official secret.

I will only say that the number of our officers can change periodically depending on our needs and the situation in the Republic.

[Zyankovich] **On what principles is the selection of officers for the Personal Security Service based?**

[Karalew] Primarily, on professionalism and appropriate physical training. Many master athletes work for us. When the people are enrolled in our service, priority is given to those who have a command of the basics of hand-to-hand combat, as well as shooting.

All our officers have graduated with at least one college degree. Two diplomas are not an unusual thing for one of our officers. As a rule, our men finished "civil" colleges and studied at the KGB High School, where they received special training.

Therefore, statements to the effect that we fulfill the functions of bodyguards do not quite correspond with reality. Our officers must think, analyze the situation, and on the basis of those factors, make proper and professional decisions.

In addition, they must be ready for situations when it is necessary to make decisions immediately, without prior consultations with their supervisors. Only experience, the general level of intellectual development, and personal professionalism can be their aides.

[Zyankovich] **Is it difficult to work for our president? As far as I know, Alyaksandr Ryhoravich [Lukashenka] quite often diverts from schedules, which may have been set down to the very minute. He can quite unexpectedly—for**

example, after the ceremony of laying wreaths—go up to the people watching the ceremony and begin talking with them.

[Karalew] The president is extremely demanding on himself and he is similarly strict and demanding with his entourage. We take into consideration his specific characteristics.

The primary duty of an officer of the Belarusian President's Personal Security Service, or that of any other state, is not to impede the activities of an official under protection and not to encroach upon their interests and intentions. Therefore, when we work with the president, we are always ready for unexpected situations, and in principle we have never had any problems. A. Lukashenka never avoids talking with people in big crowds and this does not present us with any additional burdens. The primary thing is to be attentive and, foreseeing the possibility of the president's "going down to the people," prepare for this beforehand. Our officers are always present in places where the president could come into contact with the people. Our task is to detect individuals with hostile intents against the head of state and stop any illegal activity. If there is a threat to the president's life or health, personal security officers much take responsibility to prevent such incidents.

[Zyankovich] **Already in ancient times, it was the duty of those who protected the heads of states to taste their food and drinks. Before a cup-bearer poured alcohol into the goblet of the head of state, a man, who fulfilled the functions of a food-taster, sipped the wine to check whether or not it was poisoned. Is there such a taster in the President's Personal Security Service?**

[Karalew] Undoubtedly, our service must check the president's food. However, physicians from the Public Health and Epidemiologic Service—not tasters—do this. They perform chemical analyses to test whether toxins and other harmful substances are present in the food. In addition, there is a cook on our staff who is also obliged to keep an eye on the quality of prepared meals.

[Zyankovich] **The leaders of the Belarusian power ministries have repeatedly issued statements about the threats against our top state officials. What about these threats? To what extent are they founded and by what are they triggered?**

[Karalew] As a rule, such threats emerge on the eve of certain political developments in the Republic. They take various forms, but usually they come in the form of anonymous letters and phone calls. Each such case is studied and investigated. We do this work, along with the KGB and the Interior Ministry. Of course, appropriate measures are taken, first of all, to verify and assess the threats, and secondly, to strengthen the President's Personal Security Service.

[Zyankovich] **In general, have there been any attempts on the life of President A. Lukashenka or other leaders of the state?**

[Karalew] There have not been any such accidents during the existence of our service. But there have been threats of a similar nature against the president in the form of letters and phone calls. The KGB and the Interior Ministry directly head investigations into such cases, attempting to track down the culprits.

An attempt was made on A. Lukashenka's life in Liozno Rayon in Vitebsk Oblast last summer, when the candidate for the president of Belarus entered a car to travel to his next rally. A shot was fired from a car which overtook A. Lukashenka's vehicle. Fortunately, the single shot only hit the doors of the car of our future president. An investigation into the case was begun. As far as I know, the criminals' tracks lead to one of our neighboring states.

[Zyankovich] **Have you had to use force to provide security for President A. Lukashenka?**

[Karalew] No. We have not had to use force. Only during the president's talks with crowds of people have we tried to prevent the head of state from being trampled. We have had to hold back people who wanted to get closer to the president and hear what he was saying.

[Zyankovich] **SVABODA has recently published a report about one of its photographers being attacked by an officer of the President's Security Service for carrying out his professional duty—taking pictures of A. Lukashenka. What can you say about this?**

[Karalew] This report is of a provocative nature and is designed to call attention to our service. I am always near the president when he is going somewhere and I supervise the work of the Personal Security Service. I assure you that my men always behave themselves properly and never show disrespect toward anyone, either by word or action. This is an obligatory condition of our work.

All our officers realize that being impolite to people tarnishes the president's authority.

As for this specific case, about which you spoke, everyone knows that SVABODA correspondents always take pictures of the president in unattractive poses or while making improper gestures, and comments against the president usually accompany the pictures. The SVABODA report is its response to our appeal to journalists to observe at least a minimum of ethical norms in their work.

'Secret' Deal Reported on Unification of Army Units

WS2302111795 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian 22 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Ivan Sidar: "We Are Being Dragged Into the Russian 'Trap'"— passage in italics is photocopy of alleged agreement, printed alongside the article, published in Russian]

[FBIS Translated Text] **This document (see photocopy) vividly confirms what kind of "integration" the Kremlin, along with its sidekick [Belarusian President] Lukashenka, is preparing for us.**

A draft of this agreement, which SVABODA has obtained through its channels, has recently been sent from Moscow to the Belarusian Defense Ministry. As you can see, it has so far been signed by only the Russian side. We have learned, however, that the Belarusian General Staff is also ready to sign the draft (or, perhaps, it has already signed it).

The draft includes 16 articles. As a matter of fact, this agreement transforms the Belarusian Army into a part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In particular, the draft envisions "joint use of the unified forces in peacetime and emergency situations, the establishment of a unified system of antiaircraft defense with a centralized command," etc. Therefore, Belarusian boys will again serve in the "indestructible and legendary" army. Hurrah!

It is a pity, however, that high-ranking officials prepare similar agreements in secrecy from their own people.

Not for Publication [as published in original]

Draft

Agreement on Establishing Unified (Coalition) Groupings of Troops (Forces) in the Interests of Ensuring Collective (Regional) Security

States, members of this Agreement, further on called sides, being guided by their intentions to establish a system of collective security of the CIS based on the Treaty on Collective Security dated 15 May 1992, and recognizing the need to unify the sides' efforts and coordinated actions in the interests of collective (regional) security in a common military-strategic area, have agreed with the following:

Article 1

The sides, within six months of this agreement being signed, will jointly draft proposals regarding possible personnel, time of the establishment, and functions during peacetime and war of command bodies of unified (coalition) groupings of troops (forces), as well as proposals concerning issues of their material, technical, and other forms of provisions and a system of their command.

By 1 September 1995, the sides will examine and approve the aforementioned proposals at the highest level. [creased line appears across text at this point, cutting off part of the next paragraph; portion below line appears to be end of document and contains signatures]

[Signed] On behalf of the Republic of Belarus [blank]
On behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan [blank]
On behalf of the Russian Federation [blank]

Approved by [handwritten]:

Colonel General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, on 7 February 1995 [signature]
Colonel General [name indistinct] on 7 February 1995 [signature]
Lieutenant General D. Kharchenko on 7 February 1995 [signature]

Moldova

Concern Voiced Over Dniester Region Weapons

MM2202122095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Svetlana Gamova: "Who Inherits the 14th Army's Weapons?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chisinau—The question of the 14th Army was raised once again by the Moldovan parliament during the discussion of the state's foreign policy concept. Declaring its intention of pursuing a policy of permanent neutrality and pledging "not to take part in armed conflicts or political or economic unions which aim to prepare for war," the parliament once again stressed that the republic's territory must not be used for the siting of foreign military bases. Deputies from the "Peasants and Intellectuals" faction submitted the categorical amendment: No foreign military bases, no foreign armies.

Some 15 autonomous power units designed to provide amenities for Russian soldiers in Chechnya were the only 14th Army property that the Dniester authorities officially authorized to be removed. Everything else was vetoed.

Under an edict issued by Administration Head Igor Smirnov it is permissible to take part in the sale of "hardware, equipment, and other material assets" if that happens, but it is categorically forbidden to remove "goods" purchased from the region.

As regards the question of the 14th Army's withdrawal from Moldova, the main point is not the date when the Russian servicemen entrain, i.e. what it is formally customary to consider withdrawal, but the division of its property—hardware, weapons, munitions—a third of which is claimed by Moldova in accordance with an agreement, while the Dniester Region has declared all 100 percent of it by Supreme Council ruling to be its own "people's property."

How can anything practically be withdrawn in this situation, never mind handed over to Moldova? By air? Aircraft are in short supply. According to Chisinau there are around 400,000 tonnes of supplies alone here. Military specialists cited the following figure: Around 3,000 hypothetical freightcars are needed to transport the actual disputed property to its new place of registration.

Fourteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed cited a concrete figure: The supplies alone would take "45 months to transport in theory." Given the state of the railroads it is infeasible and even dangerous to remove everything. According to a report from the army headquarters a train "jumped" the rails 6 February near the city of Balta in Odessa Oblast, and that is a possible route home. Military specialists in both Moldova and Russia are unanimous that some of the property will have to be blown up "in situ." But the question of "how?" remains open. Moreover the Tiraspol authorities have already said that there will be no explosions on the Left Bank of the Dniester.

There is every indication that the railroads to the Dniester region will be monitored. According to Shtefan Kitsak [name as transliterated], military adviser to the head of the region's administration, if Russia tries to remove hardware or weapons for Chisinau across the Ukrainian border in the east in order to bring it into Moldova across the Ukrainian border in the west, Russia itself will have taken on more than it bargained for.

Fourteenth Army Commander A. Lebed defined the wrangling over army property as a "situation that could take any direction." Everything can in theory be removed—a float-bridge regiment was removed in the past—but how that is possible "is not material for the press." A. Lebed asserts that "everything in the army will remain as it has been and as it is" until people stop "jumping the gun and the requisite political, economic, and technical conditions have been created."

According to Moldovan Parliament Vice Chairman N. Andronik, who handles military matters, the solution lies in international monitoring, the go-ahead for which was obtained during the OSCE conference in Budapest.

"Our main interest," he noted, "is not Gen. Lebed and his army but the removal of the weapons. If they are not destroyed, they must be withdrawn. It is dangerous to leave them where they are now. In order to prevent a repetition of what happened in Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Chechnya, where the forces were withdrawn but the weapons were left behind. As for Moldova's share, the float-bridge units—the main thing to which we lay claim—have already been withdrawn. This was motivated by the fact that we can use them against the Dniester region."

In N. Andronik's opinion, international monitoring of where the weapons are taken and how is essential, and it is primarily in Russia's interests to begin withdrawing the army today because Russia is interested in the world community's view of this.

Russia is unable—and it is economically unprofitable for it—to take home all the weapons that it has in the Dniester region. They will undoubtedly remain and will be put up for sale. But how many?

Money for the national economy is urgently required on both the Right and Left Banks. The question is whether these weapons might not be used in what are the now-familiar hot spots or those regions that are just warming up?

Kazakhstan

Tokayev on Relations With Other Nations

LD2202175095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Kazakhstan strives to develop relations with Russia while being a large regional power it should not be tied only to relations with Moscow, head of Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry Kasymzhomart Tokayev declared in an interview with Interfax in Almaty.

Mentioning priorities in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, Tokayev also noted relations "with a Great Power, the United Sates," China, and countries of the South-Eastern Asia.

"Kazakhstan intends to pursue a multilateral well-balanced foreign policy, not getting stuck on one definite group of countries," he said.

As he said, "Kazakhstan's geopolitical situation, as a Eurasian state, gives a great number of pluses to it in the sphere of foreign policy." At the same time he believes that "being squeezed between two Great neighbors, Russia and China, Kazakhstan is to a certain extent vulnerable."

According to Tokayev, "this vulnerability should be compensated by more active foreign political actions, many of which are already crowned with success." As an example, Tokayev mentioned "security guarantees from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China."

Solzhenitsyn Role in Ethnic Tension Noted

954F1431A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Sergey Borisov: "Solzhenitsyn? To the Wall!—This Is How Kazakhstan Nationalists Are Attempting To Resolve the Border Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty—**Persona non grata—and indeed, persona non grata No. 1—this is what "GULAG Archipelago" author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has become in Kazakhstan following publication of his famous essay "How We Should Arrange Things in Russia."**

Geopolitical passages written by the Vermont hermit have even roused Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. True, they cooled down a bit and decided it was unbecoming for men of state to butt heads with a private individual, even if he is a Nobel Prize laureate. Polemics with the author on the pages of Kazakhstan's newspapers die down a bit, then ignite with renewed fury—depending on Aleksandr Isayevich's political activity. It seems that citizens of the young sovereign state relate painfully to the author's apt notions, especially when these form judgments about Kazakhstan's territorial and other expanse.

It goes without saying that polemics in the mass media are not distinguished by protocol-type restraint. When opponents lack weighty arguments, they burst into shouts, and even threats.

Surpassing all others in this regard is the Kokchetav branch of the nationalistic organization Azat, which has demanded that the Supreme Court of the republic impose capital punishment upon Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn—no more, no less. Why? Because the "high-handed and manque sorry excuse for an author" has doubts about the fairness of the Russia-Kazakhstan border and clearly has an inimical attitude towards people of the indigenous nationality.

It is a shame that we cannot even categorize as factors that would at least to some degree mitigate the author's guilt, the participation of Shch-282 Prisoner A. Solzhenitsyn in constructing the Ekibastuz Thermal Electric Power Plant (the old geezer is providing heat to this day), and his short-lived but fruitful activity in the field of education in that God-forsaken place Birlik in the south of Kazakhstan. It would be appropriate to mention here that Azat proposes also to send Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy "to the wall," to provide Aleksandr Isayevich company. This because the former, as USSR president, also made an assassination attempt upon the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan. And the latter—an inveterate scoundrel—wants to return the old name of Vernyy to Kazakhstan's capital.

Activists of Kazakhstan's Russian community have sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice and General Procuracy of the republic demanding that criminal charges be brought against Azat and that its registration as a social organization be rescinded—for instigating ethnic strife and bloodthirsty anti-humane sentiment.

'New Generation' Social Movement Clarified

954F1438A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 8, 17 Feb 95 p 4

[Interview with Bakhytzhan Dospanov, secretary of the New Generation movement's organizational committee, by KARAVAN deputy editor in chief Viktor Shatskikh; place and date not given: "Without the 'Nationality' Question"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The "New Generation" social movement was started at the initiative of Kazakhstan's businessmen, who recently appealed to the president and the parliament with the proposal to provide equal rights to all republic citizens regardless of their nationality and to introduce private ownership in land.**

KARAVAN deputy editor in chief Viktor Shatskikh met with Bakhytzhan Dospanov, secretary of the New Generation movement's organizing committee.

[Shatskikh] Bakhytzhan, over the past few weeks, New Generation has been subjected to massive criticism. A few days ago the KHALYK KENESI newspaper published a letter addressed to businessmen, which is titled with disarming simplicity: "He Who Talks Unthinkingly Dies a Violent Death." In the last lines of the letter its authors quote an old proverb: "All it takes to deal with a boy is one rope, and with a warrior—one bullet...."

[Dospanov] This is not a conversation of civilized people. Fortunately, such outlandish extremism is indeed rare, and we do not take such threats seriously. But we should not underestimate the danger emanating from people who inflame emotions. It is generally typical of human nature that it is easier to rouse people for bad deeds than for good ones.... Take those who voted for Zhirinovskiy in Russia. I am sure that most of them are regular, normal people. Nevertheless, the cunning "Volfovich" was able to find the right chord that produced a response in the soul of each of them....

[Shatskikh] This chord, in my opinion, is this: "You are weak now; you are poor, and you are not counted for much. And you know whose fault it is? THEY are at fault for everything. THEY were oppressing you, deceiving you, but I will help you to get even with THEM...." Such arguments appeal to the subconscious, to human instincts, and even phobias. It is always easier to believe that someone else is at fault for your troubles. This is a common algorithm of any militant nationalism: Russian, Kazakh, German....

[Dospanov] Hence the one-dimensional interpretation of history by national-radicals, without nuances and half-shades. To a considerable extent this is the growing pains, the euphoria from sovereignty. First the 260 years Russia and Kazakhstan spent together were presented as great brotherhood, and now—as a never- ending oppression. You do not have to be a doctor of science to understand that these are extremes. One would have to stretch it quite far to call Russian policy colonial, because colonizers do not behave this way. On the other hand, "voluntary unification" certainly was only the lesser of all evils for Kazakhs. Our forebears would have preferred, of course, to create their own state, had they had at the time the strength to do it. But one cannot rewrite history.

[Shatskikh] It is true—to look for arguments in the past is a dead-end approach. One can find anything there, and support any position by citing history. Nevertheless, eighteenth-century arguments are actively being used by some current politicians and ideologues. For instance, one Supreme Council deputy does not see a single bright spot in the relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. He proposes that all Slavs in Kazakhstan admit that they are the progeny of colonizers, that all their fathers and grandfathers did here was implementing the policy—first of the czar and then of the CPSU—of exterminating the Kazakh people.

[Dospanov] Such statements do not need any comments. And I am sure that most Kazakhs react to them with puzzlement, to say the least. But I and my colleagues in New Generation are concerned over the following. You see, calls for consolidation, the willingness to understand each other, to search for what unites us rather than separates us—there is no shortage of this. But people are nevertheless leaving the republic! These good exhortations and alarming—I would even say, ominous—statistics of outflow somehow exist separately.

[Shatskikh] Yes, more than a million persons have left Kazakhstan over the past few years. At first these figures were hushed up; then we were told that almost as many come back and this is overall a natural process. The latest version is that migration is caused mainly by economic reasons.

[Dospanov] Of course, the fact that Kazakhstan lags behind Russia in the economic sense cannot be dismissed as a cause of migration. And the more construction workers, miners, and grain-growers leave, the more significant this lag will be. It will cause another wave of migration.... These things are interrelated.

[Shatskikh] But by the character and tone of the articles in "patriotic" publications, one may draw the conclusion that we have at least another 100 years to deal with this problem. It is much more important to first sort out who "enslaved" whom two centuries ago, to compete who can talk more eloquently about his love for the motherland and his willingness to protect sovereignty to the last drop of ink....

[Dospanov] You are right. Not everybody understands yet how serious the situation is. Hence confusion with respect to priorities. Speaking of true patriotism, without quotation marks—why did our esteemed Kazakh commentators decide that Allah bestowed more of this quality on them than on other Kazakhs, who do not advertise their love for motherland? For me, for instance, it is quite obvious that the most important point today is to keep our ship from sinking, because it is already listing and taking water. If we sink, we will then have to beg our neighbors to save us, to help to raise and fix the ship, to tug it.... This would hurt me, as a patriot, very much. It is not yet too late for all citizens of Kazakhstan to get into working out a common platform based on mutual compromises, to jump into common work. This is why we wrote our appeal to the president and the parliament.

[Shatskikh] The point that probably attracted the greatest criticism was the New Generation's proposal to introduce private ownership in land.

[Dospanov] Yes, while for many people the question of two state languages and the character of statehood remains rather abstract, property relations are a concrete thing; this affects everyone. In this respect there are also anecdotal points. Judging by letters to the organizing committee, far from all Kazakhstan citizens are aware of what exactly private ownership in land is. For instance, a man calls and says: "I have an apartment, and if I sell it, I will have no place to live. Now, if I get my own piece of land and I sell it, I will have to leave Kazakhstan—there will be no place for me to live, because all land will be in private hands...."

There is some of our fault in this too: Instead of explaining our proposals, we simply proclaimed them. This created grounds for various interpretations, including underhanded ones. Now we are correcting this oversight. Everybody who calls New Generation gets a detailed consultation about the nature of our movement, its goals, and our positions on particular issues.

[Shatskikh] Are there many callers?

[Dospanov] Yes, we get tens of calls a day; many come in person, fill out an application. We feel solid support, and from people of different nationalities, ages, and social groups. In order to register as an all-republic movement, we must set up branches in 11 oblasts of Kazakhstan. Over a short period of time such branches already have been organized in nine oblasts. A founding congress of the New Generation will be held in May, and then we will transform ourselves into a political party.

[Shatskikh] The press of certain orientation already has dubbed you the "Russian-Speaking Kazakhs Movement."

[Dospanov] I repeat—this is not so. We do not even have the question of nationality in our applications—a person fills out this part voluntarily in the part "Additional Information About Yourself." Among the people who come to us are Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, Koreans, and members of many other ethnic groups. We can see for a fact that people whose attitude is not confrontational—unlike the author of the letter you quoted in the beginning—but constructive, creative, they are the majority. People want to live in peace and accord.

[Shatskikh] Still, the letter I quoted has more than one author—it is a collective letter. This letter was sent to the KHALYK KENESI newspaper—an organ of the Supreme Council—jointly by the Semipalatinsk Oblast and city boards of the Khazakh Tili society. And the newspaper published it without any comments. So it is not some anonymous person who warns you how many bullets are needed to fell a warrior—it is an educational and partly state-funded organization.

[Dospanov] Threats begin when people have no other answer... I am not afraid of these "warnings," especially considering that they are useful in a way: They convincingly show the intellectual level of our opponents.

The address of the New Generation movement's organizing committee: 223 Furmanov Street, Almaty. Telephone 64-25-23, 64-07- 20.

Reserve Officers Called to Active Service

LD2202155995 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The cabinet of ministers has passed a decision on calling up for two years active military service officers in the reserve who have previously not undergone military service. The decision was adopted in connection with the lack of junior officer personnel.

Kyrgyzstan

President Meets Bhutto Envoy, Invited to Pakistan

LD2202131895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0635 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bishkek, 22 Feb, TASS— Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev and Makhdum Shahabuddin, special envoy of Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Minister of State for Finance, discussed the development of Pakistan-Kyrgyzstan relations and the participation of Kyrgyzstan in the forthcoming summit of the Organization for Economic Cooperation due to take place in Islamabad on 13-15 March at a meeting today. Shahabuddin also conveyed a personal invitation from Bhutto to the Kyrgyz leader to participate in the Islamabad summit.

Akayev's visit to Pakistan last December boosted relations between the two countries. Pakistan intends to purchase electricity from Kyrgyzstan. By using power transmission lines through China Bishkek is prepared to supply Pakistan with three to five billion kilowatt hours of power annually. Agreements have been concluded on the export of Kyrgyz cement, lime, slate and asbestos-cement pipes to Pakistan. On top of this, the two countries have signed an agreement on the construction of the Kara-Korum highway, which would give Kyrgyzstan an exit to two oceans.

Communists Only Secure Two Seats in New Parliament

LD2202174395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1346 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Communists have secured only two seats in Kyrgyzstan's new parliament, and the democratic party Ata Meken - four seats, head of the Public Relations Department of the Kyrgyz president's administration Kamilya Kenenbayeva told Interfax on Wednesday [22 February].

The Social-Democratic Party won three mandates, the Party of Kyrgyzstan's Unity - two and the other parties - one mandate each.

"One can't say that Kyrgyzstan will have a mono-party or mono-ethnic parliament, the more so since the election campaign is not over yet," she said.

Among the newly elected deputies there are representatives of eight out of the 13 registered parties, including six Russians, seven Uzbeks, one German and one Karachayev.

"It's early yet to assert that the communists will secure the majority of the seats in the new parliament," the president's Press Secretary Kamil Bayalinov told Interfax.

He said that the newly elected deputies might be divided into three groups: "normal citizens, who take the future of the state close to heart; business people and dealers who need the deputy's immunity for money laundering; and populists of various bias, who have got through thanks to revanchist calls (the restoration of the Soviet Union) and promises of social well being."

The first round was held on February 5 and the second one on February 19. The upper house (the legislative assembly) has 35 seats and the lower house (the assembly of people's representatives) - 70 seats.

The Central Electoral Commission reports that 82 seats out of the 105 have been filled already.

Tajikistan

Statement Reaffirms Elections on 26 February

LD2202151595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0840 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 22 Feb—Parliamentary elections in the Republic of Tajikistan will be held as scheduled on 26 February, says a statement by the Tajikistan Embassy in Moscow received by ITAR-TASS today. The conjectures circulated by the media on a possible postponement of the elections following pressure from the Tajik opposition do not correspond to reality, the document says. [passage omitted]

Election Campaign Enters Home Stretch

LD2202190595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1455 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe February 22 TASS—The general election campaign in Tajikistan has entered its home stretch ahead of the voting scheduled for February 26. Chairman of the republic's Central Electoral Committee Mizrob Kabirov told ITAR-TASS that 354 out of 399 candidates initially nominated by work collectives, political parties and local councils would vie for 181 seats in Tajikistan's future parliament.

Mizrob Kabirov said that around 40 percent of the nominees were leaders of the republic's regions, cities and districts. He admitted that most of them had been single nominees in respective constituencies. Another group of candidates was nominated by work collectives, and still another consisted of the nominees of four officially registered political parties. This latter group is dominated by 46 candidates from the Communist Party.

The Party of Political and Economic Revival nominated only one candidate, its leader Mukhtor Boboyev, known in the republic as a successful businessman. The Popular Party led by Deputy Chairman of the present parliament Abdumadjid Dastiyev nominated ten candidates, and the popular Unity Party, which was formed last October by the one-time candidate for Tajik presidency, ex-ambassador of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation, Abdumalik Abduladjanov nominated two candidates.

According to preliminary data, more than one-third of the registered candidates are representatives of the present deputy corps. The overwhelming majority of the candidates are ethnic Tajiks.

Independent observers point out that breaches of the law on elections to the national parliament of Tajikistan in the course of the election campaign were not exceptional. Some authoritative international organisations, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union, expressed regret that very many representatives of state structures, including administration heads, were single nominees in their respective constituencies. They pointed out that the nomination in such cases was tantamount to the appointment.

Jihad Council Department of IRP Boycotts Elections

LD2302115295 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Gornyy Badakhshani department of the jihad council of the Islamic Rebirth Party [IRP] of Tajikistan, has boycotted the forthcoming elections to the Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan, and appealed to his supporters not to appear in the polling stations to cast their ballot.

This request has been described in one of the department's statements broadcast by the MESSANGER OF KHORASAN new agency.

The statement says that the Badakhshani department of the jihad council of the Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan, did not approve the results of the presidential elections and referendum on the constitution, and still is ready not to accept Rakhmanov and his new constitution. The council resolutely announces that it will continue the struggle against the Dushanbe regime and Rakhmanov's associates.

Islamic Movement Leader Holds News Conference

LD2302002395

[FBIS Editorial Report] (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik at 0640 GMT on 22 February broadcasts a 74-minute recorded news conference by Sayed

Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, with unidentified correspondents on 21 February; the place of the news conference is not given.

A correspondent says that Uzbekistan's view of the political trends in Tajik society is changing. He asks Nuri what he has to say about this issue.

Nuri replies: "We should tell the truth. That is to say, the regime in Uzbekistan is very much afraid of Islamic fundamentalism, as they call it. They even cooperate with the Jews in order to fight against what they call fundamentalism. However, in [word indistinct] we should mention that, for instance, the destruction and elimination of freedom-seeking ideas in Tajikistan was carried out with the help of the regimes in Uzbekistan and Russia.

"Today, however, we see some changes in Uzbekistan's policy. That is to say, there is an inclination toward our movement on the part of Uzbekistan's politicians for which, I think, there are two main reasons. One of the reasons is the talks, the face to face talks, that have been held between representatives from Uzbekistan and our politicians. They were impressed and understood the objectives and goals of our struggle and fight. That was one thing.

"The second is that, although Uzbekistan might be cast in the communist mold, and although its politicians may be communists and may have tried to recast themselves in a democratic mold, they will—in spite of all this—strive for independence. That is to say, these same state officials want their own particular independence.

"Independence from what? From the regime that enslaved them in the past. Of course, we can openly say that Russia is still trying to make all the countries that used to be under its supervision and control dependent on itself by other means and in other ways. Uzbekistan does not want this, however, and is very much avoiding it. When it sees that its child is [word indistinct], it leaves and adopts (?another father).

"Russia is causing distress and anxiety for Uzbekistan. This has happened several times before. Since the regime in Tajikistan is in political and economic difficulties, it is forced to become entirely politically and economically dependent on Russia.

"One of the dangers that [Uzbek President] Karimov is facing today is that presented by the increasing number of Russian soldiers in Tajikistan. On the one hand, we think that these soldiers are against us. However, these soldiers are also against other republics in the region. Uzbekistan understands this very well. Their current inclination toward us is because the increasing influence of Russian soldiers in the region has created a strong common enemy for us and the regime in Uzbekistan.

"That is why we, Uzbekistan, and other republics in the region are forced to fight against those who are once again causing a foreign power to come into the region."

A correspondent asks: "In general, which side initiated the establishment and development of relations between the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan and the United States? What is the future of these relations, in your view? What can we hope to achieve from these relations?"

Nuri replies: "Let me tell you one thing in general terms. According to the experience we have gained recently, if a movement wants to announce its existence in society, or a state intends to exist on this earth and not be eliminated, it should establish relations with the entire world. The Islamic Movement of Tajikistan has made efforts to implement this plan from the very first. That is to say, our policy is a policy of peaceful coexistence with our neighbors and good relations with all countries in the world. [word indistinct] this policy, we have so far not supported western or eastern policies or this or that country.

"In order to gain political support from the entire world, we started from the first countries that are friendly toward us and our movement and that know us; for instance, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. From a political point of view, and insofar as we have had dealings with them, we have had political dealings with these three countries to the extent that they do not hate us. That is the least we want. So if they do not want to help us—since helping us politically and giving us political support might be damaging to their own policies given that they have relations with the world in their own right—we have managed to get to a stage where these countries do not condemn us. That is to say, they acknowledge our rights. They acknowledge our right to struggle, to jihad.

"When I was in Pakistan, I had talks with some foreign officials—for instance, from America and other places, Russia, and so on. There were Pakistani representatives with us. When they heard logical comments from us and that what we are calling for to resolve the problem of Tajikistan is even better and more appropriate than what the regime's leaders were putting forward, they became confident and began to trust us. One of their officials even said: Given your policies today, we can now stand before America. Anyone who puts pressure on us saying that we should not allow this group to receive assistance via Pakistan.... [pauses] They realized, however, that our entire struggle is a logical one and that none of their tags—such as extremists, radicals, or fundamentalists, as they call it—apply to us. This was all set right.

"We adopted a policy that proved to be the gateway for our politicians to reach America. At present, we do not expect anything from America; that is to say, we do not desire any assistance from America. The only help we need from the world [words indistinct] is for them to get to know us, to regard our movement, our tendency and [word indistinct] as a logical one, and to acknowledge the fact that we have the right to struggle. That much would be a help to us. In the future, we will, God willing, try to start this political struggle with other countries as well and to also achieve this recognition from other countries."

A correspondent says: "Iran has hostile relations with the United States and good diplomatic relations with Russia. Will the establishment of relations between the United States and the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan now jeopardize these relations?"

Nuri replies: "I do not think that relations between the United States and the Islamic Movement will be jeopardized.

"Relations between the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Republic of Iran may possibly be jeopardized to some slight extent. However, we have a policy that we are pursuing and that is recognized by our friends in this region; for example, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the Islamic State of Afghanistan, or Pakistan.

"Certainly, we (?are prepared) to deal with other countries, and the policy we are pursuing is one that would not conflict with the policies or wishes of countries that are rivals with one other. Therefore, in the position we are in, in the movement or tendency, we are following a policy of absolute impartiality. It is our aim to show to the whole world, especially the superpowers, that our struggle is a logical one and that we have the right to struggle. We do not care about their policies or rivalries. I believe and am confident that our actions would not interfere with the policies of the [word indistinct] countries."

Nuri is asked to comment on a split in the opposition Democratic Party.

He says that the reason for setbacks is the split in the opposition forces and that he remembers times when nobody thought the opposition could continue. He adds that he saw a lack of faith from the opposition leaders, except of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan. At that time, Nuri says, no one was afraid of Islam, and even the communists said that if the Islamists won they would cooperate with them.

Nuri says that Democratic Party leader Shodmon Yusuf was one such leader, but his policy has changed many times. He says that abandoning the struggle means being a traitor to the people, and Yusuf did this. Nuri adds that it must be said that he was deceived by Russian Embassy officials, who said they would assist the democrats if they split from the Islamic movement. One Russian, Nuri says, even promised Yusuf that they would try to remove Tajik Interior Minister Salimov and build a democratic state in Tajikistan if he supported Tajik President Rakhmanov.

Nuri is then asked about Tajik authorities seeking contacts with the opposition.

Nuri says Latifi, of the Moscow-based Tajik democratic opposition, has not supported anyone. He says that Abdumalik Abdullojonov has sent a letter to Iran promising cooperation with the opposition, but—except for one or two people—no one changed their minds and opened relations with Abdullojonov.

Nuri is then asked about the Badakhshan region. He replies that Badakhshan is not held by Rakhmanov. He says it is under the influence of the opposition and Russia. Although the Russians have increased their forces there, he adds, they are in a trap; Badakhshan could be a region for our forces, and no one could dislodge us. Nuri says that Badakhshan is a good strategic region, and they must protect both the people and the region. He says that the people of the region are waiting for them to return, and they must purge their jihad forces of those who are unworthy.

Nuri says that war is not their goal. He says they want their rights. He says he has met the leaders of the Dushanbe regime, and they have no plans to bring the refugees back. The regime, he says, only wants to repatriate the work force; they do not want the scientists and intelligentsia to return home.

A correspondent asks Nuri about the Tajik negotiating process.

Nuri says that they have met representatives of the Dushanbe regime only once, and foreign observers say that all the opposition's demands are legitimate. Nuri says that Islamic Party deputy head Haji Akbar Turajonzoda is a political force for the opposition who could bring in all the laws of the international community.

A correspondent says: "What is your view of the offer made by the Uzbek justice minister and special secretary of Islam Karimov to hold the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks in Tashkent?"

Nuri replies: "I have said to you before that our policy is that we must have relations with all countries of the world in their own way. At present, we are really not in a position to be rivals with any country. We intend to sit and talk to everyone so that they can understand us and decide whether we or the opposing side are right.

"To this end, we will, for instance, accept the invitation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and we will derive some benefit and advantage from this. If the fourth round is to be held in Tashkent, we accept."

Another correspondent says: "Professor, following on from the same question, I would like you to clarify one point. The opposition to the Dushanbe regime did not agree to hold the fourth round in Moscow, because Moscow was not considered to be neutral. Does this also not apply to Tashkent?"

Nuri replies: "Well, during those early days, when we said that the fourth round would not be held in Moscow, we also announced that we would accept any of the CIS republics except Moscow. The Russian side intends to draw us into deadlock so that we decide against negotiating. We said, however, that—apart from Russia, which has a civil war and cannot resolve its own problems by political means—we accept any other country—even Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. In the end, we said it could even be Uzbekistan. We were even ready to accept Uzbekistan at that point.

"Since these two countries now have relations with each other, it might be that accepting that the fourth round of talks should be held in Tashkent is taken as acceptance of Moscow. However, we are caught between two evils here. In other words, to completely abandon the talks is one evil, and to accept one of the CIS countries is another evil. We incline more toward the lesser of the two evils; the smaller evil, namely Tashkent, will be less harmful."

Nuri is asked about refugees in other countries. Nuri says they have addressed this issue at the United Nations and in the United States.

A correspondent says: "It is obvious that the policy of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan has developed to a greater extent than many other movements in the world, especially when compared with other popular movements in Tajikistan. What do you anticipate for the future in order to improve the policy of the Movement and for our struggle to climb higher peaks?"

Nuri replies: "We have said repeatedly—and we will say again—that efforts will be made [words indistinct] remember that the deliverance of the oppressed and much-suffering people of Tajikistan lies in our unity and accord.

"Our wish today is that all the opposition groups that are in existence should be united, although apart from the Islamic Movement the rest are not engaged in armed struggle, or even a political struggle.

"In terms of world politics, our policy is that we do not impose any structure on the people of Tajikistan. We are struggling for a government that is accepted by the people themselves. Today other opposition groups should make use of the reputation, progress, and recognition that the Islamic Movement enjoys in the world and should unite in order to save the oppressed nation. With this unity and accord, both in politics and jihad, God willing, we will together be able to save the people from sedition."

Turkmenistan

President Makes Government Appointments, Resolutions

LD2302111595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian at 0850 GMT on 22 February carries a report noting the following appointments by Turkmen presidential edict:

—Allaberdy Tekayev is appointed minister of construction and architecture;

—Tagandurdy Nuryyev is appointed minister of agriculture and foodstuffs and chairman of the agricultural products production association;

—Nury Orazovich Orazmukhamedov is appointed head of Ashgabat city administration;

The following resolutions have also been issued by the Turkmen president:

—Yagmyr Ovezov, deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, is charged with the coordination and supervision of activities in the transport, telecommunications, construction and construction materials industries, and of land-surveying, standardization, and work safety;

—Batyr Kurbanovich Sardzhayev, deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, is charged with the coordination and supervision over the activities of the bodies of the military directorate, national security, internal affairs, border guards, justice, the courts and the prosecutor's office.

Edict on Amendments to Income Tax Law

LD1802110395 Ashgabat VECHERNIY ASHGABAT in Russian 1 Feb 95 p 1

[Edict issued by President Saparmurad Niyazov on "Amendments to the Regulations on Income Tax for Citizens of Turkmenistan, Foreigners, and Stateless Persons"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The following amendments and additions are to be made to the regulations on income tax for citizens of Turkmenistan, foreigners, and stateless persons approved by edict UP-252 of the Turkmen president of 6 January 1992 on the introduction of income tax for citizens of Turkmenistan, foreigners, and stateless persons (re-edited as presidential edicts UP-481 of 6 July 1992, PP-1058 of 22 November 1993, and PP-1251 of 10 June 1994).

1. The untaxed minimum wage paid at the main source of employment is to be set at 1,000 manats. The untaxed total value of bonuses awarded in the form of goods is to be increased to 8,000 manats.

2. In Section I, Point 3, Paragraphs 17, 21, and 22, the wording is to be changed as follows: "to 2,000 manats", "to 250 manats", and "an average of 250 manats" are to be replaced by "to 8,000 manats", "to 1,000 manats", and "an average of 1,000 manats", respectively.

3. Section II, Point 9 is to be reworded as follows:

9. The following rates of tax are levied on the incomes set out in Point 8 of these regulations:

Monthly income	Tax
1,001-3,000 manats	6 percent of amount over 1,000 manats
3,001-6,000 manats	120 manats plus 8 percent of amount over 3,000 manats
6,001-9,000 manats	360 manats plus 10 percent of amount over 6,000 manats
9,001-12,000 manats	660 manats plus 15 percent of amount over 9,000 manats
12,001 manats and above	1,110 manats plus 20 percent of amount over 12,000 manats

4. In Section III, Point 11, Paragraph 3, the words "3,000 manats" are to be replaced with "12,000 manats"; Point 12, Paragraph 1 of the same section is to be reworded as follows:

12. The following rates of tax are levied on the incomes set out in this point:

Monthly income	Tax
up to 1,000 manats	2 percent of income
1,000-2,000 manats	20 manats plus 4 percent of amount over 1,000 manats
2,001-3,000 manats	60 manats plus 6 percent of amount over 2,000 manats
3,001 manats and above	120 manats plus the rate set out in Section 9, Point 9 of these Regulations

5. Section IV, Point 14, Paragraph 1 is to be reworded as follows:

14. The following rates of tax are levied at source of payment on the sum total of the remunerations set out in Point 13 of these Regulations:

Annual income	Tax
up 12,000 manats	2 percent of income
12,001-24,000 manats	240 manats plus 4 percent of amount over 12,000 manats
24,001-36,000 manats	720 manats plus 6 percent of amount over 24,000 manats
36,001-72,000 manats	1,440 manats plus 8 percent of amount over 36,000 manats
72,000-108,000 manats	4,320 manats plus 10 percent of amount over 72,000 manats
108,001-144,000 manats	7,920 manats plus 15 percent of sum over 108,000 manats
144,000 manats and above	13,320 manats plus 20 percent of amount over 144,000 manats

Section IV, Point 15, Paragraph 1 is to be reworded as follows:

15. The following rates of tax are levied on royalties paid to the heirs of authors, on a continuing basis:

Annual income	Tax
up to 4,000 manats	50 percent of income
4,001-12,000 manats	2,000 manats plus 60 percent of amount over 4,000 manats
12,001-36,000 manats	6,800 manats plus 70 percent of amount over 12,000 manats
36,001 manats and above	23,600 manats and 80 percent of amount over 36,000 manats

6. Section V, Point 22, Paragraph 1 is to be reworded as follows:

22. The following rates of tax are levied on the incomes set out in Point 20 of these Regulations:

Annual income	Tax
up to 36,000 manats	amount equal to tax paid by a worker/employee for the corresponding number of months, at the rates set in Point 9 of these Regulations if there is no main place of work, or at the rates set out in Point 12 of these Regulations if there is a main place of work
36,001-72,000 manats	1,440 manats plus 6 percent of amount over 36,000 manats
72,001-108,000 manats	4,320 manats plus 10 percent of amount over 72,000 manats
108,001-144,000 manats	7,920 manats plus 15 percent of amount over 108,000 manats
144,000 manats and above	13,320 manats plus 20 percent of amount over 144,000 manats

7. This decree is effective from 1 January 1995.

[Signed] President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy of Turkmenistan

Review of Energy Sector Development

LD2302110795 Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian 0852 GMT 22 Feb 95

[Unattributed report: "The Fuel and Energy Complex Is the Bedrock and Hope of the Country's Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The country's fuel and energy complex will provide 80 percent of national revenue in 1995. Experts believe the extraction of 90 billion cubic meters of gas and 6 million tonnes of oil is quite attainable for the Turkmen oil and gas industry. For this it is necessary to work seriously on restoring the former potential of the fuel and energy complex. Its decline in recent years, above all, was due to non-payments by the main consumers of Turkmen gas—the CIS states—as well as to the breakdown in traditional economic ties in the CIS.

The forced reduction in gas extraction volumes (to 35.7 billion cubic metres) last year slowed down the work of the industry and the development of deposits stopped. The insolvency of gas purchasers did not allow resources to be channelled in time for repairing and reconstructing compressor equipment. Currently only 37 percent of all compressor stations are operating. The main consumer of the gas, Ukraine, and the chief partner, Russia, will help Turkmenistan get out of this situation. Ukrainian enterprises will participate in the restoration and construction works on compressor stations, and Russia's Zarubezhneftegazstroy [foreign oil and gas construction] has already started laying pipes in the country's eastern region.

One of the priority fields for the industry's development is the complete gasification of the country, which is scheduled to be completed this year. The completion of gasification in Dashovuz Region, where more than 5,400 kilometers of pipeline have been laid, is evidence that the time-scale is realistic. It is necessary by the end of this year to lay more than 8,500 kilometers of gas lines, the pipes for which are already prepared.

The gasification policy is also under way in the country's power industry. The U.S. Import-Export Bank recently gave a credit worth $45.5 million to the U.S. company General Electric to install a gas-turbine generator at the Byuzmeyin state power station. The country's chemical industry, with its rich raw material resources, has good prospects as well. Its products—phosphate and nitrogen fertilizers, iodine and sulphur, as well as electricity and gas—are in a great demand both among its neighbors and in CIS countries.

According to experts, this year will be the turning point in the resolution of the issue of exporting fuel to the world market. In line with the projects, gas and electricity, which are Turkmenistan's two main export products, will start going to Turkey via Iran. The large-scale gas pipeline project should receive final management and financial provisions this year. As regards the second project with a similar route, Turkey and Iran have given their guarantees as purchaser and transporter of the Turkmen gas.

These fields of development of the country's fuel and energy complex correspond to the tendency that has arisen in the structure of demand for fuel. According to UN data, by the end of the century the most rapid consumption growth in the world energy balance will be for gas and electricity and not oil and coal.

Uzbekistan

Karimov, Visiting Delegation Discuss U.S. POW's

LD2202143295 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Uzbek 1000 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov received members of the delegation from the U.S.-Russian commission on POW's and MIA's, headed by its co-chairman Malcolm Toon.

The worth of men and their memory is always dear, the president of our country said. In line with this, the great concern shown by the United States about the fate of each of its citizens who was a POW or MIA is evidence of the great state's care for its people.

Malcolm Toon expressed gratitude for the cordial reception. While speaking about the aim of his delegation's visit to Uzbekistan, he expressed satisfaction that the Uzbek Government is ready to render assistance in this area.

During the conversation they discussed issues of cooperating on gathering information about the fate of American POW's and MIA's in the 1950's and 1960's.

Abdulazis Komilov, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, took part in the reception.

Henry Lee Clark, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States to Uzbekistan, was present at the conversation.

Parliament Begins Work, Elects Officials

LD2302100195 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Uzbek 0625 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The first session of the Uzbek Supreme Council of the first convocation has begun its work. At the beginning Qudratulla Ahmedov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, took the floor. He asked the deputies to register their presence. It was revealed that 236 deputies out of 250 are participating in the session. As the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission said, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, members of the republic's cabinet of ministers and of the diplomatic corps, representatives of international organizations, and the heads of republican organizations and establishments are participating in the session. The session was declared open and the Uzbek national anthem was performed.

Then chairman Ahmedov spoke about the organization of the election campaign and the conduct of the multiparty elections. He congratulated the newly elected deputies and wished them success in their responsible activities.

As regards the mandate commission, Ahmedov gave the floor to Mahammadjon Karimov, the deputy elected from Bobursho, constituency no. 87. He proposed a mandate commission of 14 deputies. The deputies positively solved the question of the composition of the mandate commission by voting on candidates for it. Shavkat Mirziyoyev was, by a majority of votes, elected the chairman of the mandate commission.

Khalilov Reelected Supreme Council Chairman

LD2302105895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Uzbek at 0640 GMT 23 February carries a report noting that Erkin Khalilov, former acting head of the Uzbek Supreme Council, has been elected chairman of the new Uzbek Supreme Council, which opened today. His candidature was proposed by Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who recommended him for his "experience." The deputies elected Khalilov by secret vote.

Karimov To Address Opening of New Parliament

LD2302065495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0643 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vilor Niyazmatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tashkent February 23 TASS—The first session of a new Uzbek parliament, Oli Majlis [Supreme Assembly], opens here today. It is half as large as the previous Supreme Soviet and is made up of 250 members.

Various parliamentary groups and blocs will be formed for the first time in the Uzbek parliament. They will represent the interests of the two parties which took part in the elections: the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan and Vatan Tarakiete (Revival of Fatherland).

The first session of Oli Majlis is expected to last for two days. Its agenda includes some 20 items (most of them are organising issues), specifically the adoption of provisions dealing with the prerogatives of people's deputies, the election of the chairman of parliament, the creation of parliamentary committees and commissions, as well as the appointment of ther chairmen. Oli Majlis will discuss the status of people's deputies and the working schedule of the new parliament, and will ratify a number of international agreements.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov is expected to make a report at the first session of Oli Majlis about the sociopolitical situation and the guidelines of the economic development of the republic.

People's Democratic Party To Back President

LD2202171295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1238 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TASHKENT, Feb 22 (Interfax)—The People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan will form the biggest group supporting the policy of President Islam Karimov in the new parliament, a high-ranking member of the party Kamiljan Jumaniyazov told Interfax Wednesday [22 February].

69 out of the 250 seats in the new parliament are occupied by the People's Democratic Party. The first session will be held Thursday.

According to Jumaniyazov, the main purpose of the group is to back Karimov who as the party chairman should feel political support.

The party was founded in 1991 as a successor to the Uzbek Communist Party with 220,000 out of 660,000 members joining the new party. Now the party has a membership of 380,000 people who belong to 80 ethnic groups.

The National Progress party with a membership of 35,000 was the rival of the People's Democratic Party in the elections and collected 14 seats. Uzbekistan does not have any other officially registered political parties.

Armenia

Armenia Called Possible Plutonium Source for Iran

95WC0025A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by T. Salakhly: "The Armenian Trail of the Islamic Bomb"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The sore reaction of the United States to the recent deal between the Russian Minatom [Ministry of Atomic Energy] and Iran shows not only the serious concern in the West over the possibility of a spread of nuclear technologies and terrorist regimes coming into possession of nuclear weapons, but also Iran's readiness from the science and technology standpoint to build its own nuclear bomb.**

Western analysts estimate that Iran is five to seven years away from the capability to build its own "Islamic bomb." At the same time, it is obvious that in order to build its own bomb, Iran has to possess a certain stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. It is unlikely that Iran can produce this plutonium in its own nuclear center, which is monitored by just about anybody, and in general build a reactor there that would permit it to carry out such an operation. It would be logical to assume that Iran would attempt to set up production of weapons-grade plutonium somewhere outside its borders. Theoretically, "donor countries" of nuclear technologies may include the leading Western economic powers, China, and Russia. China, however, is far away and has no particular ties to Iran. Moreover, Beijing has little desire to spoil relations with America for the sake of Iran. For understandable reasons, neither will the West share its nuclear technologies with Iran. This leaves Russia. In addition to the aforementioned Minatom deal, there is information that Russia has sold Iran a consignment of submarines and other armaments and military hardware. Russia's nuclear facilities, however, are also monitored precisely for the eventuality of nuclear materials smuggling. Which means that taking weapons-grade plutonium from there to Iran may not be entirely impossible, and at the very least involves considerable difficulties.

Here is where the most interesting part begins. From the political standpoint, the most convenient facility from which to obtain weapons-grade plutonium for the future "Islamic bomb" turns out to be the Armenian AES [nuclear power station], which recently underwent major reconstruction. It is maintained by Russian specialists—Armenia does not have its own—which means that its nuclear program will not cause undue fears on anyone's part. There are too many facts attesting to friendship between Iran and Armenia to call it a coincidence. Suffice it to recall the recent opening in Armenia of the representation of the Iranian Mellat Bank, Iranian trucks on the streets of Yerevan, and so on, and so on. Most importantly, Iran's true position in the Karabakh conflict and its tender friendship with the long-suffering Armenian people is known in Azerbaijan but certainly not on the other side of the Atlantic, where Armenia successfully presents itself as a Christian country fighting Islamic fundamentalism. And since for America it is typical for everyone to mind their own business, and those who are responsible for nuclear safety are unlikely to delve into the finer points of Armenian-Iranian-Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, they certainly will not be looking for the trail of the "Islamic bomb" in Christian Armenia, which is at war with Muslim Azerbaijan.

Iranian Embassy Refutes Nuclear 'Lie'

95WC0025B Baku ZERKALO in Russian 11 Feb 95 p 11

[Statement of the press service of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Baku: " 'Close Ties Between Iran and Armenia' Is Misleading Public Opinion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the name of Almighty Allah!

To the esteemed editor in chief of ZERKALO.

Greetings!

Please be so kind as to publish in one of the next issues of your newspaper the reply of the press service of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Baku to the material "The Armenian Trail of the Islamic Bomb" published in issue No. 3 of 20 January 1995.

[Signed] Press service of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Baku.

* * *

The article titled "The Armenian Trail of the Islamic Bomb," published in your newspaper, is an insidious conjecture of a morbid imagination and bears no relation to reality, since the Islamic Republic of Iran has never attempted to build an atomic bomb and does not intend to take any steps in this direction in the future. The use of nuclear power generation is common to all humanity and its goal is economic development of the country. This position is shared by international agencies' representations.

The reliability of the mass media, and especially of a newspaper, is measured by the extent to which the material and information it publishes correspond to objective reality. Therefore conjectures and untrue facts are unacceptable in newspapers.

Those who, at the prompting of others, set for themselves the unprincipled goal of negatively influencing public opinion in Azerbaijan know very well that they are deeply mistaken, since the public conscience of the noble people of Azerbaijan in their attitude to Iran is based on natural historical, religious, and cultural affinity.

Thus, this sort of groundless, unsubstantiated, false material will not be able to sow the seeds of suspicion in the souls of the Azerbaijani people with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The heroic people of Azerbaijan know very well that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been building ties with Azerbaijan without being tempted by the smell of oil and economic benefits. The results of the past three years clearly show this.

It would be better if those who are behind this article served their motherland and its national interests at least a little.

The press service of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Baku rejects the accusations raised in the article and once again indicates that these articles, full of lies and conjectures, will not benefit their authors in any way. It would be much better for them to follow the example of all sincere people in serving the cause of rapprochement of the two people. Otherwise those who sow discord will be condemned both by our Lord's judgment and in the eyes of the coming generations for their dark designs.

Finally we would like to state that the people who allege the development of close ties between Iran and Armenia and thus wish to disorient the Azerbaijani public opinion must know that these old tricks will produce no results, and enemy propaganda with the help of Allah, as they say, will turn into a benefit for Azerbaijan. It has been said: The truth will out. In the end, the Azerbaijani people will understand both the true purpose of these false and venal insinuations and the good intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at deepening all sorts of ties between Iran and Azerbaijan.

Russian Parliamentarians Visit Protesting Pressmen

NC2302090795 Yerevan SNARK in English 1254 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, February 22 (SNARK)—Today currently visiting Yerevan deputies of Russian Parliament Vitaliy Zhuravlev (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia), Pavel Burdukov (Agrarian party) and Michael Gnezdilov (deputy group "New Religious Policy") met with participants of the sit down demonstration at the residence of Armenian President.

Having listened heads of suppressed mass media offices about the events following the presidential decree of Armenia on stopping activity of "Dashnaktsutyun" party, Russian parliamentarians said, the aim of their visit is to learn opinion of all political forces. "People should become an arbitrator between authorities and opposition, that's why everything possible must be done to guarantee free just elections," Zhuravlev said.

On behalf of the closed editorial offices, editor-in-chief of "MUNETIK" newspaper Mher Davoyan asked to let the Russian Parliament know that "A process of strangulation of the freedom of opinion and opposition is going on in Armenia." The witness of it is economic pressure on mass media, beating of reporters, closing not only oppositional, but also of a number of independent editorial offices.

Black Sea Bank for Trade, Development Established

NC2202221595 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1327 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 22/02/95 NOYAN TAPAN—On February 13-14 a session of a temporary committee of the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development was held in Thessaloniki (Greece). The agreement on establishment of such an organization was signed by representatives of countries-members of Black Sea Economic Cooperation on December 14, in Athens. It was the first session of the committee, temporarily replacing the Bank's Board of Directors. Board of Directors will be set up only after all countries ratify the agreement. The session was attended by all countries-members of BSEC. Republic of Armenia was represented at the session by the Foreign Ministry's official Edgar Grigoryan.

In an interview Grigoryan reported that the session discussed a range of issues, concerning the Bank's Head-Office, which is located in Thessaloniki, elaboration of plan, which would outline Bank's structure and activities. During the session main directions of Bank's activities were worked out. All countries expressed unanimous opinion that the main goal of the Bank is the stimulation of development of economic cooperation in the Black Sea region. Greece was charged to held negotiations with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other financial establishments on provision of technical assistance and elaboration of Bank's business plan, which is to be submitted to temporarily committee for consideration.

During the session participants were presented a draft agreement, regulating relations between the BSEC's Bank and Greek side. "The agreement is likely to be signed until the start of the second session. The second session will probably take place in early April. It will discuss and if necessary make suggestions or recommendations to it", Grigoryan said.

At present the Bank is completely equipped and after resolution of a number of procedural issues it will start operating.

Industrial Production Realization Increased

NC2202222095 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1501 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 22/02/95 NOYAN TAPAN—In 1994 the gross output of industrial production in Armenia has increased as compared with 1993 data by 6 percent, while the amount of realized goods increased by

20 percent. This was reported by Armenian Minister of Industry Ashot Safaryan at the session of the Ministry Board held on February 21. In 1994 the distribution of the produced goods by the spheres was as follows: gold and diamonds - 35 percent, chemistry and biological technology - 12 percent, mining metallurgy - 12 percent, radio-electronics - 13 percent, machine engineering - 9 percent, electrical engineering - 18 percent, timber industry - 1 percent.

The gross output constituted in 1994 147 million dollars. The market of hard currencies has considerably widened and totals 30 percent, the ruble market - 40 percent, clearing - 18 percent, domestic market - 12 percent.

In 1994 20 percent partial free privatization of enterprises was conducted, new scientific and technical centers and market structures were formed ("Dvin" concern, "Armexpo", "Hrazdanmash" business center, Fund for development of Armenia's industry, "Armmetallurgimpex" and others).

Azerbaijan

Leadership Said To Disapprove Document on Elchibey

NC2202223295 Baku TURAN in English 1101 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 22) TURAN—On February 21 the Deputy Commission, which had visited Keleki, was invited by President Aliyev to discuss the document that Deputies prepared on the results of their visit, the member of the Milli Mejlis, Hijran Kerimli, told Turan's correspondent. He said that the speaker of the Parliament, Rasul Guliyev, and the Minister of Interior, Ramil Usubov, also participated at the meeting. When the Deputies informed President Aliyev about the draft of the resolution of the Commission, Azeri President as well as the speaker severely criticized the draft.

President Aliyev was dissatisfied with the work of the Deputies and he said that there is no necessity to discuss it in the Parliament, Kerimli says. The Deputy also says that the Chief of the republican TV is instructed to prepare "objective" report about the events in Keleki and show it to the population. Kerimli considers that in the near future the authorities will wage the campaign against Abulfaz Elchibey and will cast slurs upon him in the mass media. "The leadership of the republic realizes that Elchibey is a real political power and his physical elimination can cause dissatisfaction, that is why the authorities decided to remove Elchibey from the political scene", Kerimli says.

The Chairman of the Deputy Commission, Kamran Rahimov, told Turan's correspondent that during their visit to Keleki Elchibey promised to apply to the Milli Mejlis with the request to provide him with the guard. "However, Elchibey did not do that and we cannot discuss this issue in the Milli Mejlis without appropriate application", Kamran Rahimov says.

The Chairman of the Commission added that there will be no report of the Deputies about their visit to Keleki, though the commission was created by the resolution of the Parliament. Questioned how he assesses the fact that the Deputies presented their report to the President but not to the Parliament, Rahimov says "President is the head of the state, he called us and we presented him our report. There is nothing criminal in that".

Judging by all, the hopes of the publicity that the authorities and the opposition will find agreement and stop confrontation, were not realized.

Opponents of Regime Reportedly Arrested

NC2202222395 Baku TURAN in English 1105 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 22) TURAN—The organ of the Ministry of Interior, the newspaper "Mubariz Keshikde" [fighter on guard] reports that the citizen of the Lachin region, Mustafa Ahmedov, born in 1962, is arrested in the regional centre of Naftalan district. The same source says that Ahmedov was arrested "for propaganda against the authorities of the republic".

The press-centre of Musavat party reports that over the past two weeks several opposition supporters have been detained in Ganja city. The same source reports that "the arrests were unwarranted. The members of the PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan], Sahid Gasanov, Rasim Mursalov and Rashid Mamedov, were arrested. They court sentenced them for 15 days of imprisonment for non-subordination to the police".

As was earlier reported, on February 18 the leader of Sumgait's branch of the Labour party, Vagif Balayev, was arrested and his apartment was searched. The Ministry of National Security acknowledged that he was accused of "anti-governmental activity". The source did not specify the details about his activity.

Guluzade Makes Statement on Karabakh

NC2202223895 Baku TURAN in English 1101 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 22) TURAN—"Until now the Armenian party neither raised the issue concerning the status of Nagorno Karabakh on the talks nor forwarded any proposals on this problem", the State Advisor for Foreign Affaires, Vafa Guluzade, told Turan's correspondent.

Vafa Guluzade says that the issues, which are discussed at the talks are of protocol character. "The Armenians do not discuss the issues concerning Shusha and Lachin. Nor they touch upon the status of Nagorno-Karabakh".

He thinks that it is the handiwork of the third party, which actually guides the activities of Armenians, Guluzade considers.

That is the reason for the failure of the last meeting of the Minsk Group in Moscow. Due to this fact, Guluzade notified the OSCE Chairman in written form about his dissatisfaction with the preparation of Moscow's meeting. "The day before yesterday the co-Chairman of the Minsk Conference, Jan Eliasson, called me and said that my letter it taken into consideration", Guluzade says. Elliasson assured that the next meeting of the Minsk Group will touch upon the principal issues concerning the conflict settlement. "The Minsk Group will try to achieve discussion of the concrete settlement issues and adoption of the concrete resolution", the State Advisor mentioned.

Georgia

Parliament Bans Export of Processed Metals

LD2202171695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1238 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Georgian parliament has banned export of processed non-ferrous and ferrous metals from the republic and has categorized them as strategic raw materials. Deputies adopted this resolution Tuesday [22 February] evening.

All licences for processed metal export issued by the Cabinet of Ministers are annulled with the exception of licences issued by Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze on presentation of the prime minister.

In the course of discussing this document many deputies expressed doubt that the resolution will be enforced, given that mafia structures which "will not turn away from a profitable business" control export of such resources.

Parliamentarians presented data which shows that more than 30,000 tonnes of processed metals were exported from Georgia over the last year, primarily to Turkey. Several deputies assert that about 200,000 tonnes of metal ready for export have been accumulated in Adzharia and western Georgia.

Meanwhile, Interfax learned at a press conference in the press center of Georgia's Interior Ministry Wednesday that on Monday the police prevented the attempted export of 20 train-cars-full of 36 dismantled T-54 tanks to Turkey. The tanks belonged to the training tank company stationed in the city of Gori. An investigation on this case is underway.

'Algeti Wolves' Claim Responsibility for Terrorism

LD2202173895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1718 GMT 22 Feb 95

[By GIA Correspondent for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi February 22 TASS—The terrorist organization Algetis Mglebi (Algeti Wolves), operating in Georgia, claimed responsibility for the terrorist acts against Russian troops in Tbilisi in late January. Two bombs were planted, the first exploding outside the headquarters of Russian troops in the Transcaucasia, and the second—at the check-point of a Russian border unit "Gruzia". The second explosion injured a Russian border guard.

"Such blasts will continue until Russia halts the war in Chechnya", the terrorist organization said on Wednesday [22 February] in a letter to the Tbilisi-based newspaper REZONANSI.

Estonia

Transition Period for Associate EU Membership Waived

LD2202183895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonia is to become an associate member of the European Union [EU] without a transition period. Estonia obtained this right at association talks with the European Union, which ended in Brussels today. Estonia is the first state in Central and Eastern Europe with which the European Union wishes to conclude an association agreement without a transition period. The agreement will come into force after it is ratified by the parliaments of Estonia and the European Union.

Earlier, Estonia had been the only state in the former Eastern bloc that had concluded a free trade agreement with the European Union without a transition period. Priit Kolbre, the leader of the Estonian delegation at the talks with the European Union, a deputy chancellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Baltic News Service that, compared to other Central and Eastern European states, Estonia had made an economic leap that fully justified not having a transition period.

Clyde Kull, the Estonian ambassador to Brussels, noted that with this agreement, the European Union admitted that the market economy has begun to work in Estonia. The ambassador said that this was a very strong acknowledgement of the reform process in Estonia.

Kull said that, among other issues, the agreement regulates the movement of labor between Estonia and the EU countries, the right of businesses to set up subsidiaries in the EU states, and the movement of services. All this would take effect immediately after the agreement is signed and not after a certain period as was the case with other Central European states.

Among the Central and Eastern European states, only Latvia, Lithuania, and the republics of the former Yugoslavia have not yet concluded an association agreement with the European Union. Latvia and Lithuania are to continue talks with the European Union next week.

Russia Fails To Provide Maps Showing New Borders

WS2202160195 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Feb 22, BNS—Russia has not handed over to Estonia any maps of border areas with Estonia, a Land Registry Department official in Tallinn said Wednesday. But the official added that Estonia would welcome such a step by Moscow.

Lembit Tamme, departmental head at the Estonian Land Registry Department, was commenting on a recent report that Russia is going to give to the Baltic country the maps and tables concerning unilateral demarcation by Russia of the disputed borderline between the two countries.

Nikolai Zhdanov, head of the Russian Federal Geodesy and Cartography Service, in an interview with INTERFAX news agency said Russia finished demarcation of the border between the two countries in December and that the border is being controlled by Russian border guards.

Tamme in his remarks to BNS Wednesday said that Estonia has held talks with Russia to obtain copies of the maps drawn up by Russia. He added that the talks were stalled because the Russians were asking too high a price. "It would be easier (for Estonia) to draw up its own maps," Tamme said.

He also said Russia has failed to return the maps taken from Estonia after the country's occupation by the Soviet Union in 1940.

The Estonian border guard chief-of-staff, Aare Evisalu, told BNS his department had had no contacts with the counterpart authority in Russia over the border demarcation maps.

Tupp Visits Peacekeeping Forces in Croatia

LD2202161795 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0700 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian Defense Minister Enn Tupp continues his visit to Croatia. Today, he is to meet Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN secretary general in the former Yugoslavia. Yesterday Enn Tupp visited infantry groups of Estonian and Lithuanian peacekeeping companies.

After meeting the Estonian peacekeepers, Enn Tupp said that their participation in the international peacekeeping mission and the visit of the Estonian delegation to the crisis area was a very important step from the point of view of developing our security and from the position of Europe's interests. Tupp is convinced that, in the context of Estonia's internal politics, it helps to understand better, justify, and increase the expenditure on peacekeeping. It also gives better guarantees for Estonia joining European security systems.

Latvia

Minister Details Country's Foreign Debt

WS2302092995 Tallinn BNS in English 1600 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Feb 22, BNS—Latvia's foreign debt constituted nearly 192 million lats on Feb. 1, 1995, Foreign Resources State Minister Indra Samite said Wednesday at a press conference. As reported, Latvia's foreign debt was 188.53 million lats on Jan. 1.

Samite said that the state has not taken up new obligations in January, but the foreign debt has increased, because Latvia received financial resources in compliance with the already signed agreements.

Samite said that the exact sum of Latvia's foreign debt cannot be determined precisely, as the agreements have been signed for different currencies and the total sum of Latvia's foreign debt changes along with the fluctuations of the rates of these currencies.

Latvia's foreign debt is expected to reach 273.93 million lats on Jan. 1, 1996.

The International Monetary Fund advises that, by the year 2000, the foreign debt should not exceed 14 percent of the GDP. Latvia's foreign debt equalled 9.6 percent of the GDP in 1994.

Experts say that Latvia's foreign debt will constitute 11.5 percent of the GDP in 1995.

In 1992, Latvia's foreign debt was 37.12 million lats, but in 1993—already 133.23 million lats.

If no new credit agreements are signed, Latvia's foreign debt will be 273.93 million lats in 1995, as much as 257.09 million lats in 1996, and in 1997—240.98 million lats. In 2000, the foreign debt is expected to equal 152.21 million lats.

Russia Sets Conditions for Continuing Gas Supplies

WS2202130795 Tallinn BNS in English 1400 GMT 21 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Feb 21, BNS—Russia will continue natural gas supplies to Latvia on the condition that the Baltic country start to pay off its debts by March 1.

The agreement was reached by management of the Latvian statestock gas company and the Russian Gazprom consortium last week. As reported, Russia decided to halt deliveries of crude oil to Latvia Dec. 2, 1994 because of payment problems. Since that time, gas has been the only heating fuel available in Latvia.

Latvijas Gaze (Latvia's Gas) President Adrians Davis, declined to state the sum to be paid by March 1 and the deadline for payment in full of its outstanding account. Latvijas Gaze is unable to pay for gas that it is receiving from Russia and has a debtload of 27 million dollars, said Davis.

Latvijas Gaze, in its turn, is facing problems with delinquent consumer account payments. Its largest gas debtors are the Latvenergo energy enterprise (14 million lats) and Riga's city council (14.2 million lats).

Davis plans to meet with management from the two groups to advise them that payments are urgent. Davis has also warned consumers that the supply of gas could be reduced as of Feb. 25 should account payments not be received.

When asked if Latvijas Gaze would take a loan to settle its account with Gazprom, Davis said that loans have been taken for the last three years and the debt from that totalled 42 million lats.

"Latvijas Gaze cannot credit its debtors any longer," Davis said.

Davis confirmed information that Latvijas Gaze does not have the funding to manage the Incukalns gas depot and is looking for Russian project bids on creating a service enterprise.

Three Transportation Agreements Signed in Moscow

WS2302115495 Tallinn BNS in English 1000 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Feb 23, BNS—Latvian Communication Minister Andris Gutmanis and Russian Transportation Minister Vitaliy Yefimov signed Wednesday in Moscow three interstate agreements on transportation.

The agreements focus on principles for cooperation and mutual relations in the sphere of transportation; international motorcar communications [as received]; and trade shipping.

The documents were initialed in November 1993.

The signing of an agreement on air communication was postponed at a request by Russian officials.

During the meeting, the Latvian delegation confirmed their country's readiness to consider the building of a side-branch of the Via Baltica roadlink to Kaliningrad.

The group also agreed that visa requirements for professional drivers in international traffic should be streamlined.

Ukrainian Delegation Lays Groundwork for Kuchma Visit

LD2102190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1529 GMT 21 Feb 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, Feb 21 (Interfax-Ukraine)—An official Ukrainian delegation, led by Chief of the president's Staff Dmitriy Tabachnik, arrived in Riga on February 21.

Among the main goals of the forthcoming talks with Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs is the date of President Kuchma's visit to Latvia. The visit is likely to take place in April 1995.

Tabachnik said that the drafting of the bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation was nearing completion. "I hope by the beginning of the visit the treaty will be ready for signing," he said.

On February 20, Tabachnik met with Estonian President Lennart Meri in Tallinn. The talks dealt, among other things, with the coordination of the two countries' actions in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], including the granting of the OSCE mandate for peacekeeping operations.

Thanks to cooperation between Ukraine and Estonia, a new hotbed of tensions has not appeared in Europe, said Tabachnik.

Refugee Issues Discussed With Swedish Official

LD2202204495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Leif Blomberg, Swedish deputy minister of labor in charge of immigration and labor law is currently visiting Latvia to discuss problems related to immigration, the improvement of border security in Latvia, and setting up refugee camps. The guest told a news conference today that in the future Latvia would take refugees who had arrived in Sweden using Latvia as a transit country back, if Sweden took a decision to expel them. [sentence as received] (?Such) an agreement was reached at a meeting between Blomberg and representatives of the Latvian Government and the immigration service, where problems concerning refugees were discussed. However, no interstate agreement that would lay down such a procedure is planned to be signed at the moment. The Swedish immigration minister will be deciding on the issue of sending immigrants back. Not one of those refugees who have already arrived in Sweden will be sent back to Latvia.

Blomberg stressed that Latvia [words indistinct] the wish to join the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. In his opinion that is one of the necessary conditions for Latvia to be able to become a member of the European Union. We recall, though, that for the time being the government has decided not to join this convention because legislation has not yet been arranged well enough in Latvia.

Baltic Information Agency's Work in Moscow Scored

WS2202130695 Tallinn BNS in English 1814 GMT 21 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Feb 21, BNS—The Baltic Assembly Presidium (BAP) plans to either reorganize or eliminate its Moscow Baltic Information Agency, Baltic Assembly President Maris Budovskis told BNS on Tuesday.

After reviewing the agency's work in Moscow, the Assembly came to the conclusion that the agency had not done its job, i.e., to represent the positions of the Baltic states in major economic and political issues.

Budovskis said that the Moscow office is currently commenting and advising only on events related to its further development.

Budovskis thinks that the situation has changed since the agency was founded and that there is a clear lack of information in Russia on events in the Baltics.

The decision to reorganize or eliminate the Baltic Information Agency will be taken by the governments of the three Baltic states.

Lithuania

State Expects To Be Treated as Potential NATO Member

LD2202212295 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO Secretary General Willy Claes received Dalius Cekuolis, the Lithuanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Kingdom of Belgium and for contacts with NATO, at the NATO headquarters in Brussels today.

Ambassador Cekuolis noted during their meeting that Lithuania, maintaining good relations with the neighboring states and taking an active part in the Partnership for Peace Program, expected to be treated as one of the potential candidates for NATO membership.

Willy Claes sincerely recognized Lithuania's active participation in the Partnership for Peace Program that creates conditions but not guarantees for an automatic NATO membership. The NATO secretary general said that currently NATO was discussing how the expansion of NATO will carried out. He noted that NATO was neither formally nor informally discussing who and when will be admitted to NATO. The reply to these questions was a matter for the future, said Willy Claes.

Ambassador Dalius Cekuolis delivered to Willy Claes a letter from Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys, inviting him on behalf of the Lithuanian president and government to pay an official visit to Lithuania.

Program To Block Entry of Radioactive Material Launched

LD2202195995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1739 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Feb 22 (Interfax)—Lithuania has launched a program to prevent importation of radioactive substances into the country and their transit through it, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said on Wednesday.

Special facilities installed at several border checkpoints have already made it possible to cut short several attempts to bring radioactive material into Lithuania, Slezevicius said in a radio program. Ultimately all checkpoints will be fitted with such equipment, he said.

Another serious problem is storing nuclear fuel waste from the country's Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, the premier said. Shortly an international tender will be called for storage containers, he said.

Lithuania already put in such a tender in 1993, which was won by the German company GNB. But the 10 containers which the firm contracted to supply and which will not arrive before the end of 1995 will only keep one year's waste.

Privatization of Ignalina Plant Set for 2000

LD2202230995 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Ignalina nuclear power station is not to be privatized until the year 2000. Such a decision was taken by the Lithuanian Seimas on Wednesday.

In view of the Seimas members, the Lithuanian nuclear power station is an exceptionally important energy object and therefore it will not be privatized just yet. The nuclear power station has been entered in the list of other state enterprises that will be neither auctioned nor privatized until the next century. [passage omitted]

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